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Abstract
This paper proposes a modal typing system that enables us to handle self-referential formulae, including ones
with negative self-references, which on one hand, would introduce a logical contradiction, namely Russell’s
paradox, in the conventional setting, while on the other hand, are necessary to capture a certain class
of programs such as fixed-point combinators and objects with so-called binary methods in object-oriented
programming. The proposed system provides a basis for axiomatic semantics of such a wider range of
programs and a new framework for natural construction of recursive programs in the proofs-as-programs
paradigm.
Keywords: typed lambda calculi, self-reference, proofs-as-programs, modal logic, fixed-point combinators,
object oriented programming, termination verification.
1. Introduction
Although recursion, or self-reference, plays an indispensable role in both programs and their specifi-
cations, it also introduces serious difficulties into their formal treatment. It is still far from obvious how
to capture it in an axiomatic semantics such as the formulae-as-types notion of construction [17]. Only
a rather restricted class of recursive programs (and specifications) has been captured in this direction as
(co)inductive proofs over the (co)inductive data structures (see e.g., [8, 14, 23, 18, 28]), and, for example,
negative self-references, which would be necessary to handle a certain range of programs such as fixed-point
combinators and objects with so-called binary methods in object-oriented programming, still remain out of
the scope. In this paper, a modal logic that provides a basis for capturing such a wider range of programs
in the proofs-as-programs paradigm is proposed. The logic is presented as a modal typing system with
recursive types for the purpose of presentation. Its soundness with respect to a realizability interpretation,
which implies the convergence of well-typed programs, is shown.
Difficulty in binary-methods
Consider, for example, the specification Nat(n) of objects that represent a natural number n with a
method which returns an object of Nat(n+m) when one of Nat(m) is given. It could be represented by a
self-referential specification such as
Nat(n) ≡ ((n = 0) + (n > 0 ∧Nat(n−1))× (∀m.Nat(m)→Nat(n+m))),
where we assume that n and m range over the set of natural numbers; +, × and→ are type constructors for
direct sums, direct products and function spaces, respectively; ∧ and ∀ have standard logical (annotative)
meanings. Although it is not obvious whether this self-referential specification is meaningful in a certain
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mathematical sense, it could be a first approximation of the specification we want since this can be regarded
as a refined version of recursive types which have been widely adopted as a basis for object-oriented type
systems [1, 5]. At any rate, if we define an object 0 as
0 ≡ 〈 i1 ∗, λx. x 〉,
then it would satisfy Nat(0), where i1 is the injection into the first summand of direct sums and ∗ is a
constant. We assume that any program satisfies annotative formulae such as n = 0 whenever they are true.
We can easily define a function that satisfies ∀n. ∀m.Nat(n)→Nat(m)→Nat(n+m) as
add x y ≡ p2 x y,
or
add′ x y ≡ p2 y x,
where p2 extracts the second components, i.e., the method of addition in this particular case, from pairs.
We could also define the successor function as a recursive program as
s x ≡ 〈 i2 x, λy. add x (s y) 〉
or
s′ x ≡ 〈 i2 x, λy. add
′ x (s′ y) 〉.
In spite of the apparent symmetry between add and add′, which are both supposed to satisfy the same
specification, the computational behaviors of s and s′ are completely different. We can observe that s works
as expected, but s′ does not.
For example, p2 (s 0) 0 would be evaluated as
p2 (s 0) 0 → (λy. add 0 (s y)) 0
→ add 0 (s 0)
→ p2 0 (s 0)
→ (λx. x) (s 0)
→ s 0,
whereas
p2 (s
′ 0) 0 → (λy. add′ 0 (s′ y)) 0
→ add′ 0 (s′ 0)
→ p2 (s
′ 0) 0
→ . . . ,
and more generally, for any objects x and y of Nat(n) (for some n),
p2 (s
′ x) y → . . .→ p2 (s
′ y) x→ . . .→ p2 (s
′ x) y → . . . .
This sort of divergence would also be quite common in (careless) recursive definitions of programs even
if we did not have to handle object-oriented specifications like Nat(n). The peculiarity here is the fact that
the divergence is caused by a program, add′, which is supposed to satisfy the same specification as add.
This example shows such a loss of the compositionality of programs with respect to the specifications that
imply their termination, or convergence. It also suggests that, to overcome this difficulty, add and add′
should have different specifications, and accordingly the definition of Nat(n) should be revised in some way
in order to force it.
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λµ and its logical inconsistency
The typing system λµ (cf. [3]) is a simply-typed lambda calculus with recursive types, where any form
of self-references, including negative ones, is permitted. A non-trivial model for such unrestricted recursive
types was developed by MacQueen, Plotkin and Sethi [20], and has been widely adopted as a theoretical
basis for object-oriented type systems [1, 5].
On the other hand, it is well known that logical formulae with such unrestricted self-references would
introduce a contradiction (variant of Russell’s paradox). Therefore, logical systems must have certain re-
strictions on the forms of self-references (if ever allowed) in order to keep themselves sound; for example,
µ-calculus[24, 19] does not allow negative self-references (see also [13]).
Through the formulae-as-types notion, this paradox corresponds to the fact that every type of λµ
is inhabited by a diverging program which does not produce any information; for example, the λ-term
(λx. xx)(λx. xx) can be typed with every type in λµ. Therefore, even with the model mentioned above,
types can be regarded only as partial specifications of programs, and that is considered the reason why
we lost the compositionality of programs in the Nat(n) case, where we regarded convergence of programs
as a part of their specifications. This shows a contrast with the success of λµ as a basis for type systems
of object-oriented program languages, where the primary purpose of types, i.e., coarse specifications, is to
prevent run-time type errors, and termination of programs is out of the scope.
The logical inconsistency of λµ also implies that no matter how much types, or specifications, are refined,
convergence of programs cannot be expressed by them, and must be handled by endowing the typing system
with some facilities for discussing computational properties of programs. For example, Constable et al.
adopted this approach in their pioneering works to incorporate recursive definitions and partial objects into
constructive type theory [9, 10]. However, in this paper, we will pursue another approach such that types
themselves can express convergence of programs.
Towards the approximation modality
Suppose that we have a recursive program f defined by
f ≡ F (f),
and want to show that f satisfies a certain specification S. Since the denotational meaning of f is given
as the least fixed point of F , i.e., f = supn<ω F
n(⊥), a possible way to do that would be to apply Scott’s
fixed-point induction[26] by showing the following:
– ⊥ satisfies S,
– F (x) satisfies S provided that x satisfies S, and
– S is chain closed.
However, this does not suffice for our purpose if S includes some requirement about the convergence of f ,
because obviously ⊥, or even Fn(⊥), could not satisfy the requirement. So we need more refined approach.
The failure of the naive fixed-point induction above suggests that the specification to be satisfied by each
Fn(⊥) inherently depends on n, and the requirement concerning its convergence must become stronger
when n increases. This leads us to a layered version of the fixed-point induction scheme as follows: in order
to show that f satisfies S, it suffices to find an infinite sequence S0, S1, S2, . . . of properties, or (virtual)
specifications, such that
(i) S =
⋂
n<ω Sn,
(ii) Sn+1 ⊆ Sn,
(iii) ⊥ satisfies S0,
(iv) F (x) satisfies Sn+1 provided that x satisfies Sn, and
(v) Sn is chain closed.
3
For, since Fn(⊥) ∈ Sn for every n by (iii) and (iv), we get F k(⊥) ∈ Sn for every k ≥ n by (ii). This and
(v) imply f ∈ Sn for every n, and consequently f ∈ S by (i).
In this scheme, the sequence S0, S1, S2, . . . can be regarded as a successive approximation of S, and
F a (higher-order) program which constructs a program that satisfies Sn+1 from one that satisfies Sn. It
should be also noted that F works independently of n. This uniformity of F over n leads us to consider
a formalization of this scheme in a modal logic, where the set of possible worlds (in the sense of Kripke
semantics) consists of all non-negative integers, and Sn in the induction scheme above corresponds to the
interpretation of S in the world n. We now write x rk S to denote the fact that x satisfies the interpretation
of S in the world k, and define a modality, say •, as
x rk •S iff k = 0 or x rk−1 S.
Condition (ii) of the induction scheme says that x rk S implies x rl S for every l ≤ k; in other words, the
interpretation of specifications should be hereditary with respect to the accessibility relation >. In such a
modal framework, the specification to be satisfied by F can be represented by •S → S provided that the
→-connective is interpreted in the standard way in each world, and our induction scheme can be rewritten
as
if ⊥ r0 S and F rk •S→ S for every k > 0, then f rk S for every k.
Furthermore, if we assume that S0 is a trivial specification which is satisfiable by any program, then, shifting
the possible worlds downwards by one, we can simplify this to
if F rk •S→ S for every k, then f rk S for every k. (∗)
Although this assumption about S0 somewhat restricts our choice of the sequence S0, S1, S2, . . ., it could
be thought rather reasonable because S0 must be an almost trivial specification that is even satisfiable by
⊥. Note that Sn+1 occurring in the induction now corresponds to the interpretation of S in the world n,
and S0 corresponds to the interpretation of •S in the world 0.
We so far considered the set of non-negative integers and the greater-than relation as the set of possible
worlds and the accessibility relation, respectively. This setting can be easily generalized to any frame with a
(conversely) well-founded accessibility relation. The standard interpretation of→ implies some fundamental
properties concerning the •-modality over such frames, which introduce a subsumption, or subtyping, relation
over specifications into our modal framework. First, the hereditary interpretation of specifications implies
the following property.
x rk S implies x rk •S
Second, if we adopt the simple semantics of types, i.e., x rk S →⊤ for every x, S and k, where ⊤ is the
universe of (meanings of) programs, which is satisfiable by any program, then
x rk •(S→ T ) implies x rk •S→•T.
Note that this is not always the case because we could consider non-extensional interpretations, e.g., F-
semantics[15], in which λx.⊥ rk S→⊤ holds, but ⊥ rk S→⊤ does not.
Furthermore, if the accessibility relation is linear, i.e., not branching, such as the case of the greater-than
relation between non-negative integers, there holds the following converse property.
x rk •S→ •T implies x rk •(S→ T )
In such cases, the meaning of •S→ •T and •(S→ T ) are equivalent.
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Specification-level self-references
This modal framework introduced for program-level self-references also provides a basis for specification-
level self-references. Suppose that we have a self-referential specification such as
S = φ(S).
As we saw in the Nat(n) case, negative reference to S in φ can introduce a contradiction in the conventional
setting, and this is still true in our modal framework. However, in the world n, we can now refer to the
interpretation of S in any world k < n without worrying about the contradiction. That is, as long as S
occurs only in scopes of the modal operator • in φ, the interpretation of S is well-defined and given as a
fixed point of φ, which is actually shown to be unique. For example, if S is defined as S = •S→ T , then S
could be interpreted in each world as follows.
S0 = ⊤→ T0
S1 = S0 ∩ ((⊤→ T0)→ T1)
S2 = S1 ∩ ((S0 ∩ ((⊤→ T0)→ T1))→ T2)
...
Sn+1 = Sn ∩ (Sn→ Tn+1)
...
where Sk and Tk are the interpretations of S and T in the world k, respectively, and the notations such as ⊤
and → are abused to denote their expected interpretations as well. This kind of self-references provides us
a method to define the sequence S0, S1, S2, . . . for the refined induction scheme when we derive properties
of recursive programs, and the induction scheme would be useless if we did not have such a method.
In the following sections, we will see that this form of specification-level self-references is quite powerful,
and captures a wide range of specifications including those which are not representable in the conventional
setting such as ones for add and add′ in the Nat(n) case. Furthermore, the modal version (∗) of the
induction scheme turns out to be derivable from other properties of the •-modality and such self-referential
specifications, where the derivation corresponds to fixed-point combinators, such as Curry’s Y. This also
gives us a way to construct recursive programs based on the proofs-as-programs notion.
The plan of the paper
The plan of the present paper is as follows. In the next section, the syntax of our type expressions,
which can be considered as coarse specifications of programs, is given. The modal semantics of such type
expressions is given in the manner of realizability in Section 3, in which we interpret types over Kripke
frames with a (conversely) well-founded accessibility relation. We discuss formal derivability of equality
and subsumption of types in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, and show their soundness with respect to the
semantics. In Section 6, we introduce a typed λ-calculus λA equipped with the modality and recursive
types, and show its soundness and subject reduction property in Section 7. Then, in Section 8, we show
convergence of well-typed λ-terms according to the forms of their type. In Section 9, we present some
examples of program derivation by extending the pure typing system, where the Nat(n)-example presented
in this section will be revisited. In Section 10, we consider λA as a modal logic by ignoring left hand sides of
“:” from typing, and show an interesting relationship to an intuitionistic version of the logic of provability.
2. Type expressions
We start with the syntax of type expressions. As a preparation for it, we first give one of pseudo type
expressions PTExp, which are obtained by adding a unary type constructor • to those of λµ, namely the
simply typed λ-calculus extended with recursive types (cf. [3, 7]). Let TVar be a countably infinite set of
type variable symbols X , Y , Z, . . . .
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Definition 2.1 (Pseudo type expressions). The syntax of PTExp is defined by
PTExp ::= TVar (type variables)
| PTExp→PTExp (function types)
| •PTExp (approximative types)
| µTVar.PTExp (recursive types).
We assume that→ associates to the right as usual, and each (pseudo) type constructor associates according
to the following priority.
(Low) µX. < → < • (High)
For example, •µX.•X→ Y →Z is the same as •(µX.((•X)→ (Y → Z))). We use ⊤ as an abbreviation for
µX.•X and use •nA to denote a (pseudo) type expression • . . . •︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
A, where n ≥ 0. In the sequel, we use A, B,
C, D, . . . to denote (pseudo) type expressions, and denote the set of type variables occurring freely in A by
FTV (A) regarding a type variable X as bound in µX.A. We regard α-convertible (pseudo) type expressions
as identical. We write A[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn] to denote the (pseudo) type expression obtained from A by
substituting B1, . . . , Bn for each free occurrence of X1, . . . , Xn, respectively, with necessary α-conversion to
avoid accidental capture of free type variables. We assume that [B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn] associates with the
preceding type expression with a higher priority than the modal operator •.
As mentioned in Section 1, the modal type operator • causes a shift of possible worlds, and makes a
reference to the one-step coarser world, in which type expressions are interpreted as coarser specifications,
i.e., larger sets of values or programs, than the ones in the present world. The (pseudo) type expression ⊤
corresponds to the universe into which λ-terms are interpreted. Hence, every λ-term should have this type
in λA. We adopt a so called simple semantics of types (cf. [15, 16]), by which the meaning of A→⊤ is
identical to the one of ⊤. Thus, some syntactically different type expressions may have the same meaning
as the one of ⊤. We call such (pseudo) type expressions⊤-variants, which can be syntactically distinguished
from others as follows.
Definition 2.2 (⊤-variants). A (pseudo) type expression A is a ⊤-variant if and only if At = •m0µX1.
•m1µX2.•m2 . . . µXn.•mnXi for some n, m0, m1, m2, . . ., mn, X1, X2, . . ., Xn and i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Xi /∈ { Xi+1, Xi+2, . . . , Xn } and mi +mi+1 +mi+2 + . . .+mn ≥ 1, where At is defined as follows.
Xt = X, (A→ B)t = Bt, (•A)t = •At, (µX.A)t = µX.At.
Note that At always has the form of •m0µX1.•m1µX2.•m2 . . . µXn.•mnY for some n, m0, m1, m2, . . ., mn,
X1, X2, . . ., Xn and Y , and it is decidable whether a pseudo type expression is a⊤-variant or not. It will be
shown that⊤-variants are semantically identical to ⊤. We can also easily see that the following propositions
hold.
Proposition 2.3. 1. X is not a ⊤-variant.
2. •A is a ⊤-variant if and only if so is A.
3. A→ B is a ⊤-variant if and only if so is B.
4. A is a ⊤-variant if and only if so is At.
5. A is a ⊤-variant if and only if so is A[Y/X ].
Proof. Obvious from Definition 2.2. 
Unrestricted use of self-reference in type expressions causes logical contradictions, i.e., divergence of
well-typed programs. So our typing system only allows self-references in coarser worlds, i.e., in scopes of the
modal operator •, or at positions where the references do not affect the meaning of the whole type expression.
We say that such references are proper. The latter case is included so that the equivalence relations between
type expressions (cf. Definitions 4.1 and 4.2) preserve properness. For example, the reference to X in X→⊤
is proper since X →⊤ is semantically identical to ⊤.
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Definition 2.4 (Properness). A (pseudo) type expression A is proper in X if and only if X freely occurs
only (a) in scopes of the •-operator in A, or (b) in a⊤-variant occurring in A. In other words,
1. A type variable Y is proper in X if and only if Y /= X .
2. •A is proper in X .
3. A→B is proper in X if and only if (a) so are both A and B, or (b) B is a⊤-variant.
4. Suppose that X /= Y . Then, µY.A is proper in X if and only if (a) so is A or (b) µY.A is a⊤-variant.
For example, •X , •(X→Y ), µY.•(X→Y ), X→⊤ and µY.X→•Y are proper in X , and neither X , X→Y
nor µY.µZ.X→ Y is proper in X . Obviously, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.5. If A is a ⊤-variant, then A is proper in every X.
We can now define the syntax of type expressions of λA. A type expression of λA is a pseudo type
expression such that A is proper in X for any of its subexpressions in the form of µX.A. We denote the set
of well-formed type expressions by TExp, which, more precisely, can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.6 (Type expressions). We define the set TExp of type expressions to be the smallest set
of pseudo type expressions that satisfy
1. X ∈ TExp for every type variable X .
2. If A ∈ TExp and B ∈ TExp, then A→ B ∈ TExp.
3. If A ∈ TExp, then •A ∈ TExp.
4. If A ∈ TExp and A is proper in X , then µX.A ∈ TExp.
For example, X , X → Y , (µX.•X → Y )→ Z, µX.X →⊤ and µX.•µY.X → Z are type expressions, and
neither µX.X → Y nor µX.µY.X → Y is a type expression.
When we consider free type variables occurring in a type expression, we can ignore those occurring in
⊤-variants, because they do not affect the meaning of the type expression. We define two sets of type
variables that effectively occur in a type expression. One consists of those that occur at positive positions,
and the other at negative positions.
Definition 2.7. Let A be a (pseudo) type expression. We define two sets ETV +(A) and ETV−(A) of type
variables as follows.
ETV ±(A) = {} (A is a⊤-variant)
ETV +(X) = {X }
ETV −(X) = {}
ETV±(•A) = ETV±(A) ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
ETV ±(A→B) = ETV∓(A) ∪ ETV±(B) (A→ B is not a⊤-variant)
ETV ±(µX.A) =


(ETV ±(A) ∪ ETV ∓(A)) − {X }
(
µX.A is not a⊤-variant
and X ∈ ETV −(A)
)
ETV ±(A)− {X }
(
µX.A is not a⊤-variant
and X /∈ ETV −(A)
)
We also define ETV (A) as ETV (A) = ETV +(A) ∪ ETV −(A).
For example, ETV +(µX. •(X→Y )→Z) = {Z }, ETV−(µX. •(X→Y )→Z) = { Y }, ETV ±(µX. (Y →
Z)→ •X) = {}, and ETV ±(µX. •(X → Y → Z)) = { Y, Z }. Obviously, ETV ±(A) ⊆ FTV (A). We can
easily check that α-conversion does not affect the definition of ETV ±(A) by Proposition 2.3.5.
Some propositions in the present paper will be proved by induction on the following two kinds of struc-
tures of type expressions. The height h(A) just reflects the syntactical one and the rank r(A) does the
semantic one in a fixed world.
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Definition 2.8. Let A be a (pseudo) type expression. We define h(A), the height of A, and r(A), the rank
of A, as follows.
h(X) = 0
h(•A) = h(A) + 1
h(A→B) = max(h(A), h(B)) + 1
h(µX.A) = h(A) + 1
r(A) = 0 (A is a⊤-variant)
r(X) = 0
r(•A) = 0 ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
r(A→B) = max(r(A), r(B)) + 1 (A→ B is not a⊤-variant)
r(µX.A) = r(A) + 1 (µX.A is not a⊤-variant)
Proposition 2.9. Let A and B be (pseudo) type expressions.
1. A[B/X ]
t
= At[Bt/X ].
2. If A is proper in X, then so is At.
3. If A is a type expression, then so is At.
4. ETV −(At) = {} and ETV +(At) ⊆ ETV +(A).
5. A is a ⊤-variant if and only if ETV (A) = {}, provided that A ∈ TExp.
Proof. By straightforward induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A using Propositions 2.3 and
2.5. Use Item 2 for 3, and use Items 3 and 4 for 5. 
In the rest of the present paper, we use A, B, C, . . . to denote only type expressions. Type expressions
also have the following basic properties concerning⊤-variants and properness.
Proposition 2.10. 1. If A is a ⊤-variant, then so is A[B/X ].
2. If A[B/X ] is a ⊤-variant, then (a) A is already a ⊤-variant, or (b) X ∈ ETV +(At) and B is a
⊤-variant.
3. If A[B/X ] is a ⊤-variant and A is proper in X, then µX.A is also a ⊤-variant.
4. µX.A is a ⊤-variant if and only if so is A[µX.A/X ].
Proof. Let At = •m0µY1.•
m1µY2.•
m2 . . . µYn.•
mnZ, where Yi /∈ FTV (B) ∪ {X } for every i. By Proposi-
tion 2.9.1,
A[B/X ]
t
=
{ At (Z /= X)
•m0µY1.•m1µY2.•m2 . . . µYn.•mnBt (Z = X).
Therefore, we get Item 1 by Proposition 2.3.4 since Z /= X if A is a ⊤-variant, and similarly Item 2
since Z = X implies X ∈ ETV +(At). We also get Item 3 since (µX.A)t is either µX.(A[B/X ])t or
µX.•m0µY1.•
m1µY2.•
m2 . . . µYn.•
mnX . The “if part” of Item 4 follows 3, and the “only if” part is also
straightforward since A[µX.A/X ]
t
is either At (in case of Z /= X), or •m0µY1.•m1µY2.•m2 . . . µYn.•mnµX.At
(in case of Z = X). 
Proposition 2.11. 1. If X ∈ ETV ±(A), X /= Y and B is not a ⊤-variant, then X ∈ ETV ±(A[B/Y ]).
2. If X /∈ ETV ±(A) and X /∈ ETV (B), then X /∈ ETV±(A[B/Y ]).
Proof. By straightforward induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. For Item 1, note that A is
not a ⊤-variant by Proposition 2.9.5 since ETV (A) /= {}. Furthermore, A[B/Y ] is not a ⊤-variant either,
by Proposition 2.10.2. Similarly, for Item 2, we only have to handle the case that neither A nor A[B/Y ]
is a ⊤-variant, because ETV±(A[B/Y ]) = {} by Proposition 2.9.5 if A[B/Y ] is a ⊤-variant, and because
A[B/Y ] is a⊤-variant by Proposition 2.10.1 if so is A. 
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Proposition 2.12. 1. If X ∈ ETV +(A) and Y ∈ ETV ±(B), then Y ∈ ETV ±(A[B/X ]).
2. If X ∈ ETV −(A) and Y ∈ ETV ±(B), then Y ∈ ETV ∓(A[B/X ]).
3. If X /∈ ETV +(A) and Y /∈ ETV ±(A) ∪ ETV ∓(B), then Y /∈ ETV ±(A[B/X ]).
4. If X /∈ ETV −(A) and Y /∈ ETV ±(A) ∪ ETV±(B), then Y /∈ ETV ±(A[B/X ]).
Proof. By simultaneous induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. For Items 1 and 2, note that
neither A, B nor A[B/X ] is a ⊤-variant by Propositions 2.9.5 and 2.10.2. In case of A = µZ.C for some Z
and C, we use Proposition 2.11.1 to show that Z ∈ ETV −(C) implies Z ∈ ETV −(C[B/X ]). Similarly, for
Items 3 and 4, by Propositions 2.9.5 and 2.10.1, it suffices to consider the case that neither A nor A[B/X ] is
a⊤-variant. In case of A = µZ.C for some Z and C, we use Proposition 2.11.2 to show that Z /∈ ETV −(C)
implies Z /∈ ETV −(C[B/X ]). 
Proposition 2.13. 1. If A is proper in X, then r(A[B/X ]) ≤ r(A) for every B.
2. If µX.A is not a ⊤-variant, then r(A[µX.A/X ]) < r(µX.A).
3. If A and B are proper in X, then A[B/Y ] is also proper in X for any Y .
4. If A is proper in X, then so is A[B/X ] for every B.
Proof. By straightforward induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A using Proposition 2.10.1,
where Item 2 immediately follows from 1. Note that every⊤-variant is proper in any type variable, and that
r(A[B/X ]) = 0 for every⊤-variant A. Hence, it suffices to only consider the case that A is not a⊤-variant.

Definition 2.14. Let X be a type variable, and A a type expression. The positive •-depth dp+• (A, X) and
the negative •-depth dp−• (A, X) of X in A are defined as follows.
dp±• (A, X) = ∞ (A is a⊤-variant)
dp+• (X, X) = 0
dp−• (X, X) = ∞
dp±• (Y, X) = ∞ (X /= Y )
dp±• (•A, X) = dp
±
• (A, X) + 1 ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
dp±• (A→B, X) = min(dp
∓
• (A, X), dp
±
• (B, X)) (A→B is not a⊤-variant)
dp±• (µY.A, X) = min(dp
±
• (A, X), dp
−
• (A, Y ) + dp
∓
• (A, X))
(X /= Y and µY.A is not a⊤-variant)
Similarly, the positive (respectively, negative) →-depth dp±→(A, X) of X in A is defined as follows.
dp±→(A, X) = ∞ (A is a⊤-variant)
dp+→(X, X) = 0
dp−→(X, X) = ∞
dp±→(Y, X) = ∞ (X /= Y )
dp±→(•A, X) = dp
±
→(A, X) ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
dp±→(A→B, X) = min(dp
∓
→(A, X), dp
±
→(B, X)) + 1 (A→ B is not a⊤-variant)
dp±→(µY.A, X) = min(dp
±
→(A, X), dp
−
→(A, Y ) + dp
∓
→(A, X))
(X /= Y and µY.A is not a⊤-variant)
The domains of + and min are assumed to be naturally extended to { 0, 1, 2, . . . , ∞}. It can be easily
verified that α-conversion does not affect the definition of dp±• (A, X) or dp
±
→(A, X). We also define the
•-depth dp•(A, X) and →-depth dp→(A, X) of X in A as follows.
dp•(A, X) = min(dp
+
• (A, X), dp
−
• (A, X))
dp→(A, X) = min(dp
+
→(A, X), dp
−
→(A, X))
9
For example, let A = µX. •(X→•Y )→Z and B = µX. •(X→Y →Z). Then, dp+• (A, Y ) = dp
+
→(A, Y ) = 2,
dp−• (A, Y ) = dp
−
→(A, Y ) =∞, dp
+
• (B, Y ) = 2, dp
+
→(B, Y ) = 3, dp
−
• (B, Y ) = 1, and dp
−
→(B, Y ) = 2.
Proposition 2.15. Let dp be either dp• or dp→, and suppose that B is not a ⊤-variant.
1. dp±(A, X) <∞ if and only if X ∈ ETV ±(A).
2. If X /= Y and Y /∈ ETV (B), then dp±(A[B/X ], Y ) = dp±(A, Y ).
3. If X /= Y , then dp±(A[B/X ], Y ) = min(dp±(A, Y ), dp+(A, X) + dp±(B, Y ), dp−(A, X) + dp∓(B,
Y )).
4. dp±(A[B/X ], X) = min(dp+(A, X) + dp±(B, X), dp−(A, X) + dp∓(B, X)).
5. A is proper in X if and only if dp•(A, X) > 0.
6. If X /∈ ETV (A), then A is proper in X.
7. dp−→(A, X) > 0.
8. If dp+→(A, X) = 0, then A = •
m0µY1.•m1µY2.•m2 . . . µYn.•mnX for some n, m0, m1, m2, . . ., mn, Y1,
Y2, . . ., Yn such that X /= Yi for any i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }.
9. If A is proper in X and µX.A is not a ⊤-variant, then dp+→(A, X) > 0.
Proof. For each item, the proof proceeds by induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. Note
that all the statements are almost trivial if A is a⊤-variant. Use Item 1, Propositions 2.10.1 and 2.10.2 for
Items 2, 3 and 4. Use also Item 3 for 4. Use Items 1, 7 and Proposition 2.9.5 for Item 8, from which Item 9
immediately follows. 
3. Semantics of types
In this section, we define the semantics of type expressions. To fix notation, we start with some necessary
definitions about the standard untyped λ-calculus.
Definition 3.1 (Untyped λ-terms). The syntax of the λ-terms is defined relatively to a setVar of count-
ably infinite individual variables (f , g, h, x, y, z, . . .). The set Exp of λ-terms is defined by the following
BNF notation.
Exp ::= Var (individual variables)
| λVar.Exp (λ-abstractions)
| Exp Exp (applications)
We useM,N,K,L, . . . to denote λ-terms. Free and bound occurrences of individual variables and the notion
of α-convertibility are defined in the standard manner. Hereafter, we identify λ-terms by this α-convertibility.
We denote the set of individual variables occurring freely in M by FV (M), and use M [N1/x1, . . . , Nn/xn]
to denote the λ-term obtained from a λ-term M by substituting N1, . . . , Nn for each free occurrence of
individual variables x1, . . . , xn, respectively, with necessary α-conversion to avoid accidental capture of free
variables.
Definition 3.2 (β-reduction). Let the syntax of context C[ ] of λ-term be defined in the standard way as
follows.
C[ ] ::= [ ] | λVar. C[ ] | C[ ]Exp | Exp C[ ]
The standard notion of β-reduction, a binary relation →
β
over Exp, is defined by
C[(λx. M )N ]→
β
C[M [N/x]],
where C is an arbitrary context of λ-term.
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We denote the transitive and reflexive closure of→
β
by ∗→
β
, and the symmetric closure of→
β
by↔
β
. We define
the equivalence relation =
β
to be the transitive and reflexive closure of ↔
β
.
Definition 3.3. Let ρ be a mapping from a set T to a set S, and let x ∈ T and v ∈ S. We define a mapping
ρ[v/x] by
ρ[v/x](y) =
{ v (y = x)
ρ(y) (y /= x).
Throughout the present paper, let 〈 V , ·, [[ ]]V 〉 be a syntactical λ-algebra of the untyped λ-calculus. Each
λ-termM is interpreted as an element of V , which is denoted by [[M ]]Vρ , where ρ is an individual environment
that assigns an element of V to each individual variable. We define syntactical λ-algebra in the standard
way as follows [3].
Definition 3.4 (syntactical λ-algebra). A syntactical λ-algebra of Exp is a tuple 〈 V , ·, [[ ]]V 〉 such that
1. V : a non-empty set.
2. − · − : V × V → V .
3. [[−]]V− : Exp→ (Var→V)→V .
4. [[x]]
V
ρ = ρ(x).
5. [[MN ]]
V
ρ = [[M ]]
V
ρ · [[N ]]
V
ρ .
6. [[λx. M ]]
V
ρ · v = [[M ]]
V
ρ[v/x].
7. If ρ(x) = ρ′(x) for every x ∈ FV (M), then [[M ]]Vρ = [[M ]]
V
ρ′ .
8. If M =
β
N , then [[M ]]
V
ρ = [[N ]]
V
ρ .
Proposition 3.5. [[M [N/x]]]
V
ρ = [[M ]]
V
ρ[[[N ]]Vρ /x]
.
Proof. Since M [N/x] =
β
(λy. M)N , [[M [N/x]]]Vρ = [[[(λy. M)N ]]
V
ρ = [[λy. M ]]
V
ρ · [[N ]]
V
ρ = [[M ]]
V
ρ[[[N ]]Vρ /x]
. 
Roughly, every type expression is interpreted as a subset of V of a syntactical λ-algebra in each possible
world of a Kripke frame, where we consider the following two classes of frames.
Definition 3.6. A well-founded frame is a pair 〈W , ⊲ 〉, which consists of a non-empty set W of possible
worlds and an accessibility relation ⊲ on W such that
1. The relation ⊲ is (conversely) well-founded, i.e., there is no infinite sequence such that p0 ⊲ p1 ⊲ p2 ⊲
p3 ⊲ . . . .
We say the accessibility relation ⊲ is locally linear if and only if it satisfies the following additional condition,
and define λA-frames as well-founded frames whose accessibility relation is locally linear.
2. If p ⊲ q, then p
∗
⊲ r ⊲ q for some r such that r ⊲ s implies q
∗
⊲ s for any s, where
∗
⊲ denotes the
reflexive and transitive closure of ⊲.
The additional condition says that the accessibility relations is not locally, in a sense, branching. Any well-
founded and linear binary relation ⊲ satisfies this condition2. For example, the set of non-negative integers,
2It suffices to let r be a minimal element such that r ⊲ q.
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or ordinals, and the “greater than” relation > constitutes a λA-frame. This condition does not always mean
that the accessibility relation is not branching. For example, the following is a λA-frame, but branching.
W = { 〈n, m 〉 | n ∈ { 0, 1, 2 } and m ∈ N }
〈n, m 〉 ⊲ 〈n′, m′ 〉 iff
{ n = 0 and n′ ∈ { 1, 2 }, or
n = n′ and m > m′
Note that we do not impose that ⊲ is transitive. It will be shown that our interpretation of types does
not depend on whether ⊲ is transitive or not (Proposition 3.11).
Definition 3.7. A mapping t from W to the power set P(V) of V is said to be hereditary if and only if
p ⊲ q implies t(p) ⊆ t(q).
A mapping η from TVar ×W to P(V) is called a type environment, and also said to be hereditary if and
only if
p ⊲ q implies η(X, p) ⊆ η(X, q) for any X ∈ TVar.
In this paper, we only consider hereditary type environments. Given a well-founded frame and a hered-
itary type environment η, each type expression A is interpreted as a hereditary mapping from W to P(V)
as follows.
Definition 3.8 (Semantics of types). Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a well-founded frame, and η a hereditary type
environment. We define a hereditary mapping I(A)η from W to P(V) for each type expression A by
extending η as follows, where we prefer to write η(X)p and I(A)ηp rather than η(X, p) and I(A)
η(p),
respectively.
I(A)ηp = V (A is a⊤-variant)
I(X)ηp = η(X)p
I(•A)ηp =
{
u
∣∣ if p ⊲ q, then u ∈ I(A)ηq } ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
I(A→B)ηp =
{
u
∣∣ if p ∗⊲ q , then u · v ∈ I(B)ηq for every v ∈ I(A)ηq } (A→ B is not a⊤-variant)
I(µX.A)ηp = I(A[µX.A/X ])
η
p (µX.A is not a⊤-variant)
Note that the I(A)ηp has been defined by induction on the lexicographic ordering of 〈 p, r(A) 〉, where we
consider the transitive closure of ⊲ for the ordering of p, which is also well-founded since so is ⊲. Because
r(A[µX.A/X ]) < r(µX.A) by Proposition 2.13.2 when µX.A is not a ⊤-variant, I(µX.A)ηp is well defined.
We can easily verify the following propositions.
Proposition 3.9. The equations other than the first one in Definition 3.8 hold for any type expression, that
is, the following equations hold.
I(X)ηp = η(X)p
I(•A)ηp =
{
u
∣∣ if p ⊲ q, then u ∈ I(A)ηq }
I(A→ B)ηp =
{
u
∣∣ if p ∗⊲ q , then u · v ∈ I(B)ηq for every v ∈ I(A)ηq }
I(µX.A)ηp = I(A[µX.A/X ])
η
p
Proof. Straightforward by Propositions 2.3 and 2.10.4. 
Proposition 3.10. Let η be a hereditary type environment.
1. I(A[B/X ])ηp = I(A)
η[ I(B)η/X]
p .
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2. I(A)η is a hereditary mapping from W to P(V); that is, p ⊲ q implies I(A)ηp ⊆ I(A)
η
q .
Proof. By straightforward induction on the lexicographic ordering of 〈 p, r(A) 〉, and by cases on the form of
A. If A is a⊤-variant, then so is A[B/X ] by Proposition 2.10.1; and hence, I(A[B/X ])ηp = I(A)
η[ I(B)η/X]
p =
I(A)ηp = I(A)
η
q = V by Definition 3.8. Therefore, it suffices to only handle the case that A is not. 
Proposition 3.11. Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a well-founded frame, and
+
⊲ the transitive closure of ⊲.
1. The accessibility relation
+
⊲ is locally linear if and only if so is ⊲.
2. Let I and I+ be the interpretations over 〈W , ⊲ 〉 and 〈W ,
+
⊲ 〉, respectively. I(A)ηp = I
+(A)ηp for
every hereditary type environment η and p ∈ W.
Proof. Straightforward. Use Propositions 3.9 and 3.10.2 for Item 2. 
Adopting such an interpretation of types over a well-founded frame, or a λA-frame, we can verify the
subtyping relations between •(A→ B) and •A→•B discussed in Section 1 as follows.
Proposition 3.12. Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a well-founded frame. Then, I(•(A→ B))ηp ⊆ I(•A→ •B)
η
p for any
A, B, η and p ∈ W.
Proof. Suppose that u ∈ I(•(A → B))ηp. To show that u ∈ I(•A → •B)
η
p, suppose also that p
∗
⊲ r
and v ∈ I(•A)ηr . By Proposition 3.9, it suffices to show that u · v ∈ I(B)
η
q for every q ⊳ r. Since
u ∈ I(•(A→ B))ηp and p
∗
⊲ r, we get u ∈ I(•(A→ B))ηr by Proposition 3.10.2. Hence, if r ⊲ q, then
u ∈ I(A→B)ηq ; and therefore, u · v ∈ I(B)
η
q by Proposition 3.9 because v ∈ I(A)
η
q from v ∈ I(•A)
η
r . 
Theorem 3.13. Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a well-founded frame. Then, I(•(A→ B))ηp = I(•A→ •B)
η
p for any A,
B, hereditary η and p ∈ W if and only if ⊲ is locally linear.
Proof. For the “if” part, suppose that ⊲ satisfies Condition 2 of Definition 3.6. We get I(•(A→ B))ηp ⊆
I(•A→ •B)ηp by Proposition 3.12. To show the opposite, suppose also that u ∈ I(•A→ •B)
η
p, p ⊲ q
′ ∗⊲ q
and v ∈ I(A)ηq . It suffices to show that u · v ∈ I(B)
η
q . Let p
′ be the element of W such that p
∗
⊲ p′ ⊲ q. By
Condition 2 of Definition 3.6, there exists some r ∈ W such that
p
∗
⊲ r, (1)
r ⊲ q, and (2)
r ⊲ s implies q
∗
⊲ s for any s. (3)
By Proposition 3.10.2, we get u ∈ I(•A→•B)ηr from u ∈ I(•A→•B)
η
p and (1), and get v ∈ I(•A)
η
r from
v ∈ I(A)ηq and (3). Therefore, u · v ∈ I(•B)
η
r by Proposition 3.9. We now get u · v ∈ I(B)
η
q from this and
(2) by Proposition 3.9.
For the “only if” part, suppose that ⊲ does not satisfy Condition 2, i.e., there exist some p, q ∈ W such
that p ⊲ q, and
for every r ∈ W , if p
∗
⊲ r ⊲ q, then r ⊲ s and q /
∗
⊲ s for some s ∈ W . (4)
Since p
∗
⊲ p ⊲ q, there exists some s such that p ⊲ s and q /
∗
⊲ s. Then, consider the hereditary type
environment η defined as follows.
η(X)t =
{ V (q ∗⊲ t)
{} (q /
∗
⊲ t)
(5)
η(Y )t =
{ V (q ⊲ t)
{} (q /⊲ t)
(6)
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We can see that I(•(X → Y ))ηp = {}, while I(•X → •Y )
η
p = V . In fact, I(X → Y )
η
q = {}, since I(X)
η
q =
η(X)q = V and I(Y )
η
q = η(Y )q = {} by (5) and (6), respectively; and hence, I(•(X → Y ))
η
p = {} from
p ⊲ q. Furthermore, I(•X→•Y )ηp = V can be also shown as follows. Suppose that p
∗
⊲ t and I(•X)ηt /= {},
which means that t ⊲ s implies η(X)s = V for any s ∈ W by (5); that is,
t ⊲ s implies q
∗
⊲ s for any s.
Hence, t /⊲ q by (4); and therefore, t ⊲ s implies q ⊲ s for any s. Then, by (6),
t ⊲ s implies η(Y )s = V for any s.
We thus get I(•Y )ηt = V from I(•X)
η
t /= {} and p
∗
⊲ t. Hence, I(•X → •Y )ηp = V . 
4. Equality of types
In Section 6, we will introduce a modal typing system λA, which respect the semantics of type expressions
based on λA-frames. In this section, we discuss formal derivability of equality between type expressions,
which will be incorporated into the modal typing system.
Definition 4.1 (∼=). The equivalence relation ∼= on TExp is defined to be the smallest binary relation that
satisfies the following:
(∼=-reflex) A ∼= A.
(∼=-symm) If A ∼= B, then B ∼= A.
(∼=-trans) If A ∼= B and B ∼= C, then A ∼= C.
(∼=-•) If A ∼= B, then •A ∼= •B.
(∼=-→) If A ∼= C and B ∼= D, then A→B ∼= C→D.
(∼=-→⊤) A→⊤ ∼= ⊤.
(∼=-fix) µX.A ∼= A[µX.A/X ].
(∼=-uniq) If A ∼= C[A/X ] and C is proper in X , then A ∼= µX.C.
For example, µX.Y →•X ∼= ⊤ by (∼=-uniq) since (Y →•X)[⊤/X ] ∼= ⊤ as follows.
(Y → •X)[⊤/X ] = Y → •µX.•X
∼= Y → µX.•X (by (∼=-reflex), (∼=-fix), (∼=-symm) and (∼=-→))
∼= µX.•X (by (∼=-→⊤))
= ⊤
The intended meaning of A ∼= B is that the interpretations of A and B are identical in any world of any
well-founded frames. We will see in Proposition 4.12.1 that the following rule is derivable from the above.
A ∼= B implies µX.A ∼= µX.B, provided that A or B is proper in X .
Definition 4.2 (≃). We similarly define another equivalence relation ≃ by adding the following condition
to the definition of ∼=.
(≃-K/L) •(A→ B) ≃ •A→ •B
This rule reflects the equivalence shown in Theorem 3.13, and is only valid for λA-frames. Noted that
A ∼= B implies A ≃ B. Roughly, two type expressions are equivalent modulo ∼=, if their (possibly infinite)
type expressions obtained by indefinite unfolding recursive types occurring in them are identical modulo the
rule (∼=-→⊤). Also, they are equivalent modulo ≃, if their indefinite unfoldings are identical modulo the
rules (∼=-→⊤) and (≃-K/L).
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4.1. Basic properties of the equality
In this subsection, we discuss some basic properties of ∼= and ≃. Most of the results are common to both
∼= and ≃. In the sequel, let ∼ denotes either ∼= or ≃.
Proposition 4.3. 1. ⊤ ∼ •⊤.
2. ⊤ ∼ µX.•nX for every n ≥ 1.
3. A ∼ •n+1A if and only if A ∼ ⊤.
Proof. Straightforward by (∼=-fix) and (∼=-uniq). 
In the succeeding sections, we occasionally use the following proposition in proofs without mention.
Proposition 4.4. If A ∼ B and C ∼ D, then A[C/X ] ∼ B[D/X ].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of A ∼ B, and by cases on the last rule applied in it. The readers
should refer to Appendix A.1 for a detailed proof. 
Before showing the soundness of ∼= and ≃ with respect to the intended semantics of type expressions,
we confirm that the equality preserves whether a type expression is a ⊤-variant or not, since some notions
introduced so far, such as properness, dp±• , dp
±
→ and ETV
±, are defined in a way where ⊤-variants are
treated as an exceptional case.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that A ∼ B. Then, A is a ⊤-variant if and only if so is B.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the derivation of A ∼ B with the claim
dp+• (A
t, Z) = dp+• (B
t, Z) for any Z,
and by cases on the last rule used in the derivation. Note that, by Propositions 2.9.4 and 2.15.1,
dp−• (A
t, Z) = dp−• (B
t, Z) =∞ for any Z.
Use Propositions 2.3 and 2.10.4. The cases other than (∼=-fix) or (∼=-uniq) are straightforward.
In case of (∼=-fix), there exist some X and C such that A = µX.C and B = C[A/X ]. First, A is a
⊤-variant if and only if so is B by Proposition 2.10.4. Therefore, if either A or B is a ⊤-variant, so are At
and Bt by Proposition 2.3.4; and hence, dp+• (A
t, Z) = dp+• (B
t, Z) = ∞ by Definition 2.14. On the other
hand, if neither A nor B is a⊤-variant, then assuming X /= Z without loss of generality,
dp+• (B
t, Z) = dp+• (C
t[At/X ], Z) (by Proposition 2.9.1)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp+• (C
t, X) + dp+• (A
t, Z), dp−• (C
t, X) + dp−• (A
t, Z))
(by Proposition 2.15.3)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp+• (C
t, X) + dp+• (A
t, Z)) (since dp−• (C
t, X) = dp−• (A
t, Z) =∞)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp+• (C
t, X) + min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp−• (C
t, X) + dp−• (C
t, Z)))
(by Definition 2.14)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp+• (C
t, X) + dp+• (C
t, Z)) (since dp−• (C
t, X) = dp−• (C
t, Z) =∞)
= dp+• (C
t, Z)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp−• (C
t, X) + dp−• (C
t, Z)) (since dp−• (C
t, X) = dp−• (C
t, Z) =∞)
= dp+• (A
t, Z) (by Definition 2.14).
In case of (∼=-uniq), there exist some X and C such that B = µX.C, A ∼ C[A/X ], and C is proper in
X . By induction hypothesis, we have
A is a⊤-variant iff so is C[A/X ], and (7)
dp+• (A
t, Z) = dp+• (C[A/X ]
t
, Z) for any Z. (8)
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First, if A is a ⊤-variant, then so is C[A/X ] by (7); and therefore, so is µX.C by Proposition 2.10.3. To
show the converse, assume that µX.C is a⊤-variant whereas A is not. We show that this assumption leads
to a contradiction. Let Ct = •m0µX1.•m1µX2.•m2 . . . µXn.•mnY , and At = •m
′
0µX ′1.•
m′1µX ′2.•
m′2 . . . µX ′n′.
•m
′
n′Y ′. Note that Y ∈ {X,X1, X2, . . . , Xn } and Y ′ /∈ {X ′1, X
′
2, . . . , X
′
n′ } since µX.C is a ⊤-variant and
A is not. Furthermore, since A is not, C[A/X ]t is not a ⊤-variant either, by (7) and Proposition 2.3.4.
Therefore, Ct is not a⊤-variant either, by Propositions 2.9.1 and 2.10.1; and hence, Y = X and Y /= Xi for
every i. Note also that m0 +m1 + . . . +mn > 0 by Propositions 2.9.2 and 2.15.5 since C is proper in X .
Hence,
dp+• (A
t, Y ′) = dp+• (C[A/X ]
t
, Y ′) (by (8))
= dp+• (C
t[At/X ], Y ′) (by Proposition 2.9.1)
= dp+• (•
m0µX1.•
m1µX2.•
m2 . . . µXn.•
mnAt, Y ′)
= dp+• (A
t, Y ′) +m0 +m1 + . . .+mn (by Definition 2.14).
However, this is impossible since dp+• (A
t, Y ′) = m′0 +m
′
1 + . . . +m
′
n′ < ∞ and m0 +m1 + . . . +mn > 0.
This completes the proof of the first part. For the second part, we assume that neither At nor (µX.C)t is
a ⊤-variant, since dp+• (A
t, Z) = dp+• ((µX.C)
t
, Z) = ∞ by Definition 2.14 if they are. Note that Ct is also
proper in X by Proposition 2.9.2; and hence, dp•(C
t, X) > 0 by Proposition 2.15.5. Then, assuming that
X /= Z without loss of generality,
dp+• (A
t, Z) = dp+• (C[A/X ]
t
, Z) (by (8))
= dp+• (C
t[At/X ], Z) (by Proposition 2.9.1)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp+• (C
t, X) + dp+• (A
t, Z), dp−• (C
t, X) + dp−• (A
t, Z))
(by Proposition 2.15.3)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp+• (C
t, X) + dp+• (A
t, Z)) (since dp−• (C
t, X) = dp−• (A
t, Z) =∞)
= dp+• (C
t, Z) (since dp+• (C
t, X) > 0; valid even if dp+• (A
t, Z) =∞)
= min(dp+• (C
t, Z), dp−• (C
t, X) + dp−• (C
t, Z)) (since dp−• (C
t, X) = dp−• (C
t, Z) =∞)
= dp+• (µX.C
t, Z) (by Definition 2.14)
= dp+• (B
t, Z) (by Definition 2.2). 
4.2. Soundness of the derivation rules for equality
We now proceed to show that the equivalence relations ∼= and ≃ on type expressions well respect the
semantics of types according to their intended frame classes. The last one step before the proof is to prove
the following lemma, which says that if a type expression is proper in a type variable, then the interpretation
of the type expression in a possible world does not depend on the interpretation of the type variable in that
world.
Lemma 4.6. Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a well-founded frame, A a type expression, and p ∈ W. Let η and η′ be
hereditary type environments such that η(X)q = η
′(X)q for every X ∈ TVar and q ∈ W such that p ⊲ q. If
for every X, either (a) A is proper in X, or (b) η(X)p = η
′(X)p, then I(A)ηp = I(A)
η′
p .
Proof. By induction on the lexicographic ordering of 〈 p, r(A) 〉. Suppose that (a) or (b) holds for every
X ∈ TVar. If A is a ⊤-variant, then I(A)ηp = I(A)
η′
p = V by Definition 3.8. Therefore, we show that
I(A)ηp = I(A)
η′
p by cases on the form of A assuming that A is not a⊤-variant.
Case: A = Y for some Y . In this case, A is not proper in Y . Hence, I(A)ηp = η(Y )p = η
′(Y )p = I(A)η
′
p
from (b).
Case: A = •B for some B. Since η(X)q = η′(X)q for every X and q ⊳ p, we get I(B)ηq = I(B)
η′
q for
every q ⊳ p by induction hypothesis. Therefore, I(•B)ηp = { u | u ∈ I(B)
η
q for every q ⊳ p } = { u | u ∈
I(B)η
′
q for every q ⊳ p } = I(•B)
η′
p by Definition 3.8.
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Case: A = B → C for some B and C. Note that C is not a ⊤-variant since A is not. Therefore, r(B),
r(C) < r(A), and (a) implies both B and C are also proper in X . Hence, by induction hypothesis, we get
I(B)ηq = I(B)
η′
q and I(C)
η
q = I(C)
η′
q for every q such that p
∗
⊲ q. Therefore, I(B→ C)ηp = I(B→ C)
η′
p
by Definition 3.8.
Case: A = µY.C for some Y and C. We can assume that X /= Y without loss of generality. Note
that r(C[µY.C/Y ]) < r(µY.C) by Proposition 2.13.2, and that C[µY.C/Y ] is proper in X if so is A, by
Definition 2.4 and Proposition 2.13.3. Hence,
I(µY.C)ηp = I(C[µY.C/Y ])
η
p (by Definition 3.8)
= I(C[µY.C/Y ])η
′
p (by induction hypothesis)
= I(µY.C)η
′
p (by Definition 3.8). 
Theorem 4.7 (Soundness of ∼=). Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a well-founded frame, and consider the interpretation
in the frame. If A ∼= B, then I(A)η = I(B)η for any type environment η.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of A ∼= B, and by cases on the last rule in the derivation. Suppose that
A ∼= B. If either A or B is a⊤-variant, then so are both by Proposition 4.5; and hence, I(A)ηp = I(B)
η
p = V
for every p by Definition 3.8. Therefore, we show that I(A)η = I(B)η assuming that neither is a⊤-variant.
Cases: (∼=-reflex), (∼=-symm) and (∼=-trans). Trivial.
Case: (∼=-•). In this case, there exist some A′ and B′ such that A = •A′, B = •B′ and A′ ∼= B′.
We have I(A′)ηq = I(B
′)ηq for every q ∈ W by induction hypothesis. Therefore, I(•A
′)ηp = { u | u ∈
I(A′)ηq for every q ⊳ p } = { u | u ∈ I(B
′)ηq for every q ⊳ p } = I(•B
′)ηp by Definition 3.8.
Case: (∼=-→). Similar to the previous case.
Case: (∼=-→⊤). Impossible because we assumed that neither A nor B is a⊤-variant.
Case: (∼=-fix). Obvious from Definition 3.8.
Case: (∼=-uniq). There exist some X and C such that B = µX.C, A ∼= C[A/X ] and C is proper in X . By
induction hypothesis,
I(A)η
′
p = I(C[A/X ])
η′
p for every η
′. (9)
We show that I(A)ηp = I(µX.C)
η
p for every p ∈ W by induction on p. The induction hypothesis in this
induction is
I(A)ηq = I(µX.C)
η
q for every q ⊳ p. (10)
Therefore,
I(A)ηp = I(C[A/X ])
η
p (by (9))
= I(C)η[ I(A)
η/X]
p (by Proposition 3.10.1)
= I(C)η[ I(µX.C)
η/X]
p (by (10) and Lemma 4.6)
= I(C[µX.C/X ])ηp (by Proposition 3.10.1)
= I(µX.C)ηp (by Definition 3.8). 
Theorem 4.8 (Soundness of ≃ with respect to λA-frames). Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a λA-frame, η a hered-
itary type environment. If A ≃ B, then I(A)η = I(B)η .
Proof. The proof is quite parallel to the one of Theorem 4.7. The only additional task is to check the rule
(≃-K/L), which is straightforward from Theorem 3.13. 
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4.3. Properties of type expressions preserved by the equality
At the end of Subsection 4.1, we showed that the equality preserves whether a type expression is a
⊤-variant or not. In this subsection, we shall confirm the fact that the equivalence relations also preserve
other basic properties of type expressions such as properness, dp±• , dp
±
→ and ETV
±. Most of them are
proved by induction on the derivation of the equality.
Proposition 4.9. A ∼ B implies At ∼ Bt.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of A ∼ B, and by cases on the last rule used in the derivation. We
employ Proposition 2.9 in the case that last rule is (∼=-fix) or (∼=-uniq). 
Proposition 4.10. If A ∼ B, then dp±• (A, X) = dp
±
• (B, X) and dp
±
→(A, X) = dp
±
→(B, X).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of A ∼ B, and by cases on the rule applied last. Suppose that A ∼ B.
The cases other than (∼=-fix) or (∼=-uniq) are again straightforward. Let dp be either dp• or dp→. If either
A or B is a ⊤-variant, then so are they by Proposition 4.5; and therefore, dp±(A, X) = dp±(B, X) = ∞
by Definition 2.14. Hence, we assume that neither is. In case of (∼=-fix), there exist some Y and C such
that A = µY.C and B = C[A/Y ], where we can assume that Y /= X without loss of generality. Note that
dp(C, Y ) > 0 by Propositions 2.15.5, 2.15.7 and 2.15.9, since C is proper in Y . Therefore,
dp±(B,X) = dp±(C[A/Y ], X)
= min(dp±(C,X), dp+(C, Y ) + dp±(A,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(A,X)) (by Proposition 2.15.3)
= min(dp±(C,X),
dp+(C, Y ) + min(dp±(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(C,X)),
dp−(C, Y ) + min(dp∓(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp±(C,X))) (by Definition 2.14)
= min(dp±(C,X),
dp+(C, Y ) + min(dp±(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(C,X)),
dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(C,X)) (since dp−(C, Y ) > 0)
= min(dp±(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(C,X)) (since dp+(C, Y ) > 0)
= dp±(µY.C,X) (by Definition 2.14).
In case of (∼=-uniq), there exist some Y and C such that B = µY.C, A ∼ C[A/Y ], and C is proper in
Y , where we again assume that Y /= X without loss of generality. In this case, C[A/Y ] is not a ⊤-variant
either, by Proposition 4.5. Note that dp(C, Y ) > 0 by Propositions 2.15.5, 2.15.7 and 2.15.9, since C is
proper in Y . Therefore,
dp±(A, X) = dp±(C[A/Y ], X) (by induction hypothesis)
= min(dp±(C,X), dp+(C, Y ) + dp±(A,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(A,X)) (by Proposition 2.15.3)
= min(dp±(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(A,X)) (since dp+(C, Y ) > 0; valid even if dp±(A,X) =∞)
= min(dp±(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + min(dp∓(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp±(A,X))) (by the equation so far)
= min(dp±(C,X), dp−(C, Y ) + dp∓(C,X)) (since dp−(C, Y ) > 0; valid even if dp±(A,X) =∞)
= dp±(µY.C,X) (by Definition 2.14). 
Proposition 4.11. Suppose that A ∼ B.
1. ETV ±(A) = ETV±(B).
2. A is proper in X if and only if so is B.
Proof. Straightforward by Propositions 2.15.1, 2.15.5 and 4.10. 
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By the facts obtained so far, we can show the following derived rules.
Proposition 4.12. 1. If A ∼ B, then µX.A ∼ µX.B.
2. µX.A[X/Y ] ∼ µX.A[A[X/Y ]/Y ].
Proof. For Item 1, suppose that A ∼ B. Then, µX.A ∼ A[µX.A/X ] ∼ B[µX.A/X ] by (∼=-fix) and
Proposition 4.4. Therefore, µX.A ∼ µX.B by (∼=-uniq). For Item 2, whether X = Y or not,
µX.A[X/Y ] ∼ A[X/Y ][µX.A[X/Y ]/X ] (by (∼=-fix))
∼ A[µX.A[X/Y ]/Y ][µX.A[X/Y ]/X ] (since X /∈ FTV (µX.A[X/Y ]))
∼ A[A[X/Y ][µX.A[X/Y ]/X ]/Y ][µX.A[X/Y ]/X ] (by (∼=-fix) and Proposition 4.4)
∼ A[A[X/Y ]/Y ][µX.A[X/Y ]/X ] (since X /∈ FTV (A[X/Y ][µX.A[X/Y ]/X ])).
Hence, µX.A[X/Y ] ∼ µX.A[A[X/Y ]/Y ] by (∼=-uniq), again. 
Proposition 4.5 says that the relation ∼ preserves whether a type expression is a ⊤-variant or not.
Furthermore, we can show that a type expression A is a⊤-variant if and only if A ∼ ⊤. It does not depend
on which of ∼= and ≃ we consider as the equality between types. Because it is syntactically decidable whether
a type expression is a⊤-variant or not, it is decidable whether A ∼ ⊤ or not,
Lemma 4.13. Let At = •m0µX1.•m1µX2.•m2 . . . µXn.•mnY for some n, m0, m1, m2, . . ., mn, X1, X2,
. . ., Xn and Y .
1. A ∼ ⊤ if the following is the case.
(a) Y = Xi for some i such that Y /∈ { Xi+1, Xi+2, . . . , Xn }, and mi +mi+1 +mi+2 + . . .+mn ≥ 1.
2. A[⊤/Y ] ∼ ⊤ if the following is the case.
(b) Y /∈ { X1, X2, . . . , Xn }.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A.
Case: A = Z for some Z. In this case, Y = Z, n = 0 and m0 = 0 since A
t = Z. Hence, (a) is not the case.
The second item is trivial since A[⊤/Y ] = Y [⊤/Y ] = ⊤.
Case: A = B → C for some B and C. In this case, At = Ct. If (a) holds, then C ∼ ⊤ by induction
hypothesis. Hence, A ∼ B→⊤ ∼ ⊤ by (∼=-→⊤). On the other hand, if (b) is the case, then C[⊤/Y ] ∼ ⊤
by induction hypothesis. Hence, A[⊤/Y ] = B[⊤/Y ]→ C[⊤/Y ] ∼ B[⊤/Y ]→⊤ ∼ ⊤ by (∼=-→⊤).
Case: A = •B for some B. In this case, At = •Bt. If (a) holds, then B ∼ ⊤ by induction hypothesis.
Therefore, A ∼ •⊤ ∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.3.1. In case (b), B[⊤/Y ] ∼ ⊤ by induction hypothesis. Hence,
A[⊤/Y ] ∼ •B[⊤/Y ] ∼ •⊤ ∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.3.1, again.
Case: A = µZ.B for some Z and B. In this case, (µZ.B)
t
= µZ.Bt, m0 = 0, Z = X1, n ≥ 1 and Bt =
•m1µX2.•m2 . . . µXn.•mnY . First, suppose that (a) holds. If i ≥ 2, then B ∼ ⊤ by induction hypothesis.
Hence, B[⊤/Z] ∼ ⊤[⊤/Z] = ⊤ by Proposition 4.4; and therefore, µZ.B ∼ ⊤ by (∼=-uniq). On the other
hand, if i = 1, i.e., Y = Z, then B[⊤/Z] ∼ ⊤ by induction hypothesis, since Z = Y /∈ { X2, X3, . . . , Xn }.
Therefore, again A = µZ.B ∼ ⊤ by (∼=-uniq). Second, suppose that (b) holds. We get B[⊤/Y ] ∼ ⊤
by induction hypothesis. Hence, A[⊤/Y ] = (µZ.B)[⊤/Y ] = µZ.B[⊤/Y ] ∼ µZ.⊤ ∼ ⊤[µZ.⊤/Z] = ⊤ by
Proposition 4.12.1 and (∼=-fix). 
Theorem 4.14. A type expression A is a ⊤-variant if and only if A ∼ ⊤.
Proof. The “only if” part is straightforward from Lemma 4.13.1. For the “if” part, suppose that A ∼ ⊤, and
let At = •m0µX1.•m1µX2.•m2 . . . µXn.•mnY . We get At ∼ ⊤t = ⊤ by Proposition 4.9 and Definition 2.2.
Hence, Y = Xi for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) by Definition 2.7 and Proposition 4.11.1, because ETV
+(⊤) = {}.
Therefore, taking the largest such i, we also establish Y /∈ { Xi+1, Xi+2, . . . , Xn } and mi+mi+1 +mi+2+
. . .+mn ≥ 1 by Proposition 2.9.3. 
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By Theorem 4.14, we can show other basic properties about the equality of type expressions as follows.
In the succeeding sections, we might use Theorem 4.14 in proofs without mention.
Proposition 4.15. 1. X /∼ ⊤.
2. •A ∼ ⊤ if and only if A ∼ ⊤.
3. A→ B ∼ ⊤ if and only if B ∼ ⊤.
4. A ∼ ⊤ if and only if At ∼ ⊤.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 2.3 and Theorem 4.14. 
Proposition 4.16. If X /∈ ETV (A), then A ∼ A[B/X ].
Proof. If A is a ⊤-variant, then A ∼ A[B/X ] by Proposition 2.10.1 and Theorem 4.14. For the case when
A is not, by straightforward induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. 
4.4. Canonical forms of type expressions
So far we have confirmed that the equality defined by the derivation rules preserves the basic properties
of type expressions, such as⊤-variants, properness, dp±• , dp
±
→ and ETV
±. However, we know almost nothing
about when two type expressions are equal to each other. For example, one might conjecture the following
properties.
1. X ∼ Y if and only if X = Y .
2. •A ∼ •B if and only if A ∼ B.
3. A→B ∼ C→D if and only if (a) A ∼ C and B ∼ D, or (b) B ∼ D ∼ ⊤.
Furthermore,
4. X /∼ •A.
5. X /∼ A→B.
6. •A ∼= B→ C implies A ∼= C ∼= ⊤, which should not be the case for ≃ because of (≃-K/L).
In fact, Items 1, 4 and 5 can be shown by Theorems 4.7 and 4.8 considering an appropriate type environment
under a certain non-trivial interpretation3. However, we need some more preparation to realize that the
other expectations are also fulfilled. Because of the existence of (∼=-→⊤) (and also (≃-K/L) in case of ≃),
the equivalence relation ∼= (or ≃) is not identical to the equality as (possibly infinite) labeled trees obtained
by unfolding recursive types. So it is convenient to define canonical representation of type expressions.
Definition 4.17 (Canonical type expressions). We define a set CTExp
∼= (respectively, CTExp≃) of
canonical type expressions as follows.
CTExp
∼= ::= ⊤ | •n TVar | •n (TExp1 →TExp2)
CTExp≃ ::= ⊤ | •n TVar | TExp1 →TExp2
where n is an arbitrary non-negative integer and TExp2 is not a⊤-variant.
The following definition can be regarded as an effective procedure for finding canonical forms of given
type expressions, which will be immediately verified by Proposition 4.19. Later, also by Proposition 4.21, it
will be shown that A /∼ B if canonical forms of two type expressions A and B fit in different categories of
the three forms above.
3Proposition 4.15.1 can be also shown in the same way.
20
Definition 4.18. For each type expression A, we define Ac∼= as follows.
Ac
∼= = ⊤ (A is a⊤-variant)
Xc
∼= = X
(•A)c
∼= = •Ac
∼= ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
(A→B)c∼= = A→ B (A→ B is not a⊤-variant)
(µX.A)c
∼= = Ac
∼=[µX.A/X ] (µX.A is not a⊤-variant)
We similarly define Ac≃ by adjusting the definition of (•A)c∼= as follows.
(•A)c≃ =
{ ••nX (Ac≃ = •nX)
•B→ •C (Ac≃ = B→ C)
For example, let A = •µX. •(X → •Y ) and B = X → µY. X → •(Z → Y ). Then, Ac∼= = ••((µX. •(X →
•Y ))→•Y ), Ac≃ = ••(µX. •(X →•Y ))→ •••Y , and Bc∼= = Bc≃ = ⊤.
In order to make the description concise, we will use Ac, to denote either Ac∼= or Ac≃, according to the
context in which we consider ∼= or ≃, respectively.
Proposition 4.19. Ac is a canonical type expression such that Ac ∼ A, that is, Ac∼= ∼= A and Ac≃ ≃ A.
Proof. If A is a⊤-variant, then Ac = ⊤ ∼ A by Definition 4.18 and Theorem 4.14. Hence, we assume that
A is not a⊤-variant; and therefore, A /∼ ⊤. The proof proceeds by induction on h(A), and by cases on the
form of A. Most cases are straightforward. In the case when A = µX.B for some X and B, we get that
Bc is canonical and Bc ∼ B by induction hypothesis. Hence, we get Ac = Bc[A/X ] ∼ B[A/X ] ∼ A by
Proposition 4.4 and (∼=-fix), and get Bc /= ⊤ from A /∼ ⊤, since Bc = ⊤ implies A = µX.B ∼ µX.Bc =
µX.⊤ ∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.12.1 and (∼=-fix). Therefore,
(a) Bc = •nY for some n and Y , or
(b) Bc = •n(C→D) for some n, C and D such that D is not a⊤-variant, where n = 0 in case of ≃.
In case (a), Y /= X since Y = X implies A = µX.B ∼ µX.•nX ∼ ⊤ by Propositions 4.12.1 and 4.3.2.
Hence, Ac is canonical since Ac = Bc[A/X ] = (•nY )[A/X ] = •nY . As for case (b), since neither A nor
D is a ⊤-variant, D[A/X ] is not a ⊤-variant either, by Proposition 2.10.2, which implies that Bc[A/X ] is
canonical. Thus, Ac is a canonical type expression. 
The following lemma will be used in Proposition 4.21.
Lemma 4.20. If neither A[⊤/X ] nor B is a ⊤-variant, then A[B/X ]c = Ac[B/X ].
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. Suppose that neither A[⊤/X ] nor B is a
⊤-variant, which also implies that neither A nor A[B/X ] is a⊤-variant by Propositions 2.10.1 and 2.10.2.
Case: A = Y for some Y . In this case, we get Y /= X since A[⊤/X ] is not a ⊤-variant. Therefore,
A[B/X ]c = Y [B/X ]c = Y c = Y and Ac[B/X ] = Y c[B/X ] = Y [B/X ] = Y .
Case: A = •C for some C. Since A[⊤/X ] is not a ⊤-variant, C[⊤/X ] is not either, by Proposition 2.3.2.
Hence, by induction hypothesis,
C[B/X ]c = Cc[B/X ]. (11)
Furthermore, C is not a⊤-variant since A is not. Hence, there are two subcases on the form of Cc as follows.
(i) Cc = •nY for some n and Y . By Definition 4.18, Ac = •n+1Y in this case. By Propositions 4.19 and
4.4, we get A[⊤/X ] ∼ Ac[⊤/X ] = (•n+1Y )[⊤/X ]. Thus, Y /= X since A[⊤/X ] is not a ⊤-variant.
Hence, C[B/X ]c = Cc[B/X ] = (•nY )[B/X ] = •nY by (11). Therefore, A[B/X ]c = (•C)[B/X ]c =
(•C[B/X ])c = •n+1Y , and Ac[B/X ] = (•n+1Y )[B/X ] = •n+1Y .
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(ii) Cc = •n(D→E) for some n, D and E, where n = 0 in case of ≃. We get Ac∼= = •n+1(D→E) and Ac≃ =
•D→ •E by Definition 4.18. On the other hand, we also get C[B/X ]c = Cc[B/X ] = •n(D[B/X ]→
E[B/X ]) by (11). Therefore, in case of ∼=, A[B/X ]c∼= = (•C[B/X ])c∼= = •n+1(D[B/X ]→ E[B/X ])
and Ac∼=[B/X ] = (•n+1(D → E))[B/X ] = •n+1(D[B/X ]→ E[B/X ]). Similarly, for ≃, A[B/X ]c≃
= (•C[B/X ])c≃ = •D[B/X ]→•E[B/X ] and Ac≃[B/X ] = (•D→•E)[B/X ] = •D[B/X ]→•E[B/X ].
Case: A = C → D for some C and D. Since A is not a ⊤-variant, D is not, either. Hence, Ac = C → D
by Definition 4.18. Therefore, A[B/X ]c = (C→D)[B/X ]c = (C[B/X ]→D[B/X ])c = C[B/X ]→D[B/X ],
and Ac[B/X ] = (C→D)[B/X ] = C[B/X ]→D[B/X ].
Case: A = µY.C for some Y and C. We assume that Y /∈ {X }∪FTV (B) without loss of generality. Since
A[⊤/X ] is not a ⊤-variant, C[⊤/X ] is not, either. Therefore, A[B/X ]c = (µY.C[B/X ])c = C[B/X ]c[µY.
C[B/X ]/Y ] = C[B/X ]c[A[B/X ]/Y ] = Cc[B/X ][A[B/X ]/Y ] = Cc[B/X,A[B/X ]/Y ] by Definition 4.18
and the induction hypothesis on C. On the other hand, Ac[B/X ] = Cc[A/Y ][B/X ] = Cc[B/X,A[B/X ]/Y ].

Proposition 4.21. Suppose that A ∼ B.
(i) If Ac = ⊤, then Bc = ⊤.
(ii) If Ac = •nX for some n and X, then Bc = •nX.
(iii) If Ac = •n(C → D) for some n, C and D, then Bc = •n(C′ → D′) for some C′ and D′ such that
C ∼ C′ and D ∼ D′ /∼ ⊤, where n = 0 in case of ≃.
Proof. If A ∼ B, and if A or B is a ⊤-variant, then Ac = Bc = ⊤ by Definition 4.18 and Theorem 4.14.
Hence, we assume that neither A nor B is a⊤-variant, i.e., A /∼ ⊤ and B /∼ ⊤. We prove the following more
general claim by induction on the derivation of A ∼ B or B ∼ A.
If A ∼ B /∼ ⊤ or B ∼ A /∼ ⊤, then (ii) and (iii) hold.
Suppose that A ∼ B /∼ ⊤ or B ∼ A /∼ ⊤. By cases on the last rule applied in the derivation. Most cases
are trivial. The only interesting cases are the following three.
Case: (∼=-fix). In this case, for some Y and C, A = µY.C and B = C[µY.C/Y ], or vice versa. Note that
C[⊤/Y ] /∼ ⊤, since C[⊤/Y ] ∼ ⊤ implies µY.C ∼ ⊤ by (∼=-uniq). Therefore, (µY.C)c = Cc[µY.C/Y ] =
C[µY.C/Y ]c by Lemma 4.20.
Case: (∼=-uniq). In this case, there exist some Y , C and D such that D ∼ C[D/Y ], and either A = D
and B = µY.C, or vice versa. Similarly to the previous case, C[⊤/Y ] is not a ⊤-variant; and hence,
C[D/Y ]c = Cc[D/Y ] by Lemma 4.20. We also get Cc /= ⊤ and Cc /= •nY for any n, since µY.C is not a
⊤-variant. That is, there are two subcases on the form of Cc to consider.
(a) Cc = •nX for some n and X such that X /= Y .
(b) Cc = •n(E→ F ) for some n, E and F such that F /∼ ⊤, where n = 0 in case of ≃.
In case (a), C[D/Y ]c = Cc[D/Y ] = (•nX)[D/Y ] = •nX ; and hence, Dc = •nX by induction hypothesis. On
the other hand, (µY.C)c = Cc[µY.C/Y ] = (•nX)[µY.C/Y ] = •nX . As for case (b), C[D/Y ]c = Cc[D/Y ] =
(•n(E→F ))[D/Y ] = •n(E[D/Y ]→F [D/Y ]); and hence, by induction hypothesis,Dc = •n(E′→F ′) for some
E′ and F ′ such that E′ ∼ E[D/Y ] and F ′ ∼ F [D/Y ] /∼ ⊤. On the other hand, (µY.C)c = Cc[µY.C/Y ] =
(•n(E → F ))[µY.C/Y ] = •n(E[µY.C/Y ] → F [µY.C/Y ]). Note that E′ ∼ E[D/Y ] ∼ E[µY.C/Y ] and
F ′ ∼ F [D/Y ] ∼ F [µY.C/Y ] by Proposition 4.4 since D ∼ µY.C.
Case: (≃-K/L). This case only applies to ≃. In this case, A = •(C→D) and B = •C→•D, or vice versa.
Therefore, Ac≃ = Bc≃ = •C→•D by Definition 4.18. 
Proposition 4.22. A ∼ B if and only if either
(i) Ac = Bc = ⊤,
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(ii) Ac = Bc = •nX for some n and X, or
(iii) Ac = •n(C → D) and Bc = •n(E → F ) for some n, C, D, E and F such that C ∼ E and D ∼ F .
Furthermore, n = 0 in case of ≃.
Proof. The “if” part is straightforward by Proposition 4.19, (∼=-•) and (∼=-→). We get the “only if” part
by Propositions 4.19 and 4.21. 
4.5. Other properties of the equality of types
In the rest of this section, we shall continue to examine other properties of ∼= and ≃ that are necessary
for the proofs in the succeeding sections. The conjectures raised at the beginning of the previous subsection
will be proved.
Proposition 4.23. 1. If •A ∼= B→ C then A ∼= C ∼= ⊤.
2. If •A ≃ B→ C, then (a) A ≃ C ≃ ⊤, or (b) A ≃ D→ E for some D and E such that •D ≃ B and
•E ≃ C.
Proof. For Item 1, suppose that •A ∼= B→ C. Since either A /∼= ⊤ or C /∼= ⊤ implies that neither •A nor
B→C is a⊤-variant by Proposition 2.3 and Theorem 4.14, we get (•A)c∼= = •Ac∼= and (B→C)c∼= = B→C by
Definition 4.18. However, it contradicts Proposition 4.22. As for Item 2, suppose that •A ≃ B→C, and that
either A /≃ ⊤ or C /≃ ⊤. Since either one implies that B→C is not a⊤-variant, we get (B→C)c≃ = B→C.
Therefore, by Propositions 4.19, 4.22 and Definition 4.18, we get A ≃ Ac≃ = D→E for some D and E such
that (•A)c≃ = •D→ •E, •D ≃ B, and •E ≃ C. 
Proposition 4.24. Let m and n be non-negative integers.
1. •mX /∼ •n(A→B).
2. •mX /∼ ⊤.
3. •mX ∼ •nY if and only if X = Y and m = n.
4. X /∼ •A.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 4.21 and Definition 4.184. 
Definition 4.25. Let n be a non-negative integer. We define pAq
n
as follows.
pAq
n
= ⊤ (A is a⊤-variant)
pXq
n
= X
p•Aq
0
= •A ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
p•Aq
n+1
= pAq
n
( •A is not a⊤-variant)
pA→ Bq
n
= pAq
n
→ pBq
n
(A→B is not a⊤-variant)
pµX.Aq
n
= pA[µX.A/X ]q
n
(µX.A is not a⊤-variant)
Note that pAq
n
is defined by induction on the lexicographic ordering of 〈n, r(A) 〉. For example,
pµX.•X → Y q
0
= p•(µX.•X → Y )→ Y q
0
= p•(µX.•X → Y )q
0
→ pY q
0
= •(µX.•X → Y )→ Y,
4Proposition 4.24 can be also shown by Theorems 4.7 and 4.8 considering an appropriate type environment under a certain
non-trivial interpretation.
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pµX.•(•X →••Y )q
3
= p•(•(µX.•(•X → ••Y ))→ ••Y )q
3
= p•(µX.•(•X→ ••Y ))→••Y q
2
= p•(µX.•(•X→ ••Y ))q
2
→ p••Y q
2
= pµX.•(•X →••Y )q
1
→ p•Y q
1
= p•(•(µX.•(•X → ••Y ))→ ••Y )q
1
→ pY q
0
= p•(µX.•(•X→ ••Y ))→••Y q
0
→ Y
= (p•(µX.•(•X →••Y ))q
0
→ p••Y q
0
)→ Y
= (•(µX.•(•X →••Y ))→••Y )→ Y.
Proposition 4.26. 1. pAq
0
∼ A.
2. p•Aq
n+1
∼ pAq
n
.
3. pA→ Bq
n
∼ pAq
n
→ pBq
n
.
4. pµX.Aq
n
∼ pA[µX.A/X ]q
n
.
Proof. Item 1 is by straightforward induction on r(A). Note that other items are trivial for type expressions
other than⊤-variants. Use Propositions 2.3, 2.10.4 and Theorem 4.14. 
Lemma 4.27. Let m and n be non-negative integers, A1, . . . , Am, B1, . . . , Bm and C be type expressions
such that Ai ∼ Bi and pAiq
k
∼ pBiq
k
for every k < n and i (1 ≤ i ≤ m). Let ~X = X1, . . . , Xm,
~A = A1, . . . , Am and ~B = B1, . . . , Bm. If for every i, either (a) C is proper in Xi, or (b)
pAi
qn ∼ pBiq
n
,
then pC[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pC[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
Proof. By induction on the lexicographic ordering of 〈n, h(C) 〉, and by cases on the form of C. Suppose
(a) or (b) holds for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ m). If C is a⊤-variant or n = 0, then we get pC[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pC[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
by Proposition 2.10.1, or by Propositions 4.26.1 and 4.4, respectively. Hence, we assume that C is not a
⊤-variant and n > 0.
Case: C = Y for some Y . If Y /∈ { ~X }, then obvious since C[ ~A/ ~X] = C = C[ ~B/ ~X]. If Y = Xi for some i,
then C[ ~A/ ~X] = Ai and C[ ~B/ ~X] = Bi. Hence,
pC[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pC[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
from (b) since C is not proper in
Xi.
Case: C = •D for some D. In this case, pD[ ~A/ ~X]q
n−1
∼ pD[ ~B/ ~X]q
n−1
by induction hypothesis. Hence,
pC[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pD[ ~A/ ~X]q
n−1
∼ pD[ ~B/ ~X]q
n−1
∼ pC[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
by Proposition 4.26.2.
Case: C = D→ E for some D and E. Note that, for every i, both D and E are proper in Xi if and only
if so is C, since C is not a ⊤-variant. Therefore, pD[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pD[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
and pE[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pE[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
by induction hypothesis; and hence, pC[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pD[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
→ pE[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pD[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
→ pE[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
∼
pC[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
by Proposition 4.26.3 and (∼=-→).
Case: C = µY.D for some Y and D. We can assume that for any i, Y /∈ {Xi } ∪ FTV (Ai) ∪ FTV (Bi)
without loss of generality. Note that, for every i, D is proper in Xi if and only if so is C, since C is not
a ⊤-variant and Y /= Xi. By induction hypothesis,
pC[ ~A/ ~X]q
k
∼ pC[ ~B/ ~X]q
k
for every k < n. Since D is
proper in Y ,
pC[ ~A/ ~X]q
n
∼ pD[ ~A/ ~X][C[ ~A/ ~X]/Y ]q
n
(by Proposition 4.26.4)
= pD[ ~A/ ~X,C[ ~A/ ~X]/Y ]q
n
(since Y /∈ FTV ( ~A))
∼ pD[ ~B/ ~X,C[ ~B/ ~X]/Y ]q
n
(by induction hypothesis)
= pD[ ~B/ ~X][C[ ~B/ ~X]/Y ]q
n
(since Y /∈ FTV ( ~B))
∼ pC[ ~B/ ~X]q
n
(by Proposition 4.26.4). 
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Proposition 4.28. If A ∼ B, then pAq
n
∼ pBq
n
for every n.
Proof. Suppose that A ∼ B. Since obviously pAq
0
∼ pBq
0
by Proposition 4.26.1, we assume that n > 0,
below. By induction on the derivation of A ∼ B, and by cases on the last rule applied in the derivation.
Use Proposition 4.26. The only non-trivial case is (∼=-uniq). In this case, there exist some X and C such
that B = µX.C, A ∼ C[A/X ] and C is proper in X . By induction hypothesis,
pAq
n
∼ pC[A/X ]q
n
. (12)
We show that pAq
n
∼ pBq
n
by induction on n. By the induction hypothesis on n, we have
pAq
k
∼ pBq
k
for every k < n. (13)
Therefore,
pAq
n
∼ pC[A/X ]q
n
(by (12))
∼ pC[B/X ]q
n
(by Lemma 4.27 and (13))
∼ pBq
n
(by Proposition 4.26.4). 
Proposition 4.29. 1. •A ∼ •B if and only if A ∼ B.
2. A→ B ∼ C→D if and only if (a) A ∼ C and B ∼ D, or (b) B ∼ D ∼ ⊤.
Proof. The “if” part of Item 1 is obvious from (∼=-•), and so is the “only if” part since A ∼ pAq
0
∼
p•Aq
1
∼ p•Bq
1
∼ pBq
0
∼ B by Propositions 4.26.1, 4.26.2 and 4.28. The “if” part of Item 2 is also obvious
from (∼=-→) and (∼=-→⊤). As for the “only if” part of Item 2, suppose that A→ B ∼ C → D. If A→ B
or C → D is a ⊤-variant, then so are both B and D by Proposition 2.3.3 and Theorem 4.14; and hence,
B ∼ D ∼ ⊤. On the other hand, if neither is a ⊤-variant, we get A ∼ C and B ∼ D by Proposition 4.21
since (A→B)c = A→ B and (C→D)c = C→D. 
We shall conclude this section with the following lemma, which will be used in the proof of Propositions 5.7
and 5.8 in the succeeding section.
Lemma 4.30. Let A be proper in X, and suppose that A[B/X ] ∼ B.
1. If Bc = •nY , then Ac = •nY .
2. If Bc≃ = •n(C → D), then Ac≃ = •n(C′ → D′) for some n, C′ and D′ such that C′[B/X ] ∼ C and
D′[B/X ] ∼ D, where n = 0 is case of ≃.
Proof. By cases on the form of Ac. Suppose that A is proper in X and A[B/X ] ∼ B.
Case: Ac = ⊤. Either Bc = •nY or Bc = •n(C → D) implies B /∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.21; and hence,
Ac /= ⊤ from A[B/X ] ∼ B by Propositions 2.10.1, 4.19 and Theorem 4.14.
Case: Ac = •mZ for some m and Z. If Z = X , then m > 0 since A is proper in X , and B ∼ A[B/X ] ∼
(•mX)[B/X ] = •mB, which implies B ∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.3.3. Hence, Z /= X ; and therefore, B ∼
A[B/X ] ∼ (•mZ)[B/X ] = •mZ, which implies that Bc = •mZ by Proposition 4.21. Thus, both Items 1
and 2 hold.
Case: Ac = •m(E → F ) for some m, E and F . In this case, B ∼ A[B/X ] ∼ •m(E → F )[B/X ] =
•m(E[B/X ] → F [B/X ]). Hence, by Proposition 4.21, Bc = •m(C → D) for some C and D such that
C ∼= E[B/X ] and D ∼= F [B/X ]. Therefore, both Items 1 and 2 hold. Note that m = 0 in case of ≃. 
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5. Subtyping
As mentioned in Section 1, our intended interpretation of the •-modality introduces a subtyping relation
into types. We define the subtyping relation by a set of derivation rules in a similar way to [2].
Definition 5.1. A subtyping assumption is a finite set of pairs of type variables such that any type variable
appears at most once in the set. To denote the subtyping assumption { 〈Xi, Yi 〉 | i = 1, 2, . . . , n }, we
write {X1  Y1, X2  Y2, . . . , Xn  Yn }. We use γ, γ′, γ1, γ2, . . . to denote subtyping assumptions, and
FTV (γ) to denote the set of type variables occurring in γ.
Definition 5.2 (). We define the derivability of subtyping judgment γ ⊢ A  B by the following derivation
rules.
γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ X  Y
(-assump)
γ ⊢ A  ⊤
(-⊤)
A ≃ B
γ ⊢ A  B
(-reflex)
γ1 ⊢ A  B γ2 ⊢ B  C
γ1 ∪ γ2 ⊢ A  C
(-trans)
γ ⊢ A  B
γ ⊢ •A  •B
(-•)
γ1 ⊢ A′  A γ2 ⊢ B  B′
γ1 ∪ γ2 ⊢ A→B  A′→B′
(-→)
γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ A  B
γ ⊢ µX.A  µY.B
(-µ)
(
X /∈ FTV (γ) ∪ FTV (B), Y /∈ FTV (γ) ∪ FTV (A),
and A and B are proper in X and Y , respectively
)
γ ⊢ A  •A
(-approx)
Note that γ ∪ {X  Y } and γ1 ∪ γ2 in the rules must be well-formed subtyping assumptions, i.e., any type
variable must not have more than one occurrence in them. We also define a binary relation  over TExp
as A  B if and only if {} ⊢A  B is derivable.
The subtyping relation  reflects the interpretation of type expressions in λA-frames. Most of the
subtyping rules are standard. The rule (-µ) corresponds to the “Amber rule” [6]. The rules (-⊤), (-•)
and (-approx) reflect our intended meaning of the •-modality discussed in Section 1. In the rest of this
section, we discuss some basic properties of .
We can also consider another subtyping judgment, say γ ⊢ A ≺= B, by substituting A ∼= B for the
antecedent of the (-reflex)-rule and by instead adding the following subtyping rule, which corresponds to
the axiom schema K of normal modal logic.
γ ⊢ •(A→B) ≺= •A→•B
(≺=-K)
However, in order to concentrate on the main purpose of the present paper, we will not discuss such a variant
in the sequel5.
Definition 5.3. Let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be a λA-frame, η a type environment, and γ a subtyping assumption. We
write η |= γ if and only if η(X)p ⊆ η(Y )p for every p ∈ W , X and Y such that {X  Y } ⊆ γ.
5In [22], this variant is called S-λ•µ+.
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Theorem 5.4 (Soundness of ). Consider the interpretation I over a λA-frame 〈W , ⊲ 〉. Let η be a
hereditary type environment. If γ ⊢ A  B and η |= γ, then I(A)ηp ⊆ I(B)
η
p for every p ∈ W.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of γ ⊢ A  B, and by cases on the last subtyping rule applied in the
derivation.
Case: (-assump). In this case, A = X and B = Y for some X and Y such that {X  Y } ⊆ γ. We get
η(X)p ⊆ η(Y )p for every p from η |= γ.
Case: (-⊤). Obvious from Definition 3.8.
Case: (-reflex). Obvious from Theorem 4.8.
Case: (-trans). For some C, γ1 and γ2 such that γ = γ1 ∪ γ2, the derivation ends with
γ1 ⊢ A  C γ2 ⊢ C  B
γ1 ∪ γ2 ⊢ A  B
(-trans).
Since γ = γ1 ∪ γ2, we get η |= γ1 and η |= γ2 from η |= γ. Therefore, I(A)ηp ⊆ I(C)
η
p ⊆ I(B)
η
p by induction
hypothesis.
Case: (-•). For some A′ and B′ such that A = •A′ and B = •B′, the derivation ends with
γ ⊢ A′  B′
γ ⊢ •A′  •B′
(-•).
We get I(A′)ηq ⊆ I(B
′)ηq for every q by induction hypothesis. Therefore, by Proposition 3.9,
I(•A′)ηp = { u | u ∈ I(A
′)ηq for every q ⊳ p } ⊆ { u | u ∈ I(B
′)ηq for every q ⊳ p } = I(•B
′)ηp.
Case: (-→). For some A1, A2, B1, B2, γ1 and γ2 such that A = A1→A2, B = B1→B2 and γ = γ1 ∪ γ2,
the derivation ends with
γ1 ⊢ B1  A1 γ2 ⊢ A2  B2
γ1 ∪ γ2 ⊢ A1 →A2  B1 →B2
(-→).
Similarly to the previous case, we get I(B1)
η
q ⊆ I(A1)
η
q and I(A2)
η
q ⊆ I(B2)
η
q for every q, by induc-
tion hypothesis. Therefore, by Proposition 3.9, I(A1 → A2)ηp = { u | u · v ∈ I(A2)
η
q for every v ∈
I(A1)ηq whenever p
∗
⊲ q } ⊆ { u | u · v ∈ I(B2)ηq for every v ∈ I(B1)
η
q whenever p
∗
⊲ q } = I(B1 →B2)ηp.
Case: (-µ). For some X ′, Y ′, A′ and B′ such that A = µX ′.A′ and B = µY ′.B′, the derivation ends with
γ ∪ {X ′  Y ′ } ⊢ A′  B′
γ ⊢ µX ′.A′  µY ′.B′
(-µ)
where X ′ /∈ FTV (γ) ∪ FTV (B′), Y ′ /∈ FTV (γ) ∪ FTV (A′), and furthermore, A′ and B′ are proper in X ′
and Y ′, respectively. We show that I(A)ηp ⊆ I(B)
η
p for every p ∈ W by induction on p. Suppose that
p ∈ W . By the induction hypothesis on p,
I(A)ηq ⊆ I(B)
η
q for every q ⊳ p. (14)
Let η′ be the type environment defined as follows.
η′(X ′)q =
{ I(A)ηq (p ⊲ q)
{} (p /⊲ q)
η′(Y ′)q =
{ I(B)ηq (p ⊲ q)
{} (p /⊲ q)
η′(Z)q = η(Z)q (Z /∈ {X
′, Y ′ })
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Note that
η′(Z)q = η[ I(A)
η/X ′, I(B)η/Y ′](Z)q for every Z and q ⊳ p, (15)
and that η′ |= γ ∪ {X ′  Y ′ } by (14). Hence, by the induction hypothesis on the derivation,
I(A′)η
′
p ⊆ I(B
′)η
′
p . (16)
On the other hand,
I(A)ηp = I(A
′[A/X ′])ηp (by Proposition 3.9)
= I(A′[A/X ′, B/Y ′])ηp (by Proposition 4.16 and Theorem 4.8)
= I(A′)η[ I(A)
η/X′, I(B)η/Y ′]
p (by Proposition 3.10.1)
= I(A′)η
′
p (by (15) and Lemma 4.6).
Similarly, I(B)ηp = I(B
′)η
′
p . Therefore, I(A)
η
p ⊆ I(B)
η
p by (16).
Case: (-approx). B = •A in this case. Hence, I(A)ηp ⊆ { u | u ∈ I(A)
η
q for every q ⊳ p } = I(B)
η
p by
Propositions 3.10.2 and 3.9. 
Although not being necessary for showing the soundness of subtyping judgments, the following basic
propositions should also be established in order to discuss formal derivability of subtyping, later.
Proposition 5.5. 1. If γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ A  B is derivable, and γ ∪ {X ′  Y ′ } is a well-formed
subtyping assumption, then γ ∪ {X ′  Y ′ } ⊢ A[X ′/X, Y ′/Y ]  B[X ′/X, Y ′/Y ] is also derivable
without changing the height of derivation. (renaming)
2. If γ ⊢ A  B is derivable, and γ′ is a subtyping assumption such that γ ⊆ γ′, then γ′ ⊢ A  B is also
derivable without changing the height of derivation. (weakening)
3. If γ ∪{X  Y } ⊢ A  B is derivable, then so is γ ⊢ A[C/X, C/Y ]  B[C/X, C/Y ] without changing
the height of derivation.
4. If γ∪{X  Y } ⊢ A  B and γ ⊢ C  D are derivable, then so is γ ⊢ A[C/X, D/Y ]  B[C/X, D/Y ].
(substitution)
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation of γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ A  B or γ ⊢ A  B, and by cases
on the last rule applied. The proofs for Items 1 and 2 proceed by simultaneous induction. We use Item 1
to rename the bound type variables in case of (-µ), and Item 2 to unify the typing assumptions of the
two antecedents when the last rule is (-trans) or (-→). Use Proposition 4.4 for the case (-reflex) in the
proofs of Items 1, 3 and 4. 
In the rest of the present section, we shall show three more basic propositions about subtyping, which
give us some intuitions about the structure of subtyping introduced by the derivation rules, and are crucial
to prove the subject reduction property of the typing system in the next section.
Proposition 5.6. If γ ⊢ ⊤  A is derivable, then A ∼ ⊤.
Proof. Suppose that γ ⊢ A  B is derivable. By Theorem 4.14, it suffices to show that A ≃ ⊤ implies
B ≃ ⊤. The proof proceeds by induction on the height of the derivation, and by cases on the last rule
applied in the derivation. The case (-assump) is impossible by Proposition 4.24.2. The cases (-⊤) and
(-reflex) are trivial. The case (-trans) is straightforward by induction hypothesis. Use Propositions 4.15.2
and 4.15.3 for the cases (-•), (-→), and (-approx). If the last rule is (-µ), then the derivation ends
with
γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ A′  B′
γ ⊢ µX.A′  µY.B′
(-µ)
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for some X , Y , A′ and B′ such that A = µX.A′, B = µY.B′, X /∈ FTV (B′), Y /∈ FTV (A′), and
furthermore, A′ and B′ are proper in X and Y , respectively. By Proposition 5.5.3, we can get a derivation of
γ ⊢ A′[⊤/X ]  B′[⊤/Y ] from the one of γ∪{X  Y } ⊢ A′  B′ without changing the height of derivation.
On the other hand, since A ≃ A′[A/X ] and A ≃ ⊤, we also get A′[⊤/X ] ≃ ⊤ by Proposition 4.4. Therefore,
by induction hypothesis, B′[⊤/X ] ≃ ⊤; and hence, B = µY.B′ ≃ ⊤ by (∼=-uniq). 
Proposition 5.7. Suppose that γ ⊢ A  B be a derivable subtyping judgment, and B /≃ ⊤.
1. If Ac≃ = •mX, then Bc≃ = •nY for some n and Y such that m ≤ n, and either X = Y or {X 
Y } ⊆ γ.
2. If Bc≃ = •nY , then Ac≃ = •mX for some m and X such that m ≤ n, and either X = Y or
{X  Y } ⊆ γ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of γ ⊢ A  B, and by cases on the last rule applied in the derivation.
Use Propositions 4.19 and 4.24.3 for the case (-assump), and use Propositions 4.21, 5.6 and 4.3.1 for the
cases (-reflex), (-trans) and (-•), respectively. The case (-→) is impossible by Propositions 4.24.1 and
4.19. If the last rule is (-µ), then the derivation ends with
γ ∪ {X ′  Y ′ } ⊢ A′  B′
γ ⊢ µX ′.A′  µY ′.B′
(-µ)
for some X ′, Y ′, A′ and B′ such that A = µX ′.A′, B = µY ′.B′, X ′ /∈ FTV (B′), Y ′ /∈ FTV (A′), and
furthermore, A′ and B′ are proper in X ′ and Y ′, respectively. For Item 1, suppose that Ac≃ = •mX and
B /≃ ⊤. Note that X /= X ′ by Poposition 4.19 and 4.11.1, and that B′ /≃ ⊤ since B′ ∼ ⊤ implies B ∼ ⊤.
Since A′[A/X ′] ∼ A ∼ Ac≃ = •mX and A′ is proper in X ′, we get A′c≃ = •mX by Lemma 4.30.1; and
therefore, by induction hypothesis, B′c≃ = •nY for some n ≥ m, and X = Y or {X  Y } ⊆ γ∪{X ′  Y ′ }.
We get Y ′ /= Y from B /∼= ⊤ because otherwise B ∼= µY.B′c≃ = µY.•nY ∼= ⊤ by Propositions 4.19, 4.12.1 and
4.3.2; and hence, Bc≃ = B′c≃[B/Y ′] = •nY . Note that {X  Y } ⊆ γ ∪ {X ′  Y ′ } implies {X  Y } ⊆ γ
because X ′ /= X . Symmetrically, we can show Item 2 in this case. 
Proposition 5.8. Suppose that γ ⊢ A  B is derivable, and B /≃ ⊤.
1. If Ac≃ = C→D, then there exist some k, E and F such that
(1a) Bc≃ = E→ F ,
(1b) γ ⊢ E  •kC and γ ⊢ •kD  F are derivable.
2. If Bc≃ = E→ F , then there exist some k, C and D such that
(2a) Ac≃ = C→D,
(2b) γ ⊢ E  •kC and γ ⊢ •kD  F are derivable.
Note that k ranges over non-negative integers.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of γ ⊢ A  B, and by cases on the last rule used in the derivation.
Lemma 4.30.2 is crucial to the case (-µ). We will employ Theorem 4.14 and Proposition 4.19 in this proof
without specific mention. First, note that A /≃ ⊤ from B /≃ ⊤ by Proposition 5.6. Hence, Ac≃ = C → D
and Bc≃ = E→ F imply D /≃ ⊤ and F /≃ ⊤, respectively, by Proposition 2.3.3.
Case: (-assump). In this case, both A and B are type variables. Hence, trivial by Proposition 4.24.1.
Case: (-⊤). This case is impossible since B /∼ ⊤.
Case: (-reflex). In this case, A ≃ B. Hence, we can get both Items 1 and 2 by Proposition 4.21.
Case: (-trans). In this case, γ1 ⊢ A  G and γ2 ⊢ G  B are derivable for some γ1, γ2 and G such that
γ = γ1 ∪ γ2. We get G /∼ ⊤ from B /∼ ⊤ by Proposition 5.6. If Ac≃ = C → D, then by the induction
hypothesis on γ1 ⊢ A  G, there exist some k′, E′ and F ′ such that
Gc≃ = E′→ F ′,
γ1 ⊢ E
′  •k
′
C and γ1 ⊢ •
k′D  F ′ are derivable.
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Therefore, by the induction hypothesis on γ2 ⊢ G  B, there exist some k′′, E and F such that
Bc≃ = E→ F,
γ2 ⊢ E  •
k′′E′ and γ2 ⊢ •
k′′F ′  F are derivable.
Taking k as k = k′ + k′′, we get (1a) and (1b). The proof for Item 2 is just symmetrical.
Case: (-•). In this case, γ ⊢ A′  B′ is derivable for some A′ and B′ such that A = •A′ and B = •B′. We
get B′ /∼ ⊤ from B /∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.3.1. If Ac≃ = C →D, then A′c≃ = C′→D′ for some C′ and D′
such that C = •C′ and D = •D′ by Definition 4.18. Therefore, by induction hypothesis, there exist some
k, E′ and F ′ such that
B′c≃ = E′→ F ′,
γ ⊢ E′  •kC′ and γ ⊢ •kD′  F ′ are derivable.
Hence, it suffices for Item 1 to take E and F as E = •E′ and F = •F ′, respectively, since Bc≃ = (•B′)c≃ =
•E→•F . The proof for Item 2 is just symmetrical.
Case: (-→). In this case, γ1 ⊢ B1  A1 and γ2 ⊢ A2  B2 are derivable for some γ1, γ2, A1, A2, B1 and
B2 such that γ = γ1∪γ2, A = A1→A2 and B = B1→B2. If Ac≃ = C→D, then we get C = A1 and D = A2
by Definition 4.18. Hence, it suffices to take k, E and F as k = 0, E = B1 and F = B2. Symmetrically, if
Bc≃ = E→ F , we get E = B1 and F = B2; and hence, it suffices to take k, C and D as k = 0, C = A1 and
D = A2.
Case: (-µ). In this case, γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ A′  B′ is derivable for some X , Y , A′ and B′ such that
A = µX.A′, (17)
B = µY.B′, (18)
X /∈ FTV (γ) ∪ FTV (B′), and (19)
Y /∈ FTV (γ) ∪ FTV (A′). (20)
Note that A′ and B′ are proper in X and Y , respectively, and that A′ /≃ ⊤ and B′ /≃ ⊤ from A /≃ ⊤ and
B /≃ ⊤, respectively, by Definition 2.2. For Item 1, suppose that Ac≃ = C→D. Then, A′c≃[A/X ] = Ac≃ =
C→D by Definition 4.18 and (17). Therefore, by Lemma 4.30.2, there exist some C′ and D′ such that
A′c≃ = C′→D′
C ≃ C′[A/X ] and D ≃ D′[A/X ]. (21)
Hence, by induction hypothesis, there exist some k, E′ and F ′ such that
(1a′) B′c≃ = E′→ F ′,
(1b′) γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ E′  •kC′ and γ ∪ {X  Y } ⊢ •kD′  F ′ are derivable.
Let E and F be as E = E′[B/Y ] and F = F ′[B/Y ], respectively. Then, (1a) can be shown as follows.
Bc≃ = B′c≃[B/Y ] (by (18) and Definition 4.18)
= (E′→ F ′)[B/Y ] (by (1a′))
= E→ F
Note that F /≃ ⊤ from B /≃ ⊤ by Proposition 2.3.3; and hence, X /∈ ETV (E) ∪ ETV (F ) ∪ FTV (B) from
(19), since ETV (E) ∪ ETV (F ) = ETV (E → F ) = ETV (Bc≃) = ETV (B) ⊆ FTV (B) ⊆ FTV (B′) by
Definition 2.7 and Proposition 4.11.1. Therefore,
E ≃ E[A/X ] = E′[B/Y ][A/X ] = E′[A/X, B/Y ], and
F ≃ F [A/X ] = F ′[B/Y ][A/X ] = F ′[A/X, B/Y ]
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by Proposition 4.16. On the other hand, similarly, we get Y /∈ ETV (C) ∪ ETV (D) ∪ FTV (A) from (20);
and therefore, by (21),
C ≃ C[B/Y ] ≃ C′[A/X ][B/Y ] = C′[A/X, B/Y ], and
D ≃ D[B/Y ] ≃ D′[A/X ][B/Y ] = D′[A/X, B/Y ].
Hence, (1b) can be also established, for γ ⊢ E′[A/X, B/Y ]  •kC′[A/X, B/Y ] and γ ⊢ •kD′[A/X, B/Y ] 
F ′[A/X, B/Y ] are derivable from (1b′) by Proposition 5.5.4. We thus get (1a) and (1b) in this case. The
proof for Item 2 is just symmetrical.
Case: (-approx). In this case, B = •A. If Ac≃ = C →D, then Bc≃ = •C → •D by Definition 4.18; and
hence, it suffices to take k, E and F as k = 1, E = •C and F = •D. Symmetrically, If Bc≃ = E→ F , then
by Definition 4.18, Ac≃ = C →D for some C and D such that E = •C and F = •D. Hence, it suffices to
take k as k = 1. 
It might be supposed that the following hold concerning the subtyping of type expressions.
(Wrong) If •A  B, then B ≃ •C for some C such that A  C.
(Wrong) If A  •B, then either (a) A  B, or (b) A ≃ •C for some C such that C  B.
However, neither is the case. Consider the following counter-examples, respectively.
•(X → Y ) ≃ •X→ •Y  X →•Y
(X →•Y )→•Z  (•X →•Y )→ •Z ≃ •((X → Y )→ Z)
6. The typing system λA
In this section, we finally introduce a typed λ-calculus equipped with the modality and recursive types.
Definition 6.1 (Typing contexts). A typing context is a finite mapping that assigns a type expression to
each individual variable of its domain. We use Γ, Γ′, . . . to denote typing contexts, and { x1 : A1, . . . , xm :
Am } to denote a typing context whose domain is { x1, . . . , xm } and that assigns Ai to xi for every i, where
A1, . . . , Am are type expressions, and x1, . . . , xm are distinct individual variables. We use Dom(Γ) to denote
the domain of Γ.
Definition 6.2 (Typing judgment). A typing judgment of λA has the following form,
{ x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An } ⊢M : B,
where { x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An } is a typing context, M a λ-term, and B a type expression. We
occasionally write the same judgment omitting { } as follows.
x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An ⊢M : B
Note that n can be 0. We use •Γ to denote the typing context { x1 : •A1, x2 : •A2, . . . , xn : •An } when
Γ = { x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An }, and write Γ
′ Γ if and only if Dom(Γ′) = Dom(Γ) and Γ′(x)  Γ(x)
for every x ∈ Dom(Γ).
We now define the typing rules of λA. According to the intended meaning of •, three typing rules, namely
(shift), (⊤) and (), are added to those of the simply typed λ-calculus.
Definition 6.3 (Typing rules). The typing system λA is defined by the following derivation rules.
Γ ∪ { x : A } ⊢ x : A
(var)
•Γ ⊢M : •A
Γ ⊢M : A
(shift)
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Γ ⊢M : ⊤
(⊤)
Γ ⊢M : A A  B
Γ ⊢M : B
()
Γ ∪ { x : A } ⊢M : B
Γ ⊢ λx. M : A→B
(→ I)
Γ1 ⊢M : A→B Γ2 ⊢ N : A
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢MN : B
(→E)
The (⊤)-rule can be considered almost redundant, since in fact Γ ⊢M : ⊤ is derivable without using (⊤)
for any closed λ-termM . In derivation trees of typing judgments, the rule () is sometimes written as (∼=) or
(≃) where it is applied for two type expressions A and B such that A ∼= B or A ≃ B, respectively. Note that
two derivation rules, namely (shift) and (), are not related to term (program) construction. These rules
only reflect the relationship among types (specifications), just like the case of parametric polymorphism,
and constitute a non-constructive (non-computational, or non-informative) part of logic of programming.
The readers may wonder the following rule, which corresponds to the necessitation rule of normal modal
logic, is missing.
Γ1 ⊢M : A
•Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M : •A
(nec)
However, it will be shown that this rule is redundant to λA as Proposition 7.4. On the other hand, the
axiom schema K of normal modal logic is incorporated into λA in a stronger form as the (≃-K/L)-rule for
type equality.
The (shift)-rule represents the fact that for every hereditary interpretation over a given well-founded
frame, which is not necessarily a λA-frame, we can extend it by adding new worlds so that every possible
world p in the original frame has another world from which p is accessible. Since the interpretation of
Γ ⊢M : A in the world p is identical to the one of •Γ ⊢M : •A in such a world, Γ ⊢M : A is valid whenever
so is •Γ ⊢M : •A. In [22], the (shift)-rule was treated as an optional rule to the core typing system, which
has however turned to be sound with respect to any hereditary interpretation over well-founded frames6.
The reader should refer to the proof of Theorem 7.3 for the details.
Example 6.4. We can derive Curry’s fixed-point combinator Y in λA; more precisely, the following is
derivable.
⊢ λf. (λx. f (xx)) (λx. f (xx)) : (•X →X)→X
Let a type A = µY.•Y →X and a derivation Π as follows.
Π =
f : •X →X ⊢ f : •X →X
(var)
x : •A ⊢ x : •A
(var)
x : •A ⊢ x : ••A→•X
()
x : •A ⊢ x : •A
(var)
x : •A ⊢ x : ••A
()
x : •A ⊢ xx : •X
(→E)
f : •X →X, x : •A ⊢ f (xx) : X
(→E)
f : •X →X ⊢ λx. f (xx) : •A→X
(→I)
Then, we can derive Y as follows.
... Π
f : •X →X ⊢ λx. f (xx) : •A→X
... Π
f : •X→X ⊢ λx. f (xx) : •A→X
f : •X →X ⊢ λx. f (xx) : •A
()
f : •X →X ⊢ (λx. f (xx)) (λx. f (xx)) : X
(→E)
⊢ λf. (λx. f (xx)) (λx. f (xx)) : (•X→X)→X
(→I)
6The (shift)-rule becomes redundant if we add intersection types to λA.
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We can also observe that Turing’s fixed-point combinator (λx. λf. f (xxf)) (λx. λf. f (xxf)) has the same
type. More generally, we can derive ⊢ Yn : (•X → X)→ X for every n, where Y0 = Y and Yn+1 =
Yn(λy. λf. f (yf)).
The type (•X→X)→X gives a concise axiomatic meaning to the fixed-point combinators; it says that
they can produce an element of X with a given function that works as an information pump from •X to
X ; in other words, they provide the induction scheme discussed in Section 1. The type thus enables us
to construct recursive programs using the fixed-point combinators without analyzing their computational
behavior. We shall see some examples of such recursive programs in Section 9.
7. Basic properties of λA
In this section, we show the soundness of the typing system λA with respect to the semantics of types
presented in Section 3, and its subject reduction property. We begin with some basic property of the typing
system.
Definition 7.1 (Skeletons and sizes of derivations). The skeleton of a derivation is defined to be the
tree obtained from the derivation by erasing all the judgments occurring in it. That is, a skeleton is a finite
tree with nodes labeled by names of the inference rules listed in Definition 6.3. The size of a derivation is
defined to be the number of nodes involved in the skeleton of the derivation.
Proposition 7.2. Let Γ ∪ { x : A, y : A } be a well-formed typing context, that is, x ∈ Dom(Γ) implies
Γ(x) = A, and the same for y.
1. If Γ∪{ x : A } ⊢M : B is derivable, then so is Γ∪{ y : A } ⊢M [y/x] : B without changing the skeleton
of the derivation. (renaming)
2. If Γ ⊢ M : B is derivable, then so is Γ ∪ { x : A } ⊢ M : B without changing the skeleton of the
derivation. (weakening)
3. If Γ ∪ { x : A } ⊢ M [x/y] : B is derivable, then so is Γ ∪ { x : A, y : A } ⊢ M : B without changing the
skeleton of the derivation. (separation)
4. Suppose that x /∈ FV (M). If Γ∪{ x : A } ⊢M : B is derivable, then so is Γ ⊢M : B without changing
the skeleton of the derivation. (erasing)
Proof. By induction on the skeletons of the derivations, and by cases on the rule applied last in them. The
proofs of Items 1 and 2 proceed by simultaneous induction. We use Item 1 for 3, and use Item 2 for 3 and 4.
Note that since we have the (⊤)-rule, FV (M) ⊆ Dom(Γ) is not always the case when Γ ⊢M : B is derivable
for some B. 
Now we can show the soundness of λA with respect to the semantics I of type expressions over λA-
frames.
Theorem 7.3 (Soundness of λA). If { x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An } ⊢ M : B is derivable in λA, then for any
λA-frame 〈W , ⊲ 〉, [[M ]]Vρ ∈ I(B)
η
p for every p ∈ W, hereditary η and ρ whenever ρ(xi) ∈ I(Ai)
η
p for every
i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
Proof. By induction on the derivation, and by cases on the last rule used in it. Most cases are straightfor-
ward. Use Theorem 5.4 for the case of (). Let Γ = { x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An }, and Γ ⊢M : B be a derivable
judgment. Suppose that 〈W , ⊲ 〉 is a λA-frame, and that ρ(xi) ∈ I(Ai)ηp (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
Case: (var). In this case, M = xj and B = Aj for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ n). Therefore, by assumption,
[[M ]]Vρ = [[xj ]]
V
ρ = ρ(xj) ∈ I(Aj)
η
p = I(B)
η
p.
Case: (shift). In this case, the derivation ends with
{ x1 : •A1, x2 : •A2, . . . , xn : •An, } ⊢M : •B
{ x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An } ⊢M : B
(shift).
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For the given 〈W , ⊲ 〉, η and p, we construct another λA-frame 〈W ′, ⊲′ 〉 and a hereditary type environment
η′ for 〈W ′, ⊲′ 〉 by extending 〈W , ⊲ 〉 and η, respectively, as follows.
W ′ = { ⋆ } ∪W (⋆ /∈ W)
q ⊲′ r iff
{ q = ⋆ and r = p, or
q, r ∈ W and q ⊲ r
η′(X)q =
{ η(X)p (q = ⋆)
η(X)q (q ∈ W)
where ⋆ is a fresh world added to the original ones. Obviously, ⊲′ is (conversely) well-founded, and η′
hereditary. Observe also that ⊲′ is locally linear; and hence, 〈W ′, ⊲′ 〉 constitutes a λA-frame. Then, let
I ′(A)η
′
be the interpretation of A in the λA-frame 〈W ′, ⊲′ 〉 under the type environment η′. Note that
I ′(A)η
′
q = I(A)
η
q for every q ∈ W and A. Since ρ(xi) ∈ I(Ai)
η
p, we get ρ(xi) ∈ I
′(Ai)
η′
q for every q ⊳
′ ⋆
by the definition of ⊲′. Hence, ρ(xi) ∈ I
′(•Ai)
η′
⋆ . By induction hypothesis, we get [[M ]]
V
ρ ∈ I
′(•B)η
′
⋆ ; and
hence, [[M ]]
V
ρ ∈ I
′(B)η
′
p = I(B)
η
p because ⋆ ⊲
′ p.
Case: (⊤). Obvious since I(⊤)ηp = V for every p ∈ W by Definition 3.8.
Case: (). For some B′, the derivation ends with
Γ ⊢M : B′ ⊢ B′  B
Γ ⊢M : B
().
We get [[M ]]Vρ ∈ I(B)
η
p by Theorem 5.4 because [[M ]]
V
ρ ∈ I(B
′)ηp by induction hypothesis.
Case: (→I). The derivation ends with
Γ ∪ { y : B1 } ⊢ L : B2
Γ ⊢ λy. L : B1 →B2
(→I)
for some y, L, B1 and B2 such that M = λy. L and B = B1 → B2. Suppose that p
∗
⊲ r and v ∈ I(B1)ηr .
By Proposition 3.9, it suffices to show that [[λy. L]]
V
ρ · v ∈ I(B2)
η
r . Since p
∗
⊲ r, by Proposition 3.10.2,
ρ[v/y](xi) = ρ(xi) ∈ I(Ai)ηp ⊆ I(Ai)
η
r for every i such that xi /= y, and ρ[v/y](y) = v ∈ I(B1)
η
p ⊆ I(B1)
η
r .
Hence, by induction hypothesis, [[L]]
V
ρ[v/y] ∈ I(B2)
η
r . Therefore, [[λy. L]]
V
ρ · v = [[L]]
V
ρ[v/y] ∈ I(B2)
η
r by
Definition 3.4.
Case: (→E). The derivation ends with
Γ1 ⊢M1 : C→ B Γ2 ⊢M2 : C
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M1M2 : B
(→E)
for some Γ1, Γ2, M1, M2 and C such that Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and M = M1M2. Since Γ1,Γ2 ⊆ Γ, by induction
hypothesis, [[M1]]
V
ρ ∈ I(C → B)
η
p and [[M2]]
V
ρ ∈ I(C)
η
p. Hence, [[M1M2]]
V
ρ = [[M1]]
V
ρ · [[M2]]
V
ρ ∈ I(B)
η
p by
Definition 3.4 and Proposition 3.9. 
Theorem 7.3 assures us that the modularity of programs is preserved even if we regard type expressions,
or specifications, as asserting the convergence of programs. For example, if a type B comprises values that
are normalizable to canonical ones, and we have a program M of a type A→ B, then we can expect that
M terminates and returns such a canonical value when we provide a value of A. In Section 8, we will show
such convergence properties of well-typed λ-terms by a discussion on the soundness with respect to a term
model of the untyped λ-calculus.
In the rest of the present section, we will show other important properties of the typing system, in par-
ticular, the subject reduction property of the system, which is also necessary to derive a certain convergence
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property of well-typed λ-terms (cf. Theorem 8.34). First, we show that the following two rules are derivable
in λA. This makes the proof of the subject reduction much easier.
Γ1 ⊢M : A
•Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M : •A
(nec)
Γ1 ∪ { x : A } ⊢M : B Γ2 ⊢ N : A
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M [N/x] : B
(subst)
Proposition 7.4. The two rules (nec) and (subst) are derivable in λA. That is, the following two hold.
1. Let •Γ1 ∪Γ2 be a well-formed typing context. If Γ1 ⊢M : A is derivable, then so is •Γ1 ∪Γ2 ⊢M : •A.
2. Let Γ1 ∪ Γ2 be a well-formed typing context. If Γ1 ∪ { x : A } ⊢ M : B and Γ2 ⊢ N : A are derivable,
then so is Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M [N/x] : B.
Proof. Each proof proceeds by induction on the size of the derivation for M , and each induction step is
shown by cases on the last rule applied in it. For Item 1, suppose that Γ1 ⊢M : A is derivable.
Case: (var). In this case, M is an individual variable and {M : A } ⊆ Γ1. Therefore, •Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ M : •A is
derivable by (var).
Case: (shift). The derivation ends with
•Γ1 ⊢M : •A
Γ1 ⊢M : A
(shift).
Since ••Γ1 ∪ •Γ2 ⊢M : ••A is derivable by induction hypothesis, so is •Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M : •A by (shift).
Case: (⊤). In this case, A = ⊤. Hence, •Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M : •A is derivable by (⊤) and () since •A = •⊤ ≃ ⊤
by Proposition 4.3.1.
Case: (). Straightforward by induction hypothesis since A′  A implies •A′  •A for every A′ by (-•).
Case: (→I). The derivation ends with
Γ1 ∪ { x : B } ⊢ K : C
Γ1 ⊢ λx. K : B→ C
(→I)
for some B, C, x and K such that A = B → C and M = λx. K. By induction hypothesis, •Γ1 ∪ { x :
•B }∪Γ2 ⊢ K : •C is derivable. Hence, so is •Γ1∪Γ2 ⊢M : •A by (→I) and () since •B→•C ≃ •(B→C).
Note that the proof would fail at this point if we did not have the (≃-K/L)-rule, and even if we added an
extra subtyping rule •(B→ C) ≺= •B→ •C corresponding to the axiom schema K of normal modal logic.
Case: (→E). In this case, the derivation ends with
Γ11 ⊢M1 : B→A Γ12 ⊢M2 : B
Γ11 ∪ Γ12 ⊢M1M2 : A
(→E)
for some Γ11, Γ12, B, M1 and M2 such that Γ1 = Γ11 ∪ Γ12 and M = M1M2. By induction hypothesis,
•Γ11 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ M1 : •(B→ A) and •Γ12 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ M2 : •B are derivable. Hence, so is •Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ M : •A by ()
and (→E) since •(B→A)  •B→ •A. This completes the proof of Item 1.
The proof for Item 2 is almost straightforward. The only non-trivial case is when the last rule is (shift).
In this case, the derivation ends with
•Γ1 ∪ { x : •A } ⊢M : •B
Γ1 ∪ { x : A } ⊢M : B
(shift).
Since Γ2 ⊢ N : A is derivable, so is •Γ2 ⊢ N : •A by Item 1 of this proposition. Therefore, •Γ ⊢M [N/x] : •B
is also derivable by induction hypothesis; and hence, so is Γ ⊢ M [N/x] : B by (shift). Note that the (nec)-
rule, or Item 1 of this proposition, is crucial to this case. 
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Note that Proposition 7.4 depends on the (≃-K/L)-rule. Without this equality, even with the normal
subtyping rule •(A→B) ≺= •A→•B, and even if we dropped the (shift)-rule from λA, the (nec)-rule would
not be derivable in λA. Furthermore, without the (≃-K/L)-rule, even if we added the (nec)-rule to λA, the
(subst)-rule would remain underivable, because we could not handle the case of the (nec)-rule in the proof
of Proposition 7.4.2. For example, we have the following two derivations in such a variant of λA.
g : X → Z ⊢ g : X→ Z x : X ⊢ x : X
g : X → Z, x : X ⊢ gx : Z
(→E)
x : X ⊢ λg. gx : (X → Z)→ Z
(→ I)
x : •X ⊢ λg. gx : •((X → Z)→ Z)
(nec)
f : Y → •X ⊢ f : Y → •X y : Y ⊢ y : Y
f : Y →•X, y : Y ⊢ f y : •X
(→E)
However, we cannot derive the following judgment without the (subst)-rule7.
f : Y → •X, y : Y ⊢ λg. g(f y) : •((X → Z)→ Z)
Our final task in this section is to prove the subject reduction property of λA. To this end, we prepare
the following three lemmas.
Lemma 7.5. Suppose that Γ′  Γ. If Γ ⊢M : B is derivable, then so is Γ′ ⊢M : B.
Proof. Suppose that Γ ∪ { x : A } ⊢ M : B is derivable, A′  A, and x /∈ Dom(Γ). It suffices to show that
Γ∪{ x : A′ } ⊢M : B is also derivable. Let y be a fresh individual variable. Since { y : A′ } ⊢ y : A is derivable
by (var) and (), so is Γ ∪ { y : A′ } ⊢M [y/x] : B by Proposition 7.4.2. Therefore, Γ ∪ { x : A′ } ⊢M : B is
also derivable by Proposition 7.2.1. 
By this proposition, we realize that the following extension of the () rule does not affect the derivability
of typing judgments.8
Γ ⊢M : A Γ′  Γ A  A′
Γ′ ⊢M : A′
()
Lemma 7.6. Suppose that A→B  •n(C→D) /≃ ⊤. Then •nC  •kA and •kB  •nD for some k.
Proof. Note that neither A→ B nor C → D is a ⊤-variant by Propositions 2.3.2, 5.6 and Theorem 4.14.
Hence, (A→ B)c≃ = Ac≃ → Bc≃ and (•n(C → D))c≃ = •nCc≃ → •nDc≃. Therefore, •nCc≃  •kAc≃ and
•kBc≃  •nDc≃ for some k by Proposition 5.8, that is, •nC  •kA and •kB  •nD by Proposition 4.19. 
Lemma 7.7 (Anti-abstraction lemma). Let Γ ⊢ λx. M : A be a derivable judgment, and suppose that
x /∈ Dom(Γ). Then, •nΓ∪{ x : B } ⊢M : C is also derivable for some n, B and C such that B→C  •nA.
Proof. If A ≃ ⊤, then Γ ∪ { x : ⊤} ⊢ M : ⊤ is derivable by (⊤). Therefore, we assume that A /≃ ⊤. The
proof proceeds by induction on the derivation, and by cases on the last rule applied in it. Note that neither
(var) nor (→E) is possible because of the form of the λ-term λx. M .
Case: (shift). This is the only case that we have to consider n not being 0. In this case, the derivation ends
with
•Γ ⊢ λx. M : •A
Γ ⊢ λx. M : A
(shift).
7In [22], although the author conjectured that two typing systems S-λ•µ and F-λ•µ described in the paper enjoy some basic
properties (Proposition 2), such as the substitution lemma and the subject reduction property, it turned to be wrong. However,
fortunately, this does not affect other results, including the main ones, presented in the paper.
8The typing system presented in [22] was formulated with this variant.
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Note that •A /≃ ⊤ from A /≃ ⊤. By induction hypothesis, •n
′
•Γ∪{ x : B } ⊢M : C is derivable for some n′,
B and C such that B→ C  •n
′
•A. Therefore, it suffices to take n as n = n′ + 1.
Case: (⊤). This case is impossible by the assumption that A /≃ ⊤.
Case: (). In this case, the derivation ends with
Γ ⊢ λx. M : A′ A′  A
Γ ⊢ λx. M : A
()
for some A′. By induction hypothesis, •nΓ ∪ { x : B } ⊢ M : C is derivable for some n, B and C such that
B→ C  •nA′, which implies B→ C  •nA since A′  A.
Case: (→I). Trivial since the derivation ends with
Γ ∪ { x : B } ⊢M : C
Γ ⊢ λx. M : B→ C
(→I)
for some B and C such that A = B→ C. 
Finally, we can proceed to the proof of the subject reduction property of λA with three lemmas above.
Theorem 7.8 (Subject reduction). Suppose that Γ ⊢ M : A is derivable, and that M →
β
L. Then,
Γ ⊢ L : A is also derivable.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢M : A, and by cases on the last rule applied in it.
Case: (var). This case is impossible since M →
β
L.
Case: (⊤). In this case, A = ⊤. Hence, Γ ⊢ L : A is also derivable by (⊤).
Case: (shift) or (). The derivation ends with either of the following (for some A′ in case of ()).
•Γ ⊢M : •A
Γ ⊢M : A
(shift)
Γ ⊢M : A′ A′  A
Γ ⊢M : A
()
Hence, straightforward from the induction hypothesis by applying the same rule.
Case: (→I). The derivation ends with
Γ ∪ { x : B } ⊢M ′ : C
Γ ⊢ λx. M ′ : B→ C
(→I)
for some x, M ′, B and C such that M = λx. M ′ and A = B→ C. Since λx. M ′ →
β
L, there exists some L′
such that M ′ →
β
L′ and L = λx. L′. Hence, by induction hypothesis, Γ ∪ { x : B } ⊢ L′ : C is derivable; and
therefore, so is Γ ⊢ λx. L′ : B→ C by applying (→I).
Case: (→E). The derivation ends with
Γ1 ⊢M1 : B→A Γ2 ⊢M2 : B
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M1M2 : A
(→E)
for some M1, M2, Γ1, Γ2 and B such that M = M1M2 and Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2. If A ≃ ⊤, then Γ ⊢ L : A is
derivable by (⊤). Therefore, we assume that A /≃ ⊤ in the sequel. Note that it also implies that B→A /≃ ⊤.
Since M1M2 →β L, there are three possible subcases as follows:
(a) M1 →β L1 and L = L1M2 for some L1.
(b) M2 →β L2 and L = M1L2 for some L2.
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(c) M1 = λx. L
′ and L = L′[M2/x] for some x and L
′.
By induction hypothesis, Γ1 ⊢ L1 : B → A and Γ2 ⊢ L2 : B are derivable for (a) and (b), respectively.
Therefore, we can derive Γ ⊢ L : A by applying (→E) in these cases. As for (c), we can assume that
x /∈ Dom(Γ1) without loss of generality. Hence, by Lemma 7.7, there exist some n, C and D such that
C→D  •n(B→ A), and (22)
•nΓ1 ∪ { x : C } ⊢ L
′ : D is derivable. (23)
Therefore, by (22) and Lemma 7.6,
•nB  •kC and •kD  •nA (24)
for some k. We can derive •n+kΓ1 ∪ { x : •kC } ⊢ L′ : •kD from (23) by applying Proposition 7.4.1,
namely (nec), k times; and hence, •nΓ1 ∪ { x : •kC } ⊢ L′ : •kD is also derivable by Lemma 7.5 since
•nΓ1  •n+kΓ1. On the other hand, •nΓ2 ⊢ M2 : •nB is derivable from Γ2 ⊢ M2 : B by (nec); and hence,
so is •nΓ2 ⊢M2 : •
kC by () and (24). Therefore, •nΓ ⊢ L′[M2/x] : •
kD is derivable by Proposition 7.4.2,
namely (subst); and hence, so is •nΓ ⊢ L′[M2/x] : •nA by () and (24), from which Γ ⊢ L′[M2/x] : A is
derivable by applying (shift) n times. 
The subject reduction property is independent of the existence of the (shift)-rule. Even if (shift) is
dropped from λA, Proposition 7.4 still holds, and the statements and the proofs of Lemmas 7.6, 7.7 and
Theorem 7.8 remain valid by regarding n as 0.
8. Convergence of well-typed λ-terms
When we gave the interpretation of type expressions in Definition 3.8, the only restriction forced on what
type variables mean was that the interpretation must be hereditary with respect to the accessibility relation.
Therefore, just as in the case of the simply typed lambda calculus, we are free to incorporate convergence
properties of inhabitants into the meaning of type expressions even though recursive types are involved.
Thus, type expressions can still say something about convergence, and the soundness theorem assures the
convergence of well-typed λ-terms according to their types. In this section, we give such results as follows.
1. Every λ-term of types other than ⊤ is head normalizable, i.e., solvable.
2. Every λ-term of types without positive occurrences of ⊤ has a Bo¨hm tree without unsolvable terms.
3. Every λ-term of types without occurrences of the modal operator • is normalizable.
8.1. A term model
The results about the convergence of well-typed λ-terms are proved by applying the soundness of λA
(Theorem 7.3) to an appropriate interpretation of type expressions, considering a certain term model of the
untyped λ-calculus. So we first introduce the term model used for that purpose.
Proposition 8.1. If M =
β
M ′ and N =
β
N ′, then M [N/x] =
β
M ′[N ′/x].
Proof. Show that N =
β
N ′ implies M [N/x] =
β
M [N ′/x], and M →
β
M ′ implies M [N/x] =
β
M ′[N/x] by
induction on the structure of M . 
Definition 8.2. The term model 〈 V , ·, [[ ]]V 〉 of Exp is defined as follows.
1. V = Exp/=
β
2. [M ] · [N ] = [MN ]
3. [[M ]]
V
ρ = [M [ρ˜(z1)/z1, ρ˜(z2)/z2, . . . , ρ˜(zk)/zk]]
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where [M ] and ρ˜(z) denote the equivalence class including M and the representative member of ρ(z),
respectively, and z1, z2, . . ., zk are distinct individual variables such that FV (M) = { z1, z2, . . . , zk }. Note
that Proposition 8.1 assures the well-definedness of Item 3.
Proposition 8.3. The term model 〈 V , ·, [[ ]]V 〉 is a syntactical λ-algebra.
Proof. It suffices to show that the eight conditions of Definition 3.4 are satisfied by the term model.
Conditions 1 through 5 are straightforward. As for Condition 6, let x /∈ FV (ρ˜(zi)) ∪ { zi } for every i
(i = 1, 2, . . . , k).
[[λx. M ]]
V
ρ · [N ] = [(λx. M)[ρ˜(z1)/z1, ρ˜(z2)/z2, . . . , ρ˜(zk)/zk]] · [N ] (by Definition 8.2)
= [λx. (M [ρ˜(z1)/z1, ρ˜(z2)/z2, . . . , ρ˜(zk)/zk])] · [N ]
(since x /∈ FV (ρ˜(zi)) ∪ { zi } for every i)
= [(λx. (M [ρ˜(z1)/z1, ρ˜(z2)/z2, . . . , ρ˜(zk)/zk]))N ] (by Definition 8.2)
= [M [ρ˜(z1)/z1, ρ˜(z2)/z2, . . . , ρ˜(zk)/zk][N/x]]
= [M [ρ˜(z1)/z1, ρ˜(z2)/z2, . . . , ρ˜(zk)/zk, N/x]]
(since x /∈ FV (ρ˜(zi)) ∪ { zi } for every i)
= [[M ]]
V
ρ[[N ]/x] (by Definition 8.2)
Conditions 7 and 8 are also straightforward from Definition 8.2 and Proposition 8.1. 
8.2. Tail finite types
In this subsection, we show that every λ-term of a certain class of type expressions, which will later
be defined as tail finite types, is head normalizable. The set of head normalizable terms is defined in the
standard manner as follows.
Definition 8.4 (Head normal forms). A λ-term M is a head normal form if and only if M has the form
of λx1. λx2. . . . λxm. y N1N2 . . . Nn, where m, n ≥ 0. We say that M has a head normal form, or is head
normalizable, if M ∗→
β
M ′ for some head normal form M ′.
We also define Bo¨hm trees of λ-terms in the standard manner according to this definition of head normal
forms, in which λ-terms without head normal forms are denoted by ⊥.
Definition 8.5 (Tail finite types). A type expressionA is tail finite if and only if A ∼= •m0(B1→•m1(B2→
•m2(B3 → . . .→ •mn−1(Bn→ •mnX) . . .))) for some n, m0, m1, m2, . . ., mn, B1, B2, . . ., Bn and X .
While we used ∼= to define the tail finiteness, it is also possible to use ≃ instead of ∼=. Later, by
Proposition 8.10, we shall see that either of the two definitions leads us to the identical notion of tail
finiteness. Actually, it will be shown that a type expression A is tail finite if and only if A is not a⊤-variant.
To this end, we need an alternative definition of tail finiteness as follows.
Definition 8.6. Let V be a set of type variables. We define a subset TFV of TExp as follows.
TFV ::= X (X ∈ TVar − V )
| •TFV
| TExp→TFV
| µX.A
(
µX.A ∈ TExp and A ∈ TFV ∪{X }
)
.
We can easily check that TFV is closed under α-conversion of type expressions. We denote TF{} by TF,
which will be shown to be identical to the set of tail finite type expressions. Roughly, TFV is the set of type
expressions that are tail finite even when some of type variables listed in V are instantiated by ⊤, which
will also be shown in Proposition 8.10.
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Proposition 8.7. Let V be a set of type variables, and suppose that A ∈ TFV . Then A ∼ •m0(B1 →
•m1(B2 → •
m2(B3 → . . .→ •
mn−1(Bn → •
mnX) . . .))) for some n, m0, m1, m2, . . ., mn, B1, B2, B3, . . .,
Bn and X /∈ V .
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A.
Case: A = Y for some Y . Obvious since we get Y /∈ V by Definition 8.6.
Case: A = •C for some C. We get C ∈ TFV by Definition 8.6. Hence, by induction hypothesis, C ∼
•m
′
0(B1 → •m1(B2 → •m2(B3 → . . .→ •mn−1(Bn → •mnX) . . .))) for some n, m′0, m1, m2, . . ., mn, B1, B2,
. . ., Bn and X /∈ V . Therefore, it suffices to take m0 = m′0 + 1.
Case: A = C → D for some C and D. We get D ∈ TFV by Definition 8.6. By induction hypothesis,
D ∼ •m1(B2 → •m2(B3 →•m3(B4 → . . .→ •mn−1(Bn→ •mnX) . . .))) for some n, m1, m2, . . ., mn, B2, B3,
. . ., Bn and X /∈ V . Therefore, it suffices to take m0 = 0 and B1 = C.
Case: A = µZ.C for some Z and C. We get C ∈ TFV ∪{Z } by Definition 8.6. Hence, by induction
hypothesis, C ∼ •m0(B1 → •m1(B2 → •m2(B3 → . . .→ •mn−1(Bn → •mnX) . . .))) for some n, m0, m1, m2,
. . ., mn, B1, B2, . . ., Bn and X /∈ V ∪ {Z }. Therefore, A = µZ.C ∼ C[A/Z] ∼ (•m0(B1 → •m1(B2 →
•m2(B3 → . . .→•mn−1(Bn→•mnX) . . .))))[A/Z] = •m0(B1[A/Z]→ •m1(B2[A/Z]→ •m2(B3[A/Z]→ . . .→
•mn−1(Bn[A/Z]→•mnX) . . .))) by Proposition 4.4. 
It is also not difficult to see that TF enjoys the following properties.
Proposition 8.8. 1. If V ⊆ V ′, then TFV
′
⊆ TFV.
2. If X /∈ ETV +(A) and A ∈ TFV, then A ∈ TFV ∪{X }.
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. For Item 2, note that A ∈ TFV implies
ETV (A) /= {} by Propositions 8.7 and 4.11.1; and hence, A is not a⊤-variant, since ETV (B) = {} for every
⊤-variant B by Proposition 2.9.5. 
Proposition 8.9. Let A be a type expression, and V a set of type variables.
1. If A ∈ TFV ∪{X }, then A[B/X ] ∈ TFV.
2. If A ∈ TFV and B ∈ TFV, then A[B/X ] ∈ TFV.
3. If A[B/X ] ∈ TFV, then A ∈ TFV−{X }.
4. If A[B/X ] ∈ TFV, then A ∈ TFV ∪{X } or B ∈ TFV.
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. The only non-trivial case is when A = Y for
some Y . For Item 1, we get X /= Y from A ∈ TFV ∪{X }. Therefore, A[B/X ] = A ∈ TFV ∪{X } ⊆ TFV by
Proposition 8.8.1. For Item 2, suppose that A ∈ TFV and B ∈ TFV. We similarly get A[B/X ] = A ∈ TFV
if X /= Y . Otherwise, i.e., if X = Y , then A[B/X ] = B ∈ TFV. For Items 3 and 4, suppose that
A[B/X ] ∈ TFV. If X /= Y , then A = A[B/X ] ∈ TFV ; therefore, A ∈ TFV−{X } by Proposition 8.8.1,
and A ∈ TFV ∪{X } by Proposition 8.8.2, since X /∈ FTV (A). Otherwise, i.e., if X = Y , then A = X ∈
TFV−{X } by Definition 8.6, and B = A[B/X ] ∈ TFV. 
Now we can establish the equivalence of the two definitions. A type expression A is tail finite if and only
if A ∈ TF. This is shown by proving the following proposition.
Proposition 8.10. Let V be a set of type variables. The following three conditions are equivalent.
(a) A ∈ TFV
(b) A ∼ •m0(B1→•m1(B2→•m2(B3→ . . .→•mn−1(Bn→•mnX) . . .))) for some n, m0, m1, m2, . . ., mn,
B1, B2, B3, . . ., Bn and X /∈ V .
(c) A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] /∼ ⊤, where Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct type variables such that V = { Y1, . . . , Yk }.
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Note that in case of ≃, Condition (b) is equivalent to
(b′) A ≃ B1 → B2 → B3 → . . .→ Bn→ •mX for some n, m, B1, B2, B3, . . ., Bn and X /∈ V .
Proof. It suffices to show the following three propositions: (a) ⇒ (b), (b) ⇒ (c), and (c) ⇒ (a). The first
one has been already shown as Proposition 8.7. The rule (∼=-→⊤) of Definition 4.1 is crucial to prove the
last part. However, we can even show (b) ⇒ (a) independently of the rule.
Proof of “(b) ⇒ (c)”. Suppose that (b) holds, and let B′i = Bi[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n).
Since X /∈ { Y1, . . . , Yk }, we get A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼ •m0(B′1 → •
m1(B′2 → •
m2(B′3 → . . .→ •
mn−1(B′n→
•mnX) . . .))) by Proposition 4.4, which is not a ⊤-variant. Therefore, A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] /∼ ⊤ by Theo-
rem 4.14.
Proof of “(c) ⇒ (a)”. We prove the contrapositive by induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of
A. Suppose that (a) is not the case, i.e., A /∈ TFV . Let Y1, . . . , Yk be distinct type variables such that
V = { Y1, . . . , Yk }. It suffices to show that A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼ ⊤.
Case: A = Y for some Y . We get Y ∈ V from A /∈ TFV by Definition 8.6. Therefore, A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] =
⊤.
Case: A = •C for some C. By Definition 8.6, C /∈ TFV . By induction hypothesis, C[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼ ⊤.
Hence, A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] = •C[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼ •⊤ ∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.3.1.
Case: A = C→D for some C and D. Similarly, D /∈ TFV by Definition 8.6. Hence, by induction hypothesis,
D[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼ ⊤. Therefore, A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] = C[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk]→ D[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼
C[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk]→⊤ ∼ ⊤ by (∼=-→⊤) of Definition 4.1.
Case: A = µZ.C for some Z and C. By Definition 8.6, C /∈ TFV ∪{Z }. By induction hypothesis, C[⊤/Z,
⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼ ⊤. Therefore, A[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] = µZ.C[⊤/Y1, . . . , ⊤/Yk] ∼ ⊤ by (∼=-uniq) of
Definition 4.1. 
Theorem 8.11. The following four conditions are equivalent.
(a) A ∈ TF
(b) A is tail finite.
(c) A /∼ ⊤.
(d) A is not a ⊤-variant.
Proof. Obvious from Theorem 4.14 and Proposition 8.10 considering the case that V = {}. This theorem
fails if we adopt F-semantics of types by dropping (∼=-→⊤) from Definition 4.2. However, (a)⇔ (b) remains
to hold even in such a case. 
Finally, we show that every λ-term of tail finite types is head normalizable, by applying the soundness of
λA with respect to the term model. The proof is quite parallel to the standard method using convertibility
predicates due to Tait[27].
Definition 8.12. We define a subset Kh of Exp/=β as follows.
Kh =
{
[xN1N2 . . .Nn]
∣∣ x ∈ Var, n ≥ 0 and Ni ∈ Exp for every i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) } .
Lemma 8.13. Consider the term model of Exp, a well-founded frame 〈W , ⊲ 〉 and a type environment η
such that Kh ⊆ η(X)p for every type variable X and p ∈ W. Then, Kh ⊆ I(A)ηp for every A and p ∈ W.
Proof. By induction on the lexicographic ordering of 〈 p, r(A) 〉, and by cases on the form of A. We assume
that A is not a⊤-variant, since Kh ⊆ I(A)ηp = V if A is. For this proof, η need not to be hereditary.
Case: A = Y for some Y . By Definition 3.8, I(A)ηp = η(Y )p ⊇ Kh.
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Case: A = •B for some B. In this case, I(A)ηp = { u | u ∈ I(B)
η
q for every q ⊳ p } ⊇ Kh since
Kh ⊆ I(B)
η
q for every q ⊳ p by induction hypothesis.
Case: A = B → C for some B and C. By Definition 3.8, I(A)ηp = { u | u · v ∈ I(C)
η
q for every v ∈
I(B)ηq whenever p
∗
⊲ q }. Suppose that [xN1N2 . . .Nn] ∈ Kh. Then, for every L ∈ Exp, [xN1N2 . . . Nn] ·
[L] = [xN1N2 . . . NnL] ∈ Kh. Hence, for every q such that p
∗
⊲ q, we get [xN1N2 . . . NnL] ∈ I(C)ηq since
Kh ⊆ I(C)
η
q by induction hypothesis. Therefore, [xN1N2 . . .Nn] ∈ I(B→ C)
η
p.
Case: A = µY.B for some Y and B. By Definition 3.8, I(A)ηp = I(B[A/Y ])
η
p. On the other hand, since
r(B[A/Y ]) < r(A) by Proposition 2.13.2, we get Kh ⊆ I(B[A/Y ])ηp by induction hypothesis. 
Note that since every λA-frame is also a well-founded frame, Lemma 8.13 also holds in the case that
〈W , ⊲ 〉 is a λA-frame. Now we show the main results of this subsection, which is stated as the following
theorem.
Theorem 8.14. Let V be a set of type variables, and A a type expression such that A ∈ TFV. If Γ ⊢M : A
is derivable in λA, then M has a head normal form.
Proof. Consider the term model and a λA-frame 〈N, > 〉 where N is the set of natural numbers and > is
the greater-than relation between natural numbers. Note that 〈N, > 〉 is also a well-founded frame. Let ρ
be an individual environment such that ρ(x) = [x] for every x ∈ Var. Then, ρ(x) ∈ Kh ⊆ I(Γ(x))ηp for
every x ∈ Dom(Γ), η and p ∈ N by Lemma 8.13. Hence, [M ] ∈ I(A)ηp for every η and p by Theorem 7.3
because [[M ]]
V
ρ = [M ]. Since η can be any hereditary type environment, it suffices to show that M has a
head normal form whenever
(a) A ∈ TFV,
(b) Kh ⊆ η(X)p for every p ∈ N and X ,
(c) η(X)p = Kh for every p ∈ N and X /∈ V , and
(d) [M ] ∈ I(A)ηp for every p ∈ N.
The proof proceeds by induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. Suppose (a) through (d).
Case: A = X for some X. In this case, X /∈ V from (a); and hence, [M ] ∈ I(A)ηp = η(X)p = Kh by (c)
and (d). Therefore, M has a head normal form.
Case: A = •B for some B. In this case, h(B) < h(A) and B ∈ TFV by (a). Therefore, M has a head
normal form by induction hypothesis, since [M ] ∈ I(•B)ηp+1 = I(B)
η
p for every p.
Case: A = B → C for some B and C. In this case, h(C) < h(A) and C ∈ TFV by (a). Let y be a fresh
individual variable. Since [M ] ∈ I(B → C)ηp and [y] ∈ Kh ⊆ I(B)
η
p for every p by (b) and Lemma 8.13,
we get [My] ∈ I(C)ηp for every p. Therefore, My has a head normal form, say L, by induction hypothesis.
There are two possible cases: for some K, (i) M ∗→
β
K and L = Ky, or (ii) M ∗→
β
λy. K and K ∗→
β
L. In
either case, M obviously has a head normal form.
Case: A = µY.B for some Y and B. In this case, h(B) < h(A) and B ∈ TFV ∪{ Y } by (a). By Definition 3.8
and Proposition 3.10.1, we get I(µY.B)ηp = I(B[µY.B/Y ])
η
p = I(B)
η′
p , where η
′ = η[ I(µY.B)η/Y ]. Note
that (a′) B ∈ TFV ∪{ Y }, (b′) Kh ⊆ η′(X)p for every p and X since Kh ⊆ I(µY.B)η = η′(Y ) by (b) and
Lemma 8.13, (c′) η′(X)p = Kh for every p and X /∈ V ∪{ Y }, and (d
′) [M ] ∈ I(B)η
′
p for every p. Therefore,
M has a head normal form by induction hypothesis. 
Corollary 8.15. Every λ-term of tail finite types is head normalizable.
Proof. By Theorems 8.11 and 8.14 taking V as V = {} in 8.14. 
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8.3. Positively and negatively finite types
In the previous subsection, it has been shown that every tail finite type, i.e., any type other than ⊤-
variants, is inhabited only by head normalizable λ-terms. It can be also shown that, if the type does not
involve any positive (effective) occurrence of⊤-variants, then the Bo¨hm tree of any λ-term that belongs to
the type does not include any occurrence of ⊥. For example, we can see that Curry’s fixed-point combinator
Y has such a Bo¨hm tree since it has a type (•X →X)→X .
Definition 8.16 (Maximal λ-terms). A λ-term M is maximal if and only if the Bo¨hm tree of M has no
occurrence of ⊥, i.e., λ-terms that are not head normalizable.
Note that the maximality of λ-terms is closed under =
β
.
Definition 8.17 (Positively/negatively finite types). A type expression A is positively (respectively,
negatively) finite if and only if C is tail finite whenever A ∼ B[C/X ] for some B and X such that X ∈
ETV +(B) and X /∈ ETV −(B) (respectively, X ∈ ETV −(B) and X /∈ ETV +(B)).
Although this definition might seem to be dependent on the choice of ∼, either of the two ways of
definition gives the same notion, and the following discussion in this subsection does not depend on which
it is. That will be verified by showing that the equivalent notion can be defined by the same grammar of
type expressions (cf. Definition 8.18 and Proposition 8.29).
Obviously, every positively finite type expression is tail finite, and positively (negatively) finiteness is
closed under ∼. In this subsection, we show that every λ-term of positively finite types is maximal. To this
end, we again employ alternative definitions of positively and negatively finiteness as follows.
Definition 8.18. We define subsets PF and NF of TExp as follows.
PF ::= TVar
| •PF
| NF→PF
| µX.A (µX.A ∈ TF, A ∈ PF, and (a) X /∈ ETV −(A) or (b) A ∈ NF)
NF ::= TVar
| •NF
| PF→NF
| µX.A (µX.A ∈ TExp, A ∈ NF, and (a) X /∈ ETV−(A) or (b) µX.A ∈ PF)
| A (A is a⊤-variant)
We can easily check that PF and NF are closed under α-conversion of type expressions. Obviously, every
finite type expression, i.e., one that involves no recursive type, belongs to both PF and NF. The grammar
of NF is ambiguous since it says that any⊤-variant belongs to NF. Hence, we should be careful with the
fact that A→B ∈ NF does not always imply A ∈ PF.
Our first task in this subsection is to verify that A is positively (respectively, negatively) finite if and
only if A ∈ PF (respectively, NF) (cf. Proposition 8.29), which also implies that it is decidable whether a
given type expression is positively (negatively) finite or not.
Proposition 8.19. PF ⊆ TF.
Proof. Prove that A ∈ PF implies A ∈ TF, by straightforward induction on h(A), and by cases on the
form of A. 
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The following proposition says that we can separate an effective occurrence of an individual variable in
a type expression from others so that it becomes either positive or negative and not both. For example,
consider a type expression A = µY.•Y →X , in which the occurrence of X is both positive and negative. We
can obtain a positive and not negative occurrence of X by unfolding A to • (µY.•Y →X)→X , in which so
is the rightmost occurrence of X . Similarly, we can also obtain a negative and not positive occurrence of X
by unfolding A to • (• (µY.•Y →X)→X)→X .
Proposition 8.20. If X ∈ ETV ±(A), then there exist some A′ and X ′ such that A ∼ A′[X/X ′], X ′ ∈
ETV±(A′) and X ′ /∈ ETV ∓(A′).
Proof. By Propositions 4.19 and 4.11.1, we can assume that A is canonical without loss of generality. Note
that X ∈ ETV ±(A) implies that A /= ⊤ and dp±→(A, X) <∞ by Propositions 2.9.5 and 2.15.1, respectively.
By induction on dp±→(A, X), and by cases on the form of A. 
Proposition 8.21. Suppose that B /∼ ⊤. If A[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), then A ∈ PF (respectively,
NF).
Proof. If A[B/X ] is a⊤-variant, then A[B/X ] /∈ PF by Proposition 8.19 and Theorem 8.11, and A ∈ NF
since A is also a ⊤-variant by Proposition 2.10.2. Hence, it suffices to only consider the case that A[B/X ]
is not a ⊤-variant. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. The only interesting case is
when A = µY.C for some Y and C. In this case, we can assume that Y /∈ FTV (B) ∪ {X } without loss of
generality. Since A[B/X ] = µY.C[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF),
µY.C[B/X ] ∈ TF (respectively, TExp) (25)
C[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), and (26)
C[B/X ] ∈ NF (respectively, µY.C[B/X ] ∈ PF), if Y ∈ ETV−(C[B/X ]). (27)
First, in case of A[B/X ] ∈ PF, we get µY.C ∈ TF from (25) by Theorem 8.11 and Proposition 2.10.1.
Second, C ∈ PF (respectively, NF) from (26) by induction hypothesis. Finally, if Y ∈ ETV−(C), then
Y ∈ ETV −(C[B/X ]) by Proposition 2.11; and therefore, C[B/X ] ∈ NF (respectively, PF) from (27)
and Definition 8.18, which implies C ∈ NF (respectively, PF) by induction hypothesis. Thus, A ∈ PF
(respectively, NF). 
Lemma 8.22. Suppose that
(a) A ∈ TFV ,
(b) V ∩ ETV +(B) = {}, and
(c) X /∈ ETV +(A) or B ∈ TF.
Then, A[B/X ] ∈ TFV .
Proof. If X /∈ ETV +(A), then A ∈ TFV ∪{X } by (a) and Proposition 8.8.2; and therefore, A[B/X ] ∈ TFV
by Proposition 8.9.1. On the other hand, if X ∈ ETV +(A), then B ∈ TF by (c); that is, B ∈ TFV by (b)
and Proposition 8.8.2. Hence, A[B/X ] ∈ TFV by (a) and Proposition 8.9.2. 
Proposition 8.23. Suppose that
(a) A ∈ PF (respectively, NF),
(b) if X ∈ ETV +(A) then B ∈ PF (respectively, NF), and
(c) if X ∈ ETV−(A) then B ∈ NF (respectively, PF).
Then A[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF).
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Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. Use Proposition 2.10.1 if A = C → D for
some C and D. The only interesting case is when A = µY.C for some Y and C. In this case, suppose
that (a) through (c) hold. We can assume that Y /∈ FTV (B) ∪ {X } without loss of generality; that is,
A[B/X ] = µY.C[B/X ] and B is proper in Y by Proposition 2.15.6. By (a) and Definition 8.18, we have
µY.C ∈ TF (respectively, TExp) (28)
C ∈ PF (respectively, NF), and (29)
Y /∈ ETV−(C) or C ∈ NF (respectively, µY.C ∈ PF). (30)
Moreover, since ETV ±(C)− { Y } ⊆ ETV ±(A), from (b) and (c),
(b′) if X ∈ ETV +(C) then B ∈ PF (respectively, NF), and
(c′) if X ∈ ETV −(C) then B ∈ NF (respectively, PF).
By Definition 8.18, it suffices to show that
µY.C[B/X ] ∈ TF (respectively, TExp) (31)
C[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), and (32)
Y /∈ ETV−(C[B/X ]) or C[B/X ] ∈ NF (respectively, µY.C[B/X ] ∈ PF). (33)
First, C[B/X ] is proper in Y by Proposition 2.13.3, since so is C by (28). Furthermore, in case of A ∈ PF,
we also get C ∈ TF{ Y } from (28); and hence, C[B/X ] ∈ TF{Y } by Lemma 8.22, Proposition 8.19 and (b′).
Thus, we get (31). Second, we get (32) from (29), (b′) and (c′) by induction hypothesis. Finally, to show
(33), suppose that Y ∈ ETV−(C[B/X ]). Then, Y ∈ ETV−(C) by Proposition 2.11.2 since Y /∈ FTV (B);
and therefore, ETV±(A) = ETV (C)− { Y }. Hence, from (b) and (c), we get
X ∈ ETV (C) implies B ∈ PF ∩NF. (34)
On the other hand, from Y ∈ ETV −(C) and (30), we get C ∈ NF (respectively, µY.C ∈ PF; and therefore,
C ∈ PF by Definition 8.18). Hence, C[B/X ] ∈ NF (respectively, PF) from (34) by induction hypothesis,
where in case of A ∈ NF, C[B/X ] ∈ PF also implies µY.C[B/X ] ∈ PF because C[B/X ] ∈ NF is already
established as (32), and because we can get µY.C[B/X ] ∈ TF from µY.C ∈ PF ⊆ TF by Lemma 8.22,
Proposition 8.19 and (34). We thus establish (33). 
Proposition 8.24. Suppose that B /∼ ⊤.
1. If X ∈ ETV +(A) and A[B/X ] ∈ PF, then B ∈ PF.
2. If X ∈ ETV −(A) and A[B/X ] ∈ NF, then B ∈ PF.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. Suppose that X ∈ ETV +(A)
and A[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, X ∈ ETV −(A) and A[B/X ] ∈ NF). Note that A /∼ ⊤ since X ∈ ETV (A);
and hence, A[B/X ] /∼ ⊤ from B /∼ ⊤ by Proposition 2.10.2 and Theorem 4.14.
Case: A = Y for some Y . In this case, the assumption X ∈ ETV −(A) of Item 2 does not hold. As for
Item 1, Y = X since X ∈ ETV +(A). Hence, B = A[B/X ] ∈ PF.
Case: A = •C for some C. In this case, A[B/X ] = •C[B/X ]. Hence, X ∈ ETV +(C) and C[B/X ] ∈ PF
(respectively, X ∈ ETV −(C) and C[B/X ] ∈ NF). Therefore, B ∈ PF by induction hypothesis.
Case: A = C→D for some C and D. Since A[B/X ] = C[B/X ]→D[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), we get
X ∈ ETV −(C)∪ETV +(D), C[B/X ] ∈ NF and D[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, X ∈ ETV +(C)∪ETV−(D),
C[B/X ] ∈ PF and D[B/X ] ∈ NF). Therefore, B ∈ PF by induction hypothesis.
Case: A = µY.C for some Y and C. We can assume that Y /∈ FTV (B) ∪ {X } without loss of generality.
Since A[B/X ] = µY.C[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), we get
C[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), and (35)
C[B/X ] ∈ NF (respectively, µY.C[B/X ] ∈ PF), if Y ∈ ETV −(C[B/X ]). (36)
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On the other hand, since X ∈ ETV +(A) (respectively, ETV −(A)), either
X ∈ ETV +(C) (respectively, ETV −(C)), or (37)
Y ∈ ETV −(C) and X ∈ ETV −(C) (respectively, ETV +(C)). (38)
Note that Y ∈ ETV−(C) implies Y ∈ ETV −(C[B/X ]) by Proposition 2.11, and that µY.C[B/X ] ∈ PF
implies C[B/X ] ∈ PF. Therefore, from (35), (36), (37) and (38), we get either
X ∈ ETV +(C) (respectively, ETV−(C)) and C[B/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), or
X ∈ ETV −(C) (respectively, ETV +(C)) and C[B/X ] ∈ NF (respectively, PF).
Hence, B ∈ PF by induction hypothesis. 
Proposition 8.25. 1. If X ∈ ETV +(A) and A[B/X ] ∈ NF, then B ∈ NF.
2. If X ∈ ETV −(A) and A[B/X ] ∈ PF, then B ∈ NF.
Proof. The proof is quite parallel to the one for Proposition 8.24. Note that B ∈ NF if B ∼ ⊤ by
Definition 8.18. 
Proposition 8.26. A ∈ PF (respectively, NF) if and only if Ac ∈ PF (respectively, NF).
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. Note that the claim obviously holds when A
is a⊤-variant. Hence, we only consider the case that A is not.
Case: A = X for some X. Trivial since Ac = A in this case.
Case: A = •B for some B. In this case, A ∈ PF (respectively, NF) iff B ∈ PF (respectively, NF). On the
other hand, B ∈ PF (respectively, NF) iff Bc ∈ PF (respectively, NF) by induction hypothesis. Therefore,
it suffices to show that Ac ∈ PF (respectively,NF) iff Bc ∈ PF (respectively,NF), which can be established
by considering the form of Bc as follows. Note that Bc /= ⊤ since A is not a ⊤-variant. If Bc = •nX for
some n and X , then Ac = •Bc, and if Bc = •n(C → D) for some n, C and D, where n = 0 is case of ≃,
then Ac∼= = •Bc∼= and Ac≃ = •C→•D. In either case, we can get Ac ∈ PF (respectively, NF) iff Bc ∈ PF
(respectively, NF), by Definition 8.18.
Case: A = B→ C for some B and C. Trivial since Ac = A in this case.
Case: A = µX.B for some X and B. Note that Ac = Bc[A/X ] in this case. Since A is not a ⊤-variant,
B is not either; and hence, B /∼ ⊤ by Theorem 4.14. First, we show the “if” part. Suppose that Ac =
Bc[A/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF), which also implies Bc ∈ PF (respectively, NF) by Proposition 8.21.
Hence, by induction hypothesis,
B ∈ PF (respectively, NF). (39)
Furthermore, if X ∈ ETV−(B), then X ∈ ETV −(Bc) by Propositions 4.19 and 4.11.1; and therefore,
A ∈ NF (respectively, PF) by Proposition 8.25 (respectively, 8.24), which also implies B ∈ NF (respectively,
A ∈ PF) by Definition 8.18. That is,
B ∈ NF (respectively, A ∈ PF), if X ∈ ETV −(B). (40)
On the other hand, A ∈ TF by Theorem 8.11 since A is not a ⊤-variant. Therefore, A ∈ PF (respectively,
NF) from (39) and (40) by Definition 8.18.
As for the “only if” part, suppose that A ∈ PF (respectively, NF), which implies B ∈ PF (respectively,
NF). Hence, by induction hypothesis,
Bc ∈ PF (respectively, NF). (41)
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On the other hand, if X ∈ ETV−(Bc), then X ∈ ETV−(B) by Propositions 4.19 and 4.11.1; and therefore,
B ∈ NF (respectively, A ∈ PF) by Definition 8.18 since A ∈ PF (respectively, NF), which also implies
A ∈ NF (respectively, PF). That is,
A ∈ NF (respectively, PF), if X ∈ ETV −(Bc). (42)
Therefore, since A ∈ PF (respectively, NF), we get Ac = Bc[A/X ] ∈ PF (respectively, NF) from (41) and
(42) by Proposition 8.23. 
Lemma 8.27. If A ∈ PF (respectively, NF), then A is positively (respectively, negatively) finite.
Proof. By Theorem 8.11, it suffices to derive C ∈ TF from the following assumptions:
(a) A ∈ PF (respectively, NF),
(b) A ∼ B[C/X ],
(c) X ∈ ETV +(B) (respectively, ETV −(B)), and
(d) X /∈ ETV −(B) (respectively, ETV +(B)).
We can assume that A and B are canonical without loss of generality, because Ac ∈ PF (respectively,
NF) iff A ∈ PF (respectively, NF) by Proposition 8.26, and because Ac ∼ A, Bc[C/X ] ∼ B[C/X ] and
ETV±(Bc) = ETV ±(B) by Propositions 4.19, 4.4 and 4.11.1. Note that B /= ⊤ from (c) by Proposi-
tion 2.9.5, and that Condition (c) can be rewritten as
(c′) dp+→(B, X) <∞ (respectively, dp
−
→(B, X) <∞)
by Proposition 2.15.1. Furthermore, if A = ⊤, then A /∈ PF by Proposition 8.19 and Theorem 8.11
(respectively, X ∈ ETV +(B) from (b) by Propositions 2.10.2, 2.9.4 and Theorem 4.14 since B /∼ ⊤). That
is, A = ⊤ contradicts (a) (respectively, (d)). Hence, we can also assume that A /= ⊤; and hence, A ∈ TF
by Theorem 8.11. The proof proceeds by induction on dp±→(B, X), and by cases on the form of B.
Case: B = •nY for some n and Y . In this case, X /∈ ETV −(B) and Y = X from (c); and hence,
A ∼ B[C/X ] = •nC. Since A ∈ TF, A is tail finite by Theorem 8.11; and hence, so is C by Definition 8.5
and Proposition 4.29. Therefore, C ∈ TF by Theorem 8.11 again.
Case: B = •n(D→ E) for some n, D and E such that E /∼ ⊤, where n = 0 in case of ≃. In this case,
A ∼ B[C/X ] = •n(D[C/X ]→ E[C/X ]) and B[C/X ]c = •n(D[C/X ]→ E[C/X ]). Hence, A = •n(F → G)
for some F and G such that F ∼ D[C/X ] and G ∼ E[C/X ] /∼ ⊤ by Proposition 4.21. Therefore, since
ETV±(B) = ETV∓(D)∪ETV ±(E) and dp±→(B, X) = min(dp
∓
→(D, X), dp
±
→(E, X))+1, the assumptions
(a), (c′) and (d) imply the following.
dp−→(D, X) < dp
+
→(B, X) or dp
+
→(E, X) < dp
+
→(B, X)
(respectively, dp+→(D, X) < dp
−
→(B, X) or dp
−
→(E, X) < dp
−
→(B, X)),
F ∈ NF (respectively, PF), F ∼ D[C/X ] and X /∈ ETV +(D) (respectively, ETV −(D)), and
G ∈ PF (respectively, NF), G ∼ E[C/X ] and X /∈ ETV −(E) (respectively, ETV +(E)).
Therefore, we get C ∈ TF by induction hypothesis. 
Lemma 8.28. If A is positively (respectively, negatively) finite, then A ∈ PF (respectively, NF).
Proof. We use Theorems 4.14 and 8.11 without specific mention, below. Suppose that A is positively
(negatively) finite, i.e., C ∈ TF if there exists some B such that
A ∼ B[C/X ], (43)
X ∈ ETV +(B) (respectively, ETV−(B)), and (44)
X /∈ ETV −(B) (respectively, ETV +(B)). (45)
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The proof proceeds by induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A.
Case: A = Y for some Y . A ∈ PF ∩NF by Definition 8.18.
Case: A = •D for some D. By induction hypothesis and Definition 8.18, it suffices to show that D is
positively (respectively, negatively) finite. Suppose thatD ∼ B′[C/X ],X ∈ ETV +(B′) andX /∈ ETV −(B′)
(respectively, X ∈ ETV−(B′) and X /∈ ETV +(B′)) for some X and B′. Let B = •B′. Then we get (43)
through (45); and hence, C ∈ TF.
Case: A = D→E for some D and E. By induction hypothesis and Definition 8.18, it suffices to show that
(a) D is negatively (respectively, positively) finite, and (b) E is positively (respectively, negatively) finite.
For (a), suppose that D ∼ B′[C/X ], X ∈ ETV −(B′) and X /∈ ETV +(B′) (respectively, X ∈ ETV +(B′)
and X /∈ ETV−(B′)) for some X and B′. We can assume that X /∈ FTV (E) without loss of generality. Let
B = B′→ E. Then we get (43) through (45); and hence, C ∈ TF. We can similarly establish (b).
Case: A = µY.D for some Y and D. If A ∼ ⊤, then obviously A ∈ NF; and A ∼ X [⊤/X ], which means
that A is not positively finite. Therefore, we now assume that A /∼ ⊤, that is, A is not a ⊤-variant and
A ∈ TF. It suffices to show the following.
µY.D ∈ TF (respectively, TExp), (46)
D ∈ PF (respectively, NF), and (47)
Y /∈ ETV−(D) or D ∈ NF (respectively, µY.D ∈ PF). (48)
First, if A is positively finite, then µY.D ∈ TF since A ∼ X [µY.D/X ]. Thus, we get (46). Second, for (47),
by induction hypothesis, it is sufficient to show that D is positively (respectively, negatively) finite. To this
end, suppose that the following hold for some X and B′.
D ∼ B′[C/X ] (49)
X ∈ ETV +(B′) (respectively, ETV−(B′)), and (50)
X /∈ ETV −(B′) (respectively, ETV +(B′)). (51)
We show that (49) through (51) imply C ∈ TF. We can assume that X /∈ FTV (A) ∪ { Y } without loss of
generality. Let B1 = B
′[A/Y ]. Then we get
A ∼ µY.B′[C/X ] (by (49) and Proposition 4.12.1)
∼ B′[C/X ][µY.B′[C/X ]/Y ] (by (∼=-fix))
∼ B′[C/X ][A/Y ] (by Proposition 4.4 since A ∼ µY.B′[C/X ])
= B′[C[A/Y ]/X,A/Y ] (since X /= Y )
= B′[A/Y ][C[A/Y ]/X ] (since X /∈ FTV (A))
= B1[C[A/Y ]/X ].
Furthermore, since A is not a⊤-variant, we get
X ∈ ETV +(B1) (respectively, ETV
−(B1))
from (50) by Proposition 2.11.1, and
X /∈ ETV −(B1) (respectively, ETV
+(B1))
from (51) by Proposition 2.11.2 since X /∈ FTV (A). Therefore, C[A/Y ] ∈ TF since A is positively
(respectively, negatively) finite; and hence, C ∈ TF by Proposition 8.9.3. Thus, we establish that D is
positively (respectively, negatively) finite; and hence, we get (47) by induction hypothesis.
What is left is to establish (48). Suppose that Y ∈ ETV −(D). Then, by Proposition 8.20, there exist
some D′ and Y ′ such that
D ∼ D′[Y/Y ′], (52)
Y ′ ∈ ETV −(D′), and (53)
Y ′ /∈ ETV +(D′). (54)
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We can assume that Y ′ /∈ FTV (D)∪ {Y } without loss of generality. Since D is proper in Y , so is D′[Y/Y ′]
from (52) by Proposition 4.11.2. As an important step for establishing (48), we show that D is negatively
(respectively, positively) finite. To this end, suppose also that there exist some B′′ and X such that
D ∼ B′′[C/X ], (55)
X ∈ ETV −(B′′) (respectively, ETV +(B′′)), and (56)
X /∈ ETV +(B′′) (respectively, ETV −(B′′)). (57)
It suffices to show that C ∈ TF follows from (55), (56) and (57). We can assume that X /∈ FTV (A) ∪
FTV (D′) ∪ { Y, Y ′ }. Therefore,
A ∼ µY.D′[Y/Y ′] (by (52) and Proposition 4.12.1)
∼ µY.D′[D′[Y/Y ′]/Y ′] (by Proposition 4.12.2)
∼ µY.D′[D/Y ′] (by (52) and Proposition 4.4)
∼ µY.D′[B′′[C/X ]/Y ′] (by (55) and Proposition 4.4)
∼ D′[B′′[C/X ]/Y ′][µY.D′[B′′[C/X ]/Y ′]/Y ] (by (∼=-fix))
∼ D′[B′′[C/X ]/Y ′][A/Y ] (by Proposition 4.4 since A ∼ µY.D′[B′′[C/X ]/Y ′])
= D′[B′′[C/X ][A/Y ]/Y ′, A/Y ] (since Y ′ /= Y )
= D′[B′′[A/Y ][C[A/Y ]/X ]/Y ′, A/Y ] (since X /∈ FTV (A) ∪ {Y })
= D′[B′′[A/Y ]/Y ′, A/Y ][C[A/Y ]/X ] (since X /∈ FTV (A) ∪ FTV (D′))
= D′[B′′/Y ′][A/Y ][C[A/Y ]/X ] (since Y ′ /= Y )
We get X ∈ ETV +(D′[B′′/Y ′]) (respectively, ETV −(D′[B′′/Y ′])) from (53) and (56) by Proposition 2.12.2;
and hence,
X ∈ ETV +(D′[B′′/Y ′][A/Y ]) (respectively, ETV−(D′[B′′/Y ′][A/Y ]))
by Proposition 2.11.1 since Y /= X and A is not a ⊤-variant. On the other hand, since X /∈ FTV (D′),
X /∈ ETV −(D′[B′′/Y ′]) (respectively, ETV +(D′[B′′/Y ′])) from (54) and (57) by Proposition 2.12.3. Hence,
X /∈ ETV −(D′[B′′/Y ′][A/Y ]) (respectively, ETV +(D′[B′′/Y ′][A/Y ]))
by Proposition 2.11.2 because X /∈ FTV (A). Therefore, C[A/Y ] ∈ TF since A is positively (respectively,
negatively) finite; and hence, C ∈ TF by Proposition 8.9.3. Thus, D is negatively (respectively, positively)
finite.
Now we can finally establish (48). In fact, we get D ∈ NF (respectively, PF) by induction hypothesis,
since D is negatively (positively) finite. Furthermore, in the case that A is negatively finite, D ∈ PF also
implies µY.D ∈ PF, because µY.D ∈ TF by assumption, and because D ∈ NF is already established as
(47). 
Proposition 8.29. A is positively (negatively) finite if and only if A ∈ PF (NF).
Proof. Straightforward from Lemmas 8.27 and 8.28. 
Thus, we verified that the notions of positively finiteness and negatively finiteness do not depend on the
choice of ∼. Now we can proceed to the main result of this subsection, namely, the fact that every λ-term
of positively finite types is maximal. Before proving that, we have to prepare the following three lemmas.
Lemma 8.30. Let A and B be type expressions such that A  B.
1. If B is positively finite, then so is A.
2. If A is negatively finite, then so is B.
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Proof. By Propositions 2.15.1, 8.29 and Theorem 8.11, it suffices to show that D ∈ TF if there exist some
X , A, B and C such that either
(a) dp+→(C, X) <∞, dp
−
→(C, X) =∞, C[D/X ]  B and B ∈ PF, or
(b) dp−→(C, X) <∞, dp
+
→(C, X) =∞, A  C[D/X ] and A ∈ NF.
Suppose that (a) or (b) holds. We can assume that C is canonical with respect to ≃, since ETV±(C) =
ETV±(Cc≃), C[D/X ] ≃ Cc≃[D/X ] and dp±→(C, X) = dp
±
→(C
c≃, X) by Propositions 4.19, 4.11.1, 4.4 and
4.10. The proof proceeds by induction on dp→(C, X), and by cases on the form of C. We use Theorem 4.14,
Propositions 2.3, 4.19 and 5.6 without mention, below.
Case: C = ⊤. This case is impossible, since C = ⊤ implies ETV±(C) = {} by Definition 2.7, which then
implies dp±→(C, X) =∞ by Proposition 2.15.1.
Case: C = •nY for some n and Y . Note that (b) does not hold since dp−→(C, X) = ∞ in this case. If
(a) holds, then Y = X since dp+→(C, X) < ∞, and B /≃ ⊤ by Proposition 8.19 and Theorem 8.11. Hence,
C[D/X ] = •nD /≃ ⊤ since C[D/X ]  B in this case, which implies D /≃ ⊤ by Proposition 4.3.1. Therefore,
D ∈ TF by Theorem 8.11.
Case: C = E → F for some E and F such that F /≃ ⊤. In this case, C[D/X ] = (E → F )[D/X ] =
E[D/X ]→ F [D/X ]. Hence, if (a) holds, we get the following:
dp−→(E, X) < dp
+
→(C, X) or dp
+
→(F, X) < dp
+
→(C, X), (58)
dp+→(E, X) = dp
−
→(F, X) =∞, and (59)
E[D/X ]→ F [D/X ]  B, (60)
since dp±→(C, X) = dp
±
→(E → F ) = min(dp
∓
→(E, X), dp
±
→(F, X)) + 1 by Definition 2.14. On the other
hand, we get B /≃ ⊤ from B ∈ PF similarly to the previous case. Therefore, by (60) and Proposition 5.8,
there exist some k, G and H such that
(a1) Bc≃ = G→H ,
(a2) G  •kE[D/X ] and •kF [D/X ]  H .
Since B ∈ PF, we get Bc≃ ∈ PF by Proposition 8.29 and Definition 8.17; and hence, G ∈ NF and
H ∈ PF by Definition 8.18. Therefore, D ∈ TF from (a2), (58) and (59) by induction hypothesis, since
dp±→(•
kE, X) = dp±→(E, X) and dp
±
→(•
kF, X) = dp±→(F, X).
On the other hand, if (b) holds, then we similarly get
dp+→(E, X) < dp
−
→(C, X) or dp
−
→(F, X) < dp
−
→(C, X), (61)
dp−→(E, X) = dp
+
→(F, X) =∞ and (62)
A  E[D/X ]→ F [D/X ]. (63)
We get X /∈ ETV +(F ) from dp+→(F, X) = ∞ by Proposition 2.15.1; and hence, we get F [D/X ] /≃ ⊤
and E[D/X ] → F [D/X ] /≃ ⊤ from F /≃ ⊤ by Propositions 2.10.2 and 2.9.4. Therefore, by (63) and
Proposition 5.8, there exist some k, G and H such that
(b1) Ac≃ = G→H ,
(b2) E[D/X ]  •kG and •kH  F [D/X ].
We get Ac≃ ∈ NF from A ∈ NF by Proposition 8.29 and Definition 8.17. Furthermore, H /≃ ⊤ from (b2)
since F [D/X ] /≃ ⊤; and hence, A /≃ ⊤ by (b1). Therefore, G ∈ PF and H ∈ NF by Definition 8.18; and
hence, •kG ∈ PF and •kH ∈ NF. Therefore, D ∈ TF from (b2), (61) and (62) by induction hypothesis. 
Lemma 8.31. Let n be a non-negative integer, and x1, x2, . . . , xn distinct individual variables such that
{ x1, x2, . . . , xn }∩Dom(Γ) = {}. If Γ ⊢ λx1. λx2. . . . λxn.M : A is derivable in λA, then there exist some
m, B1, B2, . . ., Bn and C such that
•mΓ ∪ { x1 : B1, x2 : B2, . . . , xn : Bn } ⊢M : C is also derivable in λA, and
B1 →B2 → . . .→Bn→ C  •
mA.
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Proof. Proof proceeds by induction on n. It is trivial if n = 0. Hence, suppose that Γ ⊢ λx1.λx2. . . . λxn.M :
A is derivable for some n > 0. By Lemma 7.7, for some k, B′1 and D,
•kΓ ∪ { x1 : B
′
1 } ⊢ λx2. . . . λxn. M : D is derivable, and (64)
B′1 →D  •
kA. (65)
Therefore, by applying the induction hypothesis to (64), for some l, B2, B3, . . ., Bn and C,
•k+lΓ ∪ { x1 : •
lB′1, x2 : B2, . . . , xn : Bn } ⊢M : C is derivable, and (66)
B2 → . . .→Bn→ C  •
lD. (67)
Let m = k + l and B1 = •
lB′1. Then, (66) means that •
mΓ ∪ { x1 : B1, x2 : B2, . . . , xn : Bn } ⊢ M : C is
derivable, and we get
B1 →B2 → . . .→Bn→ C = •
lB′1 → B2 → . . .→ Bn→ C
 •lB′1 → •
lD (by (67))
≃ •l(B′1 →D) (by (≃-K/L))
 •k+lA (by (65))
= •mA. 
Note that the (≃-K/L)-rule is crucial to the proof of this lemma. However, if we remove the (shift)-rule
from λA, n in the statement of Lemma 7.7, and hence, m of this lemma, can be 0, and by which the
(≃-K/L)-rule becomes optional.
Lemma 8.32. If •A ≃ B1 → B2 → B3 → . . .→ Bn → C /≃ ⊤, then A ≃ B′1 → B
′
2 → B
′
3 → . . .→ B
′
n → C
′
for some B′1, B
′
2, B
′
3, . . ., B
′
n and C
′ such that •B′i ≃ Bi for every i ∈ { 1, 2, 3, . . . , n } and •C
′ ≃ C.
Proof. By induction on n. It is trivial in case of n = 0. Suppose that •A ≃ B1→B2→B3→ . . .→Bn→C
for some n > 0. By Proposition 4.23.2, we get A ≃ B′1 → A
′ for some B′1 and A
′ such that •B′1 ≃ B1 and
•A′ ≃ B2 → B3 → . . .→ Bn → C. Note that A′ /≃ ⊤ since A /≃ ⊤. Therefore, by induction hypothesis,
A′ ≃ B′2→B
′
3→. . .→B
′
n→C
′ for some B′2, B
′
3, . . ., B
′
n and C
′ such that •B′i ≃ Bi for every i ∈ { 2, 3, . . . , n }
and •C′ ≃ C. Thus, we get A ≃ B′1 →B
′
2 →B
′
3 → . . .→B
′
n→ C
′. 
Lemma 8.33. Suppose that A /≃ ⊤. If Γ ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn : A is derivable in λA, then for some k, l, B1,
B2, B3, . . ., Bn and C,
(a) Γ(x) ≃ B1 →B2 →B3 → . . .→Bn→ C,
(b) •kC  •lA, and
(c) •lΓ ⊢ Ni : •kBi is derivable in λA for every i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn : A, and by cases on the last rule used in the
derivation. Suppose that Γ ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn : A is derivable in λA.
Case: (var). In this case, n = 0, and the derivation has the form of
Γ′ ∪ { x : A } ⊢ x : A
(var)
for some Γ′ such that Γ = Γ′ ∪ { x : A }. Therefore, we get (a) through (c) by taking C, k, l as C = A and
k = l = 0.
Case: (shift). The derivation ends with
•Γ ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn : •A
Γ ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn : A
(shift).
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Note that •A /≃ ⊤ since A /≃ ⊤. By induction hypothesis, for some k′, l′, B′1, B
′
2, . . ., B
′
n and C
′,
•Γ(x) ≃ B′1 → B
′
2 → B
′
3 → . . .→ B
′
n→ C
′,
•k
′
C′  •l
′
•A, and (68)
•l
′
•Γ ⊢ Ni : •
k′B′i is derivable for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). (69)
Therefore, by Lemma 8.32, (a) holds for some B1, B2, . . ., Bn and C such that
•Bi ≃ B
′
i for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and (70)
•C ≃ C′. (71)
Taking k and l as k = k′+1 and l = l′+1, respectively, we get (b) from (68) and (71), and get (c) from (69)
and (70).
Case: (⊤). This case is impossible since A /≃ ⊤.
Case: (). In this case, the derivation ends with
Γ ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn : A′ A′  A
Γ ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn : A
()
for some A′. Note that A′ /≃ ⊤ by Proposition 5.6. By induction hypothesis, there exist some k, l, B1, B2,
B3, . . ., Bn and C such that (a), •
kC  •lA′ and (c) hold, from the second of which we can also get (b)
since A′  A.
Case: (→I). This case is impossible by the form of xN1N2 . . . Nn.
Case: (→E). In this case, n > 0, and the derivation ends with
Γ1 ⊢ xN1N2 . . . Nn−1 : D→A Γ2 ⊢ Nn : D
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ xN1N2 . . .Nn : A
(→E)
for some Γ1, Γ2 and D such that Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2. Note that D→ A /≃ ⊤ by Proposition 4.15.3 since A /≃ ⊤.
Hence, by induction hypothesis, for some k′, l, B1, B2, B3, . . ., Bn−1 and E,
Γ1(x) ≃ B1 → B2 → B3 → . . .→ Bn−1 → E, (72)
•k
′
E  •l(D→A), and (73)
•lΓ1 ⊢ Ni : •
k′Bi is derivable for every i (1 ≤ i < n). (74)
Since (•l(D→ A))c≃ = •lDc≃→ •lAc≃, by Propositions 5.8 and 4.19, there exist some B′n, C
′ and l′ such
that
•k
′
E ≃ B′n→ C
′, (75)
•lD  •l
′
B′n and •
l′C′  •lA (76)
from (73). Note that E /≃ ⊤ by (73) since D → A /≃ ⊤. Hence, by applying Proposition 4.23.2 to (75)
repeatedly, there also exist some Bn and C such that
E ≃ Bn→ C, (77)
•k
′
Bn ≃ B
′
n and •
k′C ≃ C′. (78)
We now get (a) from (72) and (77) since Γ(x) = Γ1(x). Let k = k
′+l′. Then we get (b) from (76) and (78).
On the other hand, •lΓ2 ⊢ Nn : •
lD is derivable by (nec) from Γ2 ⊢ Nn : D; and therefore, we get (c) from
(74) by Proposition 7.2.2 and (), since Γ = Γ1∪Γ2, •k
′
Bi  •kBi for every i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n−1 }, and since
•lD  •l
′
B′n ≃ •
k′+l′Bn = •kBn from (76) and (78). 
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Theorem 8.34. Let Γ ⊢M : A be a derivable judgment of λA. If A is positively finite and Γ(x) is negatively
finite for every x ∈ Dom(Γ), then M is maximal.
Proof. We show that for every n, every node of the Bo¨hm-tree of M at the level n is head normalizable,
by induction on n. Since A is positively finite, M is head normalizable by Theorem 8.14, that is,
M ∗→
β
λx1. λx2. . . . λxm. yN1N2 . . . Nl
for some x1, x2, . . ., xm, y, N1, N2, . . ., Nl. We can assume, without loss of generality, that x1, x2, . . ., and
xm are distinct individual variables such that { x1, x2, . . . , xm } ∩ Dom(Γ) = {}. It suffices to show that
every node of the Bo¨hm-tree of Ni at a level less than n is head normalizable for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ l). By
Theorem 7.8, Γ ⊢ λx1.λx2. . . . λxm.yN1N2 . . . Nl : A is also derivable in λA; and therefore, by Lemma 8.31,
for some k, B1, B2, . . ., Bm and C,
•kΓ ∪ { x1 : B1, x2 : B2, . . . , xm : Bm } ⊢ yN1N2 . . . Nl : C is derivable, and (79)
B1 → B2 → . . .→ Bm→ C  •
kA. (80)
Note that since A is positively finite, so is •kA by Proposition 8.29 and Definition 8.18; and hence, B1 →
B2→ . . .→Bm→C is also positively finite from (80) by Lemma 8.30. Therefore, C is positively finite, and
B1, B2, . . ., Bm are negatively finite by Proposition 8.29 and Definition 8.18. Note also that C /≃ ⊤ since
C is positively finite. Let Γ′ = •kΓ ∪ { x1 : B1, x2 : B2, . . . , xm : Bm }. Note that Γ′(x) is negatively finite
for every x ∈ Dom(Γ′). By applying Lemma 8.33 to (79), for some p, q, D1, D2, . . ., Dl and E,
Γ′(y) ≃ D1 →D2 → . . .→Dl→E, (81)
•pE  •qC, and (82)
•qΓ′ ⊢ Ni : •pDi is derivable for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ l). (83)
Since •qC is also positively finite, so is E from (82) by Lemma 8.30, Proposition 8.29 and Definition 8.18,
i.e., E /≃ ⊤; and therefore, Di is positively finite, and so is •
pDi, for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) from (81) because
Γ′(y) is negatively finite. Since •qΓ′(x) is also negatively finite for every x ∈ Dom(Γ′), by applying induction
hypothesis to (83), every node of the Bo¨hm-tree of Ni at a level less than n is head normalizable for every
i (1 ≤ i ≤ l); that is, so is one of M at a level less than or equal to n. 
8.4. Simple types
By the standard method due to Tait[27], it can be also shown that λ-terms of simple types, namely,
those having no occurrence of the modal operator, are normalizable.
Definition 8.35. We denote by N the subset of normalizable λ-terms of Exp, and define a subset Kn of
Exp/=
β
as follows.
Kn =
{
[xN1N2 . . .Nn]
∣∣ x ∈ Var, n ≥ 0 and Ni ∈ N for every i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) } .
Lemma 8.36. Consider the term model of Exp, an arbitrary λA-frame 〈W , ⊲ 〉 and a hereditary type
environment η such that Kn ⊆ η(X)p ⊆ N for every type variable X and p ∈ W. Let A be a type expression
with no occurrence of the modal operator •. Then, Kn ⊆ I(A)ηp ⊆ N for every p ∈ W.
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A.
Case: A = Y for some Y . Obvious since I(A)ηp = η(Y )p by Proposition 3.9.
Case: A = B→C for some B and C. First, we show Kn ⊆ I(B→C)ηp. Let u = [xN1N2 . . . Nn] ∈ Kn, and
suppose that p
∗
⊲ q and [L] ∈ I(B)ηq . By induction hypothesis, [L] ∈ N . Then, u · [L] = [xN1N2 . . . NnL] ∈
Kn ⊆ I(C)ηq by induction hypothesis again; and hence, u ∈ I(B → C)
η
p by Proposition 3.9. Second, to
show I(B → C)ηp ⊆ N , suppose that [M ] ∈ I(B → C)
η
p. Let y be a fresh individual variable. Since
53
[y] ∈ Kn ⊆ I(B)ηp by induction hypothesis, we get [M ] · [y] = [My] ∈ I(C)
η
p by Proposition 3.9; and hence,
[My] ∈ N by induction hypothesis. Therefore, My has a normal form, say L. There are two possible cases:
for some K, (i) M ∗→
β
K and L = Ky, or (ii) M ∗→
β
λy. K and K ∗→
β
L. In either case, M obviously has a
normal form.
Case: A = µX.B for some X and B. In this case, X /∈ FTV (B) since B is proper in X , and since A has
no occurrence of •. Therefore, I(µX.B)ηp = I(B)
η
p by Proposition 3.9; and hence, obvious from induction
hypothesis. 
Theorem 8.37. Suppose that the modal operator does not occur in Γ or A. If Γ ⊢ M : A is derivable in
λA, then M is normalizable.
Proof. Let Γ = { x1 : B1, x2 : B2, . . . , xn : Bn } and let 〈W , ⊲ 〉 be an arbitrary λA-frame. Consider the
term model 〈 V , ·, [[ ]]V 〉 of Exp and a type environment η such that η(X)p = Kn for every X ∈ TVar and
p ∈ W . Furthermore, let ρ be an individual environment such that ρ(x) = [x] for every x ∈ Var. For every
i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }, since ρ(xi) = [xi] ∈ Kn, we get ρ(xi) ∈ I(Bi)ηp for every p ∈ W by Lemma 8.36. Hence,
[[M ]]
V
ρ = [M ] ∈ I(A)
η
p ⊆ N by Theorem 7.3 and Lemma 8.36 again. 
Finiteness of type expressions, namely, not including recursive types, is not sufficient for assuring the
normalizability of inhabitants. In the proof of Lemma 8.36, we cannot show that I(•B)ηp ⊆ N from the
induction hypothesis I(B)ηp ⊆ N , since it might be the case that I(•B)
η
p ) I(B)
η
p. In fact, we have already
observed that Curry’s Y has such a type (•X →X)→X in Example 6.4.
9. λA as a basis for logic of programming
The typing system λA can be easily extended to cover full propositional and second-order types. For
example, we can add the following equality and typing rules for product types.
•(A1 ×A2) ∼= •A1 × •A2
Γ1 ⊢M : A1 Γ2 ⊢ N : A2
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ 〈M, N 〉 : A1 ×A2
(×I)
Γ ⊢M : A1 ×A2
Γ ⊢ piM : Ai
(×E) (i = 1, 2)
However, even with such extensions, type expressions discussed so far can only refer to approximative worlds
at a fixed distance from the current world, and do not have enough power to express the manner in which
approximation proceeds in general recursive programs. In order to handle such programs, we have to extend
our logic to a predicate logic, and allow type expressions such as •tA as well-formed type expressions, with
t being a numeric expression. We also need enough arithmetic endowing the typing system to discuss such
t. With the help of such extensions, λA can be a basis for logic of a wide range of programs. In this section
we give some examples.
9.1. Recursive programs over non-negative integers
Provided such an extension to predicate logic endowed with an arithmetic, we can construct a wide
range of recursive programs with fixed-point combinators ensuring their termination. For example, let
nat(n) represent the type of (implementations of) the non-negative integer n, and suppose that f is a
primitive recursive functional defined as
f x ≡ if (x= 0) then c else g (f (x− 1)) x,
where c is a program of a type A(0), g a type A(n .− 1)→ nat(n)→ A(n) for every positive integer n with
a primitive recursive function .− defined in the arithmetic as
x .− y ≡
{ x− y (if x ≥ y)
0 (otherwise)
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We also assume that c or g includes no free occurrence of x, and that the infix operator − is a program that
satisfies ∀m. ∀n.nat(m)→ nat(n)→ nat(n .−m). We will show that f has the type ∀n.nat(n)→ •nA(n),
where, in general, ∀n.B(n) is interpreted as
I(∀n.B(n))ηp = { u | u ∈ I(B(n))
η
p for every non-negative integer n }.
By virtue of the fixed-point combinator Y, we can reformulate the definition of f to
f ≡ Y (λf. λx. if (x = 0) then c else g (f (x− 1)) x).
Let C = ∀n.nat(n)→ •nA(n). It suffices to show that if (x = 0) else g (f (x − 1)) x : •nA(n) assuming
f : •C and x : nat(n), since Y : (•C → C)→ C. If n = 0, then this is straightforward from c : A(0). The
case that n > 0 can be accomplished as follows.
f : ∀n. •(nat(n)→ •nA(n)) (since • is interchangeable with ∀n)
f : •(nat(n .− 1)→•n
.−1A(n .− 1)) (by instantiation, i.e., (∀E))
f : •nat(n .− 1)→ •n
.−1+1A(n .− 1) (by (≃-K/L) or (≺=-K))
f : •nat(n .− 1)→ •nA(n .− 1) (since n .− 1 + 1 = n)
f (x− 1) : •nA(n .− 1) (since x− 1 : •nat(n .− 1))
g (f (x− 1)) : •nnat(n)→•nA(n) (since g : •nA(n .− 1)→ •nnat(n)→•nA(n))
g (f (x− 1)) x : •nA(n) (since x : •nnat(n))
Thus, we get if (x= 0) then c else g (f (x− 1)) x : •nA(n).
In general, if a function f of a type A(~n)→B can be recursively defined based on a well-founded measure
π(~n) on the input, then we can give f a type A(~n)→ •π(~n)B. Consider the following recursive program,
which represents McCarthy’s 91-function.
f x ≡ if (x > 100) then x− 10 else f (f (x + 11))
We can show that f has a type, or satisfies a specification, ∀n.nat(n)→ •101
.−nnat(g(n)), where n ranges
over non-negative integers, and g is a primitive recursive function defined in the arithmetic as follows.
g(x) ≡
{
x− 10 (if x > 100)
91 (otherwise)
Suppose that f : • ∀n.nat(n)→ •101
.−nnat(g(n)) and x : nat(n). The type of Y assures that it suffices to
show
if (x > 100) then x− 10 else f (f (x + 11)) : ∀n.nat(n)→•101
.−nnat(g(n)). (84)
We assume that the infix operator + is a program of the type ∀m. ∀n.nat(m)→ nat(n)→ nat(n + m).
First, we get
f (x + 11) : ••101
.−(n+11)nat(g(n+ 11)).
If n ≤ 90, then we get f (x+ 11) : •91
.−n nat(91) by the definitions of .− and g; and therefore,
f (f (x+ 11)) : •91
.−n•101
.−91nat(g(91)),
which type is equivalent to •101
.−nnat(91). On the other hand, if 90 < n ≤ 100, then we similarly get
f (x+ 11) : •nat(n+ 1); and therefore,
f (f (x+ 11)) : ••101
.−(n+1)nat(g(n+ 1)),
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which type is also equivalent to •101
.−nnat(91). Otherwise, i.e., if 100 < n, obviously x − 10 : nat(g(n)).
Thus, we establish (84).
In this derivation, the fixed-point combinator worked as the induction scheme discussed in Section 1 with
a sequence S0, S1, S2, . . ., Sn as follows.
S0 = V
Sn+1 = { f | ∀x ≥ 101
.− n. f(x) = g(x) } (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .)
The typing ⊢ f : ∀n.nat(n)→•101
.−nnat(g(n)) does not mean that the function f computes the output in
101 .−n steps. Actually, f(n) involves 2(101 .−n) recursive calls. Recall that our interpretations of types are
closed under →
β
. It only means that the output satisfies a specification that is at most 101 .−n steps weaker,
in a sense which only the programmer knows, than the specification of the input. However, on the contrary,
if a recursively defined program f over non-negative integers computes its output g(n) within π(n) levels of
recursion for every input n, the typing judgment ⊢ f : ∀n.nat(n)→ •π(n)nat(g(n)) should be derivable.
Note also that if we only consider λA-frames such that
for every p ∈ W , there exists some q ∈ W such that q ⊲ p,9 (85)
and if I(nat(n))ηp does not depend on p, then the interpretation of ⊢ f : ∀n.nat(n)→ •
101 .−nnat(g(n))
implies f ∈ I(∀n.nat(n)→ nat(g(n)))ηp for every p ∈ W . For, in such a frame, for each n, every possible
world p has another world q from which p is accessible in more than 101 .− n steps. Because the typing
judgment is valid in every possible world, we get f ∈ I(nat(n) → •101
.−nnat(g(n)))ηq for such q, and
which implies that f ∈ I(nat(n)→ nat(g(n)))ηp provided that I(nat(n))
η
p does not depend on p. Thus,
we get f ∈ I(nat(n)→ nat(g(n)))ηp for every p ∈ W and n ∈ N. It can be also observed that ⊢ f :
∀n.nat(n)→nat(g(n)) becomes formally derivable from ⊢ f : ∀n.nat(n)→•101
.−nnat(g(n)) by introducing
another modality, say !, which is interpreted as
I(!A)ηp = { u | u ∈ I(A)
η
q for every q ∈ W },
and accordingly enjoys the following subtyping relations and typing rules:
1. A  B implies !A  !B
2. !(A→ B)  !A→ !B
3. !A  A
4. ! !A ∼= !A
5. ! •tA ∼= !A
6. !nat(n) ∼= nat(n)
Γ1 ⊢M : A
! Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M : !A
(!)
! Γ1 ∪ •Γ2 ⊢M : •A
! Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢M : A
(shift)
where the new (shift)-rule supersedes the original one in Definition 6.3. While the equality ! •tA ∼= !A
and the new (shift)-rule depend on the restriction (85), the other rules are valid for any frame. We might
also need the (subst)-rule since Proposition 7.4.2 would not hold for the extended system. Recursive type
variables are not allowed to occur in scopes of the !-operator, and I(A)ηp is now defined by induction on the
lexicographic ordering of 〈 b(A), p, r(A) 〉, where b(A) is the depth of nesting occurrences of ! in A.
9For example, the set of non-negative integers, or ordinals, and the “greater than” relation > constitutes such a frame.
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9.2. Infinite data structures
Streams, or infinite sequences, of data of a type X are representable by the type µY.X × •Y . We can
construct recursive programs for streams with fixed-point combinators such as Curry’s Y. For example, a
program that generates a stream of a given constant of type X as follows, where A = µY.X × •Y .
.......
⊢ Y : (•A→ A)→A
x : X ⊢ x : X
(var)
y : •A ⊢ y : •A
(var)
x : X, y : •A ⊢ 〈x, y 〉 : X × •A
(×I)
x : X, y : •A ⊢ 〈x, y 〉 : A
(∼=)
x : X ⊢ λy. 〈x, y 〉 : •A→A
(→I)
x : X ⊢ Y(λy. 〈x, y 〉) : A
(→E)
⊢ λx.Y(λy. 〈x, y 〉) : X → A
(→I)
The following shows the derivation of a program that merges two streams, where B = A→ A→ A and
Γ = { f : •B, x : A, y : A }.
.......
⊢ Y : (•B→B)→ B
Γ ⊢ x : A
(var)
Γ ⊢ x : X × •A
(∼=)
Γ ⊢ p1 x : X
(×E)
Γ ⊢ f : •B
(var)
Γ ⊢ f : •A→ •A→•A
()
Γ ⊢ y : A
(var)
Γ ⊢ y : •A
()
Γ ⊢ f y : •A→•A
(→E)
Γ ⊢ x : A
(var)
Γ ⊢ x : X × •A
(∼=)
Γ ⊢ p
2
x : •A
(×E)
Γ ⊢ f y(p2 x) : •A
(→E)
Γ ⊢ 〈p
1
x, f y(p
2
x) 〉 : X × •A
(×I)
Γ ⊢ 〈p
1
x, f y(p
2
x) 〉 : A
(∼=)
f : •B, x : A ⊢ λy. 〈p1 x, f y(p2 x) 〉 : A→A
(→I)
f : •B ⊢ λx. λy. 〈p1 x, f y(p2 x) 〉 : B
(→I)
⊢ λf. λx. λy. 〈p1 x, f y(p2 x) 〉 : •B→B
(→I)
⊢ Y (λf. λx. λy. 〈p
1
x, f y(p
2
x) 〉) : B
(→E)
To capture more complicated recursion over streams, we naturally need an extension to predicate logic
such as used in the case of the 91-function. For example, the prime number generator based on the sieve of
Eratosthenes is derivable in our framework with such an extension. First, by using Y, define three recursive
programs sieve, primes and enum as follows.
enum x ≡ 〈x, enum (x+ 1) 〉
sieve x w ≡ if ((p1 w)mod x= 0) then sieve x (p2w) else 〈p1w, sieve x (p2 w) 〉
primes w ≡ 〈p1 w, primes (sieve (p1 w) (p2 w)) 〉
Then, primes (enum 2) generates the stream of all the prime numbers in ascending order, which can be
formally verified by the extended typing system. Let m, n, k and l range over non-negative integers, and
let preprime, prime, npp, and np be defined in the arithmetic as follows.
preprime(m, n) ≡ 1 < m ∧ ∀k. ∀l. 1 < k < m ∧ k < n⊃m /= k · l
prime(n) ≡ preprime(n, n)
npp(m, n) ≡ min{ k | m ≤ k ∧ preprime(k, n) }
np(n) ≡ min{ k | n ≤ k ∧ prime(k) }
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Note that prime(n) means that n is a prime number, and np(n) represents the least prime number that is
greater than or equal to n. We use these two predicates and two functions for annotating type expression,
and define three types PPS, PS and Sieve as follows.
PPS(m, n) ≡ nat(m) ∧ preprime(m, n)× ••npp(m+1, n)
.−m .−1 PPS(npp(m+ 1, n), n)
PS(n) ≡ nat(n) ∧ prime(n)× ••np(n+1)
.−n .−1 PS(np(n+ 1))
Sieve(m, n) ≡ nat(n) ∧ prime(n)→ PPS(m, n)→
•npp(m, np(n+1))
.−m PPS(npp(m, np(n+ 1)), np(n+ 1))
The two recursive types, namely PPS and PS, are defined without explicit occurrence of µ for readability.
The streams of all the prime numbers in ascending order should have the type PS(2). Actually, we can derive
the following typing.
enum : ∀n. nat(n) ∧ 1 < n→ PPS(n, 2)
sieve : ∀m. ∀n. Sieve(m, n)
primes : ∀n. PPS(n, n)→ PS(n)
primes (enum 2) : PS(2)
As can be seen in this example, the intrinsic complexity of ensuring the convergence, or the productivity,
of programs is not mitigated by use of the approximation modality. Its importance consists in the facts that
(a) it enables us to discuss the convergence without going into the computational behavior of programs, and
by which (b) it is possible to keep the modularity of programs. The derivations above can be done even if
the left hand sides of “:” in the typing judgments are hidden, and through the proofs-as-programs notion,
the derivation itself can be regarded as an executable program.
9.3. The Nat(n)-example
We now reconsider the example of object-oriented natural numbers with an addition method. We revise
the definition of Nat(n) as follows.
Nat(n) ≡ ((n = 0) + (n > 0 ∧ •Nat(n− 1))× (∀m. •Nat(m)→•Nat(n+m)))
Then, the specifications of add and add′ are now different as follows.
add : ∀n. ∀m.Nat(n)→•Nat(m)→ •Nat(n+m) (86)
add′ : ∀n. ∀m. •Nat(n)→Nat(m)→ •Nat(n+m) (87)
We can show s : ∀n.Nat(n)→Nat(n+ 1) by deriving s x : Nat(n+ 1) from the following assumptions.
s : • ∀n.Nat(n)→Nat(n+ 1) (88)
x : Nat(n) (89)
In fact, from x : Nat(n), we get
i2 x : (n+ 1 = 0) + (n+ 1 > 0 ∧ •Nat(n+ 1− 1)). (90)
Furthermore, if y : •Nat(m), then
s : •Nat(m)→•Nat(m+ 1) (by (∀E) from (88), and ())
s y : •Nat(m+ 1) (by (→E))
add x (s y) : •Nat(n+m+ 1) (by (86) and (89))
∼= •Nat(n+ 1 +m) (since n+m+1=n+1+m).
Hence,
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λy. add x (s y) : •Natm→ •Nat(n+ 1 +m) (by (→I))
λy. add x (s y) : ∀m. •Nat(m)→ •Nat(n+ 1 +m) (by (∀I))
〈 i2 x, λy. add x (s y) 〉 : Nat(n+ 1) (by (×I) with (90)).
Thus, we get s : ∀n.Nat(n) : Nat(n+ 1). However, on the other hand, under similar assumptions, we can
only get
add′ x (s′ y) : ••Nat(n+m+ 1),
from (87), and fail to derive s′ : ∀n.Nat(n)→Nat(n+ 1).
10. Modal logics behind λA
In this section, we consider λA as a modal logic by ignoring left hand sides of “:” from typing judgments,
and show that it corresponds to an intuitionistic version of the logic of provability GL (cf. [4]). The modal
logic GL is also denoted by G (for Go¨del), L (for Lo¨b), PrL, KW, or K4W, in the literature.
Definition 10.1 (Formal systems miK4 and LAµ). Regarding type expressions as logical formulae, we
define a formal systemmiK4, the minimal and implication fragment of the modal logicK4, by the following
inference rules, where Γ denotes a finite set of formulae.
Γ ∪ {A } ⊢ A
(assump)
Γ1 ⊢ A
•Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ •A
(nec)
Γ ⊢ •A
Γ ⊢ ••A
(4)
Γ ∪ {A } ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A→B
(→ I)
Γ1 ⊢ A→B Γ2 ⊢ A
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊢ B
(→E)
Note that the following rule is derivable in miK4.
Γ ⊢ •(A→ B)
Γ ⊢ •A→ •B
(K)
Similarly, we define LAµ as the formal system obtained frommiK4 by adding the following four additional
rules.
Γ ⊢ A[µX.A/X ]
Γ ⊢ µX.A
(fold)
Γ ⊢ µX.A
Γ ⊢ A[µX.A/X ]
(unfold)
Γ ⊢ •A→ •B
Γ ⊢ •(A→B)
(L)
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ •A
(approx)
We occasionally use ⊢ A as a synonym to {}⊢ A. Note that the (4)-rule is redundant to LAµ since it has
(approx). When miK4 is considered, we usually suppose that formulae, i.e., type expressions, are finite,
that is, do not include any occurrence of µ. It will be shown, later in Theorem 10.14, that the modal logic
LAµ corresponds to the typing system λA. In LAµ, (fold), (unfold), (K), (L) and (approx) substitute for
the ()-rule of λA. The formal system LAµ does not have a rule directly corresponding to (∼=-uniq) of λA.
This is because the logical equivalence between formulae is a weaker notion than the one as types, i.e., sets
of realizers, and is derivable from other inference rules. The first thing we should confirm is the following
proposition.
Proposition 10.2. If {A1, . . . , An } ⊢ B is derivable in LAµ, then { x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An } ⊢ M : B
is derivable in λA for some λ-term M and distinct individual variables x1, . . ., xn such that FV (M) ⊆
{ x1, . . . , xn }.
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Proof. Straightforward induction on the derivation. Use Proposition 7.4.1 to handle (nec). The rules
(assump), (→I) and (→E) have direct correspondents in λA, which involve term construction. The other
rules, namely (fold), (unfold), (L) and (approx), are imitable by the ()-rule of λA since it has (∼=-fix),
(≃-K/L) and (-approx). 
To show the opposite, we will employ the completeness of LAµ with respect to a certain interpretation
of formulae. As a preparation for that, we first show that in LAµ,
1. (•A→A)→ A,
2. A, for every⊤-variant A, and
3. A ∼= B implies A→ B and B→A.
Proposition 10.3. The following inference rule is derivable in LAµ.
Γ ⊢ •A→A
Γ ⊢ A
(Y)
Proof. It suffices to show that ⊢ (•A→A)→A is derivable in LAµ for every A. In fact, we have a derivation
corresponding to the one of Example 6.4. Let a formula B = µX.•X →A and a derivation Π as follows.
Π =
•A→A ⊢ •A→A
(assump)
B ⊢ B
(assump)
B ⊢ •B→A
(unfold)
•B ⊢ •(•B→ A)
(nec)
•B ⊢ ••B→•A
(K)
•B ⊢ •B
(assump)
•B ⊢ ••B
(approx)
•B ⊢ •A
(→E)
•A→ A, •B ⊢ A
(→E)
•A→A ⊢ •B→A
(→I)
Then we can derive ⊢ (•A→A)→ A as follows.
... Π
•A→A ⊢ •B→A
... Π
•A→ A ⊢ •B→ A
•A→ A ⊢ B
(fold)
•A→A ⊢ •B
(approx)
•A→A ⊢ A
(→E)
⊢ (•A→ A)→A
(→I)

Definition 10.4. We write Γ ⊢LAµ Γ
′ if and only if Γ ⊢ A is derivable in LAµ for every A ∈ Γ′, and write
Γ ⊢LAµ A ↔ B if and only if Γ ⊢LAµ {A→ B, B → A}. We also define a binary relation ↔LAµ between
formulae, i.e., type expressions, as A↔LAµB if and only if ⊢LAµ A↔ B.
Proposition 10.5. If Γ ∪ { •(A→ B), •(B→ A) } ⊢LAµ A↔ B, then Γ ⊢LAµ A↔ B.
Proof. Suppose that we have Γ∪{ •(A→B), •(B→A) } ⊢LAµ A↔ B. Since Γ∪{ •(A→B), •(B→A) } ⊢
A→ B is derivable, so is
Γ ∪ { •(B→A) } ⊢ A→B (91)
by Proposition 10.3, namely (Y). Similarly, Γ ∪ { •(A→ B) } ⊢ B→ A is also derivable; and hence, so is
Γ ∪ { •(A→B) } ⊢ •(B→ A) (92)
by (approx). Therefore, we can derive Γ ∪ { •(A→ B) } ⊢ A→ B from (91) and (92); and hence, so is
Γ ⊢ A→ B by (Y). Symmetrically, Γ ⊢ B→A is also derivable in LAµ. 
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Proposition 10.6. 1. Suppose that Γ′ ⊢LAµ Γ. If Γ ⊢ A is derivable in LAµ, then so is Γ′ ⊢ A.
2. If {A1, A2, . . . , An } ⊢ B is derivable in LAµ, then so is {A1[C/X ], A2[C/X ], . . . , An[C/X ] } ⊢
B[C/X ] for every C and X.
Proof. Straightforward. 
Proposition 10.7. {At } ⊢ A is derivable in LAµ for every A.
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A.
Case: A = X for some X. Trivial since At = A by Definition 2.2.
Case: A = •B for some B. In this case, At = •Bt. By induction hypothesis, {Bt } ⊢ B is derivable; hence,
so is { •Bt } ⊢ •B by (nec).
Case: A = B→C for some B and C. In this case, At = Ct. By induction hypothesis and Proposition 10.6.1,
{B, Ct } ⊢ C is derivable, from which we get {Ct } ⊢ B→ C by (→ I).
Case: A = µX.B for some X and B. In this case, At = µX.Bt, and by induction hypothesis,
{Bt } ⊢ B is derivable. (93)
If X /∈ FTV (Bt), then {At } ⊢ Bt is derivable from (assump) by (unfold) since Bt[At/X ] = Bt; and
hence, so is {At } ⊢ B by (93) and Proposition 10.6.1. In this case, we can derive {At } ⊢ B[A/X ] by
Proposition 10.6.2, from which we get {At } ⊢ A by (fold). On the other hand, in case of X ∈ FTV (Bt), let
Bt = •m0µY1.•m1µY2.•m2 . . . µYn.•mnX , where X /∈ { Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn }, and let k = m0+m1+m2+ . . .+mn.
Note that A is a⊤-variant and k > 0 in this case, since Bt is also proper in X by Proposition 2.9.2. Hence,
{ •kX} ⊢ Bt is derivable from {X } ⊢ X by repeatedly applying (nec) or (fold); and therefore, so is
{ •X} ⊢ Bt by Proposition 10.6.1 since { •X } ⊢ •kX is derivable from { •X } ⊢ •X by applying (approx)
k − 1 times. Hence, by (93),
{ •X } ⊢ B is also derivable.
Therefore, by Proposition 10.6.2, so is { •A } ⊢ B[A/X ], from which we get { •A } ⊢ A by (fold). Then,
⊢ •A→ A is derivable by (→I); and hence, so is ⊢ A by Proposition 10.3. Finally, we get {At } ⊢ A by
Proposition 10.6.1. 
Proposition 10.8. If A is a ⊤-variant, then ⊢ A is derivable in LAµ.
Proof. Suppose that A is a ⊤-variant, i.e., At = •m0µX1.•m1µX2.•m2 . . . µXn.•mnXi for some n, m0, m1,
m2, . . ., mn, X1, X2, . . ., Xn and i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Xi /∈ { Xi+1, Xi+2, . . . , Xn } andmi+mi+1+mi+2+
. . . +mn ≥ 1. By Proposition 10.7, it suffices to show that ⊢ At is derivable. Let k be the largest integer
such that mk > 0, and let C and D as C = µXk+1.µXk+2. . . . µXn.Xi and D = •miµXi+1.•mi+1µXi+2.
. . . •mk−1µXk.•mkC. Note that At = •m0µX1.•m1µX2. . . . •mi−1µXi.D. We can derive {Xi } ⊢ C from
{Xi } ⊢ Xi by (fold), from which { •Xi } ⊢ •C follows by (nec). Hence, continuing the derivation by
repeatedly applying (approx) or (fold), we get { •Xi} ⊢ D. Therefore, by Proposition 10.6.2, { •µXi.D} ⊢
D[µXi.D/Xi] is derivable, and from which { •µXi.D} ⊢ µXi.D follows by (fold). Hence, ⊢ µXi.D is derivable
by Proposition 10.3, and therefore, so is ⊢ At by applying (nec) and (fold). 
Proposition 10.9. Let [ ~B/ ~X] and [~C/ ~X] be abbreviations for [B1/X1, B2/X2, . . . , Bn/Xn] and [C1/X1,
C2/X2, . . . , Cn/Xn], respectively. Suppose that for any i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }, either
(a) {Bi→ Ci, Ci→Bi } ⊆ Γ, or
(b) { •(Bi→ Ci), •(Ci→Bi) } ⊆ Γ and A is proper in Xi.
Then, Γ ⊢LAµ A[ ~B/ ~X]↔ A[~C/ ~X].
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Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. If A is a⊤-variant, then so are both A[ ~B/X ]
and A[~C/X ] by Proposition 2.10.1; and hence, it is trivial by Proposition 10.8. Therefore, we only consider
the case that A is not.
Case: A = Y for some Y . Trivial if Y /∈ {X1, X2, . . . , Xn }. If Y = Xi for some i, then A[ ~B/ ~X] = Bi and
A[~C/ ~X] = Ci; and hence, Γ ⊢LAµ A[ ~B/ ~X]↔ A[~C/ ~X] from (a) since A is not proper in Xi.
Case: A = •D for some D. Let Γ′ = {B1→C1, C1→B1, B2→C2, C2→B2, . . . , Bn→Cn, Cn→Bn }. By
induction hypothesis, Γ ∪ Γ′ ⊢LAµ D[ ~B/ ~X]↔ D[~C/ ~X]; and hence, both •Γ ∪ •Γ′ ⊢ •(D[ ~B/ ~X]→D[~C/ ~X])
and •Γ∪ •Γ′ ⊢ •(D[~C/ ~X]→D[ ~B/ ~X]) are derivable by (nec); and so are •Γ∪ •Γ′ ⊢ A[ ~B/ ~X]→A[~C/ ~X] and
•Γ ∪ •Γ′ ⊢ A[~C/ ~X]→ A[ ~B/ ~X] by (K). Therefore, since Γ ⊢LAµ •Γ ∪ •Γ′ by (approx), Γ ⊢LAµ A[ ~B/ ~X] ↔
A[~C/ ~X] by Proposition 10.6.1.
Case: A = D→E for some D and E. Since A is not a⊤-variant, A is proper in Xi if and only if so are D
and E. Therefore, Γ ⊢LAµ D[ ~B/ ~X] ↔ D[~C/ ~X] and Γ ⊢LAµ E[ ~B/ ~X] ↔ E[~C/ ~X] by induction hypothesis;
and hence, Γ ⊢LAµ A[ ~B/ ~X]↔ A[~C/ ~X].
Case: A = µY.D for some Y and D. We can assume that Y /∈ FTV (Γ) ∪ { ~X } without loss of generality.
A[ ~B/ ~X] = µY.D[ ~B/ ~X]
↔LAµ D[ ~B/ ~X][A[ ~B/ ~X]/Y ] (by (fold) and (unfold))
= D[ ~B/ ~X,A[ ~B/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ FTV (Γ) ∪ { ~X })
Similarly, we get A[~C/ ~X]↔LAµD[~C/ ~X,A[~C/ ~X]/Y ]. On the other hand, by Definition 2.4, A is proper in
Xi if and only if so is D, since A is not a⊤-variant. Hence, by induction hypothesis,
Γ ∪ { •(A[ ~B/ ~X]→ A[~C/ ~X]), •(A[~C/ ~X]→ A[ ~B/ ~X]) } ⊢LAµ D[ ~B/ ~X,A[ ~B/ ~X]/Y ]↔ D[~C/ ~X,A[~C/ ~X]/Y ].
Therefore, Γ ∪ { •(A[ ~B/ ~X] → A[~C/ ~X]), •(A[~C/ ~X] → A[ ~B/ ~X]) } ⊢LAµ A[ ~B/ ~X] ↔ A[~C/ ~X]; and hence,
Γ ⊢LAµ A[ ~B/ ~X]↔ A[~C/ ~X] by Proposition 10.5. 
Lemma 10.10. If A ∼= B, then A↔LAµB.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of A ∼= B, and by cases on the rule applied last. Most cases are
straightforward. Use Proposition 10.8 for the case of (∼=-→⊤). The only interesting case is (∼=-uniq). In
this case, B = µX.C for some X and C such that A ∼= C[A/X ] and C is proper in X . By Proposition 10.9,
{ •(A→ B), •(B→ A) } ⊢LAµ C[A/X ]↔ C[B/X ].
Since A↔LAµC[A/X ] by induction hypothesis, and since B ↔LAµC[B/X ] by (fold) and (unfold), we get
{ •(A→ B), •(B→ A) } ⊢LAµ A↔ B.
Therefore, A↔LAµB by Proposition 10.5. 
10.1. Kripke semantics of LAµ
Now we turn to the semantics of LAµ, and proceed to show the completeness.
Definition 10.11 (iGL-frames and LA-frames). An intuitionistic well-founded frame is a triple 〈W ,
⊲, R 〉, which consists of a non-empty set W of possible worlds and two accessibility relations ⊲ and R on
W such that
1. ⊲ is a (conversely) well-founded binary relation on W ,
2. R is a transitive and reflexive binary relation on W , and
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3. p R q ⊲ r implies p ⊲ r.
An iGL-frame is an intuitionistic well-founded frame that satisfies the following condition.
4. ⊲ is transitive.
An LA-frame is an intuitionistic well-founded frame that satisfies the following two conditions.
5. p ⊲ q implies p R q.
6. if p ⊲ q R q′, then there exists some r ∈ W such that
(a) p R r ⊲ q′, and
(b) r ⊲ s implies q′ R s for every s ∈ W .
Conditions 1 through 4 constitute the class of frames, to which the intuitionistic variant of the logic of
provability is sound and complete (cf. [29, 30]). Condition 5 means that the interpretation is hereditary
with respect to the well-founded relation ⊲ as well as R. Condition 6 corresponds to Condition 2 of
Definition 3.6, which indicates that ⊲ is locally linear.
Definition 10.12 (Kripke semantics of the logics). Let 〈W , ⊲, R 〉 be an intuitionistic well-founded
frame. A mapping f from W to { t, f } is hereditary if and only if
if p R q, then f(p) = t implies f(q) = t.
A mapping ξ that assigns a mapping (from W to { t, f }) to each propositional variable, i.e., type variable,
is called a valuation. We say a valuation ξ is hereditary if and only if ξ(X) is hereditary for every X . In
this paper, only hereditary valuations will be considered. We define a hereditary mapping IL(A)ξ from W
to { t, f } for each formula A by extending ξ as follows, where we use |=ξpA to denote that IL(A)
ξ(p) = t.
|=ξp A (A is a⊤-variant)
|=ξpX iff ξ(X)(p) = t
|=ξp •A iff |=
ξ
q A for every q such that p ⊲ q ( •A is not a⊤-variant)
|=ξp A→ B iff |=
ξ
q A implies |=
ξ
q B for every q such that p R q
(A→B is not a⊤-variant)
|=ξp µX.A iff |=
ξ
pA[µX.A/X ] (µX.A is not a⊤-variant)
The interpretation |=ξpA is defined by induction on 〈 p, r(A) 〉, where we use the ordering ⊐ defined as
follows.
〈 p, A 〉 ⊐ 〈 q, B 〉 iff p R q and r(A) > r(B), or p ⊲ q.
Note that ⊐ is also well-founded, since so is ⊲, and since Condition 3 of Definition 10.11 is satisfied. We
write Γ |=ξp A if and only if |=
ξ
pA whenever |=
ξ
pB for every B ∈ Γ. It is easy to verify that for every p, q ∈ W ,
ξ and A,
if p R q, then |=ξpA implies |=
ξ
q A.
By a discussion similar to Theorem 7.3, we can also observe the soundness of λA as a modal logic with
respect to this semantics of formulae. The proof proceeds as follows. In the sequel, we write |=ξ A if and
only if |=ξpA for every p ∈ W .
Proposition 10.13. Let 〈W , ⊲, R 〉 be an LA-frame, and ξ a hereditary valuation.
1. |=ξpA[B/X ] iff |=
ξ[IL(B)
ξ/X]
p A.
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2. Let ξ′ be a hereditary valuation such that ξ(X)(q) = ξ′(X)(q) for every X and q ⊳ p. If for every X,
either (a) A is proper in X, or (b) ξ(X)(p) = ξ′(X)(p), then |=ξpA iff |=
ξ′
p A.
3. If A ≃ B, then |=ξ A iff |=ξ B.
4. Let γ = {X1  Y1, X2  Y2, . . . , Xn  Yn }. If γ ⊢ A  B is derivable, and {Xi } |=
ξ
Yi for every
i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . n }, then {A } |=ξ B.
5. If { x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An } ⊢M : B is derivable in λA, then {A1, . . . , An } |=
ξ
B.
Proof. The proofs are quite parallel to those of Proposition 3.10.1, Lemma 4.6, Theorems 4.8, 5.4 and 7.3,
respectively. The proofs of Items 1 and 2 proceed by induction on the ordering ⊐ of 〈 p, r(A) 〉. Those of
Items 3, 4 and 5 are by induction on the derivations. The only non-trivial difference is the case for the
(shift)-rules in the proof of Item 5. In this case, the derivation ends with
{ x1 : •A1, x2 : •A2, . . . , xn : •An, } ⊢M : •B
{ x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An } ⊢M : B
(shift).
For the given 〈W , ⊲, R 〉, p and ξ, we construct another LA-frame 〈W ′, ⊲′, R′ 〉 and a hereditary valuation
ξ′ for it by extending 〈W , ⊲, R 〉 and ξ as follows.
W ′ =
{
〈 a, q 〉
∣∣ a ∈ { 0, 1 } and q ∈ W }
〈 a, q 〉 ⊲′ 〈 b, r 〉 iff
{
a = b = 0 and q ⊲ r, or
a = 1, b = 0 and q R r
〈 a, q 〉 R′ 〈 b, r 〉 iff a ≥ b and q R r
ξ′(X)(〈 a, q 〉) = ξ(X)(q)
We can easily verify that 〈W ′, ⊲′, R′ 〉 satisfies Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 5 of Definition 10.11, and that ξ′ is
hereditary. Furthermore, Condition 6 is also satisfied. In fact, suppose that 〈 a, p′ 〉 ⊲′ 〈 b, q 〉 R′ 〈 c, q′ 〉. If
a = 0, then it is obvious, since a = 0 implies b = c = 0, and since 〈W , ⊲, R 〉 satisfies Condition 6. On the
other hand, if a = 1, then we get b = c = 0 by the definition of ⊲′; and hence,
p′ R q R q′.
Then, it suffices to let r be 〈 1, q′ 〉, because
〈 a, p′ 〉 R′ 〈 1, q′ 〉 ⊲′ 〈 c, q′ 〉,
and because 〈 1, q′ 〉 ⊲′ 〈 d, s 〉 implies d = 0 and q′ R s by the definition of ⊲′; and hence, 〈 c, q′ 〉 R′ 〈 d, s 〉.
Now, let I ′
L
(A)ξ
′
be the interpretation of A in 〈W ′, ⊲′, R′ 〉 under the valuation ξ′. Then, I ′
L
(A)ξ
′
〈 0, q 〉=
IL(A)ξq for every q ∈ W and A. Since IL(Ai)
ξ
p = t implies I
′
L
(•Ai)
ξ′
〈 1, p 〉= t for every i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n },
we get I ′
L
(•B)ξ
′
〈 1, p 〉= t by the induction hypothesis on the derivation. Therefore, I
′
L
(B)ξ
′
〈 0, p 〉 = t, that is,
IL(B)ξp = t. 
Theorem 10.14. The following three conditions are equivalent.
(a) {A1, A2, . . . , An } ⊢ B is derivable in LAµ.
(b) { x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An } ⊢M : B is derivable in λA for some x1, x2, . . ., xn and M .
(c) {A1, A2, . . . , An } |=
ξ
B for every LA-frame 〈W , ⊲, R 〉 and hereditary valuation ξ.
Proof. We get (a) ⇒ (b) and (b) ⇒ (c) by Propositions 10.2 and 10.13.5, respectively. Hence, it suffices
to show that (c) ⇒ (a), which is established by Theorem 10.16 below. 
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Note that this theorem implies that the (shift)-rule of λA is derivable in LAµ, that is, if •Γ ⊢ •A is derivable
in LAµ, then so is Γ ⊢ A10.
Definition 10.15. Let A and B type expressions, i.e., formulae of LAµ. We call A a component of B,
and write A ≤ B, if and only if C[A/X ] ∼= B for some X and C such that X ∈ ETV (C). We also define
Comp(B) as
Comp(B) = { A | A ≤ B }.
That is, Comp(B) is the set of all type expressions that is equivalent, in the sense of ∼=, to some subexpression
occurring freely and effectively in B. For example, let C = µX.Y →•(X → Z). Then, A ∈ Comp(Y → •C)
if and only if
A ∼= A′ for some A′ ∈ { Y, Z, C, •C, C→ Z, •(C→ Z), Y →•C }.
It can be shown that for every B, Comp(B)/∼= is a finite set. We refer the reader for the proof to Ap-
pendix A.2. We do not define the corresponding notions using ≃ instead of ∼=. If we define such a set, say
Comp≃(B), by ≃, then Comp≃(B)/≃ is not always finite11 because of the (≃-K/L)-rule. For example, con-
sider B = µX.•(X → Y ). Then, A ∈ Comp≃(B)/≃ iff A ≃ A′ for some A′ ∈ { Y, B, B→ Y, •Y, •B, •B→
•Y, ••Y, ••B, ••B→••Y, •••Y, •••B, •••B→ •••Y, . . . }, since
B ≃ •(B→ Y )
≃ •B→•Y
≃ ••(B→ Y )→ •Y
≃ (••B→ ••Y )→ •Y
≃ (•••(B→ Y )→ ••Y )→•Y
≃ ((•••B→ •••Y )→••Y )→•Y
≃ . . . .
Theorem 10.16 (Kripke completeness of LAµ). If {A1, A2, . . . , An } ⊢ B is not derivable in LAµ,
then there exist some LA-frame 〈W0, ⊲0, R0 〉, hereditary valuation ξ0, and p0 ∈ W0 such that /|=
ξ0
p0
B while
|=ξ0p0Ai for every i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . n }.
Proof. Suppose that {A1, . . . , An } ⊢ B is not derivable in LAµ. Let
F = { C | C ∈ Comp(B) or C ∈ Comp(Ai) for some i },
and define W0 and p0 as follows.
W0 = { p ⊆ F | C ∈ p whenever C ∈ F and p ⊢ C is derivable12 }
p0 = { C ∈ F | {A1, . . . , An } ⊢ C is derivable }
Note that F/∼= is a finite set, since so are Comp(B)/∼= and Comp(Ai)/∼= for every i; and hence, W0 is also
a finite set because C ∼= D implies C ↔LAµD by Lemma 10.10. Then, for each p ∈ W0, define p˜ as
p˜ = { C ∈ F | p ⊢ •C is derivable }.
Observe that
p ⊢LAµ •p˜ (94)
10This is also the case for the formal systems miGLC and LA, which will be defined later.
11However, Comp(B)/≃ is still finite, since A1 ∼= A2 implies A1 ≃ A2.
12More precisely, Γ ⊢ C derivable for some finite subset Γ of p.
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by the definition, and that p˜ ∈ W0. For, if p˜ ⊢ C is derivable for some C ∈ F , then so is •p˜ ⊢ •C by (nec);
and therefore, p ⊢ •C is also derivable, i.e., C ∈ p˜, by Proposition 10.6.1 and (94). Note also that
p ⊆ p˜
since LAµ has the (approx)-rule. We then define accessibility relations ⊲0 and R0 as follows.
p ⊲0 q iff p˜ ⊆ q and q˜ /⊆ q
p R0 q iff p = q or, p ( q and q˜ /⊆ q
Since W0 is finite, and since ⊲0 is transitive and irreflexive, ⊲0 is (conversely) well-founded. We can easily
verify that ⊲0 and R0 satisfy Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 5 of Definition 10.11. Furthermore, Condition 6 is also
satisfied. For, suppose that p ⊲0 q R0 q
′. Then, let r = { C ∈ F | p ∪ •q′ ⊢ C is derivable }. We show that
(a) and (b) of Condition 6 of Definition 10.11 hold. First, obviously p ⊆ r by the definition. Furthermore,
it can be shown that r˜ /⊆ r by contradiction. Suppose that r˜ ⊆ r. Since q˜′ /⊆ q′ from p ⊲0 q R0 q′, there
exists some D ∈ q˜′ such that D /∈ q′. Hence, we can derive the following.
q′ ⊢ •D (since D ∈ q˜′)
•q′ ⊢ ••D (by (nec))
r ⊢ ••D (by the definition of r)
r˜ ⊢ •D (by the definition of r˜)
r ⊢ •D (since r˜ ⊆ r by assumption)
r˜ ⊢ D (by the definition of r˜)
r ⊢ D (since r˜ ⊆ r by assumption)
p ∪ •q′ ⊢ D (by the definition of r)
q′ ∪ •q′ ⊢ D (since p ⊆ q′ from p ⊲0 q R0 q′)
q′ ⊢ D (since q′ ⊢ •q′ by (approx))
This contradicts D /∈ q′; and hence, r˜ /⊆ r, and p R0 r. Second, we show that r ⊲0 q
′. To this end, suppose
that C ∈ r˜. Then, the following judgments are derivable.
r ⊢ •C (since C ∈ r˜)
p ∪ •q′ ⊢ •C (by the definition of r)
p ⊢ •q′→ •C (by (→I)13)
p ⊢ •(q′→ C) (by (L))
p˜ ⊢ q′→ C (by the definition of p˜)
p˜ ∪ q′ ⊢ C (by (→E))
q′ ⊢ C (since p˜ ⊆ q′ from p ⊲0 q R0 q′)
Hence, C ∈ q′; that is, r˜ ⊆ q′; and therefore, r ⊲0 q′, since q˜′ /⊆ q′ from p ⊲0 q R0 q′, Condition (a) is thus
established. Next, we show that (b) also holds. Suppose that r ⊲0 s and C ∈ q′. It suffices to show that
C ∈ s. We can derive
q′ ⊢ C (since C ∈ q′)
•q′ ⊢ •C (by (nec))
r ⊢ •C (by the definition of r)
r˜ ⊢ C (by the definition of r˜)
s ⊢ C (since r˜ ⊆ s from r ⊲0 s).
13More precisely, Γ ⊢ •A1 → •A2 → . . . → •An → •C is derivable for some finite subset Γ of p and some finite subset
{A1, A2, . . . , An } of q.
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That is, C ∈ s. Thus, Condition (b) is also established. We finally define the valuation ξ0 as follows.
ξ0(X)p =
{ t (X ∈ p)
f (X /∈ p)
Obviously, ξ0 is hereditary by the definition of R0. To finish the proof of the completeness theorem, it
suffices to prove the following lemma, because B /∈ p0 while Ai ∈ p0 for every i. 
Lemma 10.17. Consider the frame 〈W0, ⊲0, R0 〉 and F defined in the proof of Theorem 10.16. Let C ∈ F
and p ∈ W0. Then, C ∈ p if and only if |=
ξ0
p C.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the ordering ⊐ of 〈 p, r(C) 〉, and by cases on the form of C.
If C is a ⊤-variant, then C ∈ p by the definition of W0 and Proposition 10.8, and |=
ξ0
p C for every p by
Definition 10.12. Hence, we only consider the case that C is not.
Case: C = X for some X. Trivial from the definition of ξ0(X).
Case: C = •D for some D. For the “only if” part, suppose that •D ∈ p. If p ⊲0 q, then since p˜ ⊆ q and
since p ⊢ •D is derivable, we get D ∈ q. Hence, |=ξ0q D by induction hypothesis. Thus, we get |=
ξ0
p •D from
•D ∈ p. For the “if” part, suppose that |=ξ0p •D, i.e.,
|=ξ0q D for any q such that p ⊲0 q. (95)
Let
q = { E ∈ F | p˜ ∪ {•D} ⊢ E is derivable }.
Note that q ∈ W0 and p˜ ⊆ q. If p ⊲0 q, then |=
ξ0
q D by (95); therefore, D ∈ q by induction hypothesis.
Otherwise, q˜ ⊆ q. In this case, again D ∈ q since D ∈ q˜. Therefore, p˜∪{•D} ⊢ D is derivable in either case;
and hence, we can derive the following judgments.
p˜ ⊢ •D→D (by (→I))
p˜ ⊢ D (by Proposition 10.3, namely (Y))
•p˜ ⊢ •D (by (nec))
p ⊢ •D (by (94) and Proposition 10.6.1)
Thus, we get •D ∈ p from |=ξ0p •D.
Case: C = D→ E for some D and E. For the “only if” part, suppose that D→ E ∈ p, p R0 q and |=
ξ0
q D.
We get D ∈ q from |=ξ0q D by induction hypothesis. On the other hand, D→E ∈ q, since p ⊆ q from p R0 q.
Therefore, E ∈ q; and by induction hypothesis again, |=ξ0q E. Thus, we get |=
ξ0
p D→E. As for the “if” part,
suppose that |=ξ0p D→ E, i.e.,
|=ξ0q D implies |=
ξ0
q E whenever p R0 q. (96)
Let
q = { F ∈ F | p ∪ {D, •E } ⊢ F is derivable }.
Note that q ∈ W0 and p ⊆ q. If q˜ ⊆ q, then we can derive
q ⊢ •E (by the definition of q)
q˜ ⊢ E (by the definition of q˜)
q ⊢ E (since q˜ ⊆ q by assumption)
p ∪ {D, •E } ⊢ E (by the definition of q)
p ∪ {D } ⊢ •E→E (by (→I))
p ∪ {D } ⊢ E (by Proposition 10.3, namely (Y))
p ⊢ D→ E (by (→I)).
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That is, D→ E ∈ p in this case. On the other hand, if q˜ /⊆ q, then p R0 q holds. Hence, |=
ξ0
q D from D ∈ q
by induction hypothesis. Then, |=ξ0q E from (96); and therefore, by induction hypothesis again, E ∈ q, i.e.,
p∪ {D, •E } ⊢ E is derivable, which implies that so is p ⊢ D→E by (→I) and (Y). Thus, D→E ∈ p also
in this case.
Case: C = µX.D for some X and D. For the “if” part, suppose that |=ξ0p µX.D, i.e., |=
ξ0
p D[µX.D/X ]. Since
r(D[µX.D/X ]) < r(µX.D), we get D[µX.D/X ] ∈ p by induction hypothesis; and therefore, µX.D ∈ p since
LAµ has (fold). For the “only if” part, suppose that µX.D ∈ p, i.e., also D[µX.D/X ] ∈ p by (unfold).
Hence, |=ξ0p D[µX.D/X ] by induction hypothesis; and therefore, |=
ξ0
p µX.D by Definition 10.12. 
This completes the proofs of Theorems 10.16 and 10.14. Since the counter model constructed in the proof
of Lemma 10.17 is based on a finite frame, the logic LAµ has the finite model property, and we therefore
get the following corollary.
Corollary 10.18. The following problems are decidable.
1. Provability in LAµ.
2. Type inhabitance in λA.
10.2. Relationship to intuitionistic modal logic of provability
The logic LAµ allows self-referential formulae. In this subsection, we show that if LAµ is restricted to
finite formulae, i.e., those without any occurrence of µ, then we get an intuitionistic version of the logic of
provability GL.
Definition 10.19 (miGL, miGLC and LA). We define miGL, which only allows finite formulae, to be
the formal system obtained from miK4 (Definition 10.1) by adding the following inference rule called Lo¨b’s
Principle.
Γ ⊢ •(•A→ A)
Γ ⊢ •A
(W)
We also define two more formal systems: miGLC and LA, which again only allow finite formulae, as
miGL+ (approx) and miGLC+ (L), respectively, where (approx) and (L) are those of Definition 10.1.
The formal system miGL corresponds to the minimal and implicational fragment of GL14, and it
can be shown that miGL is sound and complete with respect to the Kripke semantics over iGL-frames
(Definitions 10.11 and 10.12). The (approx)-rule ofmiGLC and LA is called the “Completeness Principle”
in the context of the logic of provability (cf. [31]).
Note that (W), i.e., Lo¨b’s Principle, is a derivable rule of LAµ. In fact, ⊢ (•A→A)→A is derivable in
LAµ by Proposition 10.3, and from which we get ⊢ •(•A→A)→•A by applying (nec) and (K). Conversely,
⊢ (•A→A)→ A is derivable in miGLC and LA by (W) and (approx) as follows15.
{ •A→A } ⊢ •A→A
(assump)
{ •A→A } ⊢ •A→A
(assump)
{ •A→A } ⊢ •(•A→A)
(approx)
{ •A→A } ⊢ •A
(W)
{ •A→A } ⊢A
(→E)
⊢ (•A→A)→A
(→I)
14The intuitionistic version of GL was introduced by Ursini[29], who also showed its completeness and finite model
property[30]. The (4)-rule is redundant if conjunctive formulae are available.
15If the system allows conjunctive formulae, the pair of (approx) and (W) is equivalent to the (Y)-rule of Proposition 10.3,
which is called the “Strong Lo¨b’s Principle”.
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Table 1: Summary of the systems
miGL miGLC LA LAµ λA
system logic type
recursive types no yes
frames
well-founded
n/a locally linear
interpretation n/a hereditary w.r.t. ⊲
(assump) (var)
(→I)
(→E)
(nec) derivable
(K) drivable
(≃-K/L)
rules
n/a (L)
(4)
(approx) (-approx)
n/a
n/a derivable (shift)
(W) derivable
derivable (fold/unfold) (
∼=-fix)
(for logical fixed-points of finite formulae) (∼=-uniq)
•(A→B)→•A→ •B
n/a (•A→ •B)→ •(A→B)
theorems
•A→ ••A
n/a A→ •A
•(•A→ A)→ •A
n/a (•A→ A)→ A
Therefore, since the only role of (fold) and (unfold) for finite formulae in the proof of Theorem 10.16 is
the derivability of (•A→ A)→ A, i.e., Proposition 10.3, which is used in the “if” part of the proof of
Lemma 10.17, we get the following.
Theorem 10.20 (Kripke completeness of LA). The formal system LA is also Kripke complete with
respect to LA-frames.
This theorem also implies, with Theorem 10.16, that LAµ is a conservative extension of LA. Sambin[25]
proved that in the intuitionistic version of GL, for any X and A such that X only occurs in A within the
scope of an occurrence of the modal operator, we can construct a formula that acts as the (logically) unique
fixed-point of the propositional function that maps X to A. In case of systems involving the (approx)-rule,
such asmiGLC and LA, it is also known that the fixed-point is quite simple, and can be A[⊤/X ] (cf. [12]).
For example, in such a logic, the recursive type µX.A × •X , which represents the type of infinite streams
of A, is logically representable by A × •⊤16, since ⊢ (A× •⊤)↔ (A× •(A× •⊤)). That is, as a logic, any
recursive type is replaceable by a finite formula that is logically equivalent. However, this is not the case
from the type theoretical point of view, since we need a fixed-point as a set of realizers.
16A can be also a fixed-point of X 7→ A× •X.
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The correspondence between λA and the logical systems can be summarized as Table 117. As seen in
this table, the logic behind λA can be considered the minimal and implicational fragment of the logic of
provability with the “Completeness Principle” and the axiom schema (•A→•B)→ •(A→ B).
11. Concluding remarks
In this paper, a modal typed λ-calculus λA with recursive types has been presented, and its sound-
ness with respect to a realizability interpretation and the convergence of well-typed λ-terms according to
their types have been shown. We have also shown that the modal logic behind λA can be regarded as an
intuitionistic fragment of the logic of provability, and shown its Kripke completeness with respect to intu-
itionistic, (conversely) well-founded and locally linear frames. By the completeness theorem, decidability
of type inhabitance in λA has been also shown. However, the decidability questions for type checking and
typability of λ-terms in λA are still open.
The connection to the logic of provability suggests certain subsystems of λA which includes •A ≺= ••A
instead of A ≺= •A, or does not have •A→ •B ≺= •(A→ B), namely the converse of (K). For example,
it seems that all the examples we have seen in Section 9 can be also captured in the subsystem without
•A→•B ≺= •(A→B). In this sense, the author does not see any apparent significance of this rule in practice
so far. However, he also thinks λA, with this rule, more preferable for a basis for logic of programming,
because it has much simpler formulation. Note that we would need two additional rules, namely (nec) and
(subst) without the equality •A→ •B ≃ •(A→ B).
Although λA was presented as a typed λ-calculus, the author does not think that it is directly applicable
to type systems of programming languages. Since our framework can assert the convergence of derived
programs, typing general recursive programs naturally requires some (classical) arithmetic as seen in the cases
of the 91-function and the sieve of Eratosthenes, which would make mechanical type checking impossible.
Our goal is rather to capture a wider range of programs in the proofs-as-programs paradigm and give an
axiomatic semantics to them preserving the compositionality of programs. We have seen that our approach
is applicable to some interesting programs such as fixed-point combinators and objects with binary methods,
which have not been captured in the conventional frameworks.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 4.4
We prove a more general propositions as follows. The (∼=-uniq)-rule is crucial to the proof.
Proposition A.1. Let n be a non-negative integer, X1, X2, . . ., Xn distinct type variables, and A, B,
C1, C2, . . ., Cn, D1, D2, . . ., Dn type expressions. Let [~C/ ~X] and [ ~D/ ~X] be abbreviations for [C1/X1,
C2/X2, . . . , Cn/Xn] and [D1/X1, D2/X2, . . . , Dn/Xn], respectively. If A ∼ B and Ci ∼ Di for every i
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n), then A[~C/ ~X] ∼ B[ ~D/ ~X].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of A ∼ B, and by cases on the last rule applied in the derivation.
Most cases are straightforward, where in the cases of (∼=-reflex) and (∼=-trans), use Lemma A.2, which will
be shown later. If the last rule is (∼=-fix), then A = µY.A′ and B = A′[µY.A′/Y ] for some Y and A′. We
can assume that Y /∈ {Xi } ∪ FTV (Ci) ∪ FTV (Di) for every i. Then,
µY.A′[~C/ ~X] ∼ A′[~C/ ~X][µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (by (∼=-fix))
= A′[~C/ ~X, µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ FTV (~C))
∼ A′[ ~D/ ~X, µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (by Lemma A.2)
= A′[ ~D/ ~X][µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ FTV ( ~D)).
Since A′[ ~D/ ~X] is also proper in Y by Proposition 2.13.3, we now get µY.A′[~C/ ~X] ∼ µY.A′[ ~D/ ~X] by
(∼=-uniq); and therefore,
A[~C/ ~X] = µY.A′[~C/ ~X]
∼ µY.A′[ ~D/ ~X]
∼ A′[ ~D/ ~X][µY.A′[ ~D/ ~X]/Y ] (by (∼=-fix))
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= A′[ ~D/ ~X, µY.A′[ ~D/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ FTV ( ~D))
= A′[µY.A′/Y ][ ~D/ ~X]
= B[ ~D/ ~X].
If the last rule is (∼=-uniq), then B = µY.B′ for some Y and B′ such that A ∼ B′[A/Y ] and B′ is proper in
Y . We can assume that Y /∈ {Xi } ∪ FTV (Ci) ∪ FTV (Di) for every i. Then,
A[~C/ ~X] ∼ B′[A/Y ][ ~D/ ~X] (by ind. hyp.)
= B′[ ~D/ ~X, A[ ~D/ ~X]/Y ]
= B′[ ~D/ ~X][A[ ~D/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ FTV ( ~D))
∼ B′[ ~D/ ~X][A[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (by using Lemma A.2 twice).
Note that B′[ ~D/ ~X] is also proper in Y by Proposition 2.13.3. Hence, we now get A[~C/ ~X] ∼ µY.B′[ ~D/ ~X]
by (∼=-uniq); and therefore, A[~C/ ~X] ∼ B[ ~D/ ~X]. 
Lemma A.2. Let n be a non-negative integer, X1, X2, . . ., Xn distinct type variables, and A, C1, C2, . . .,
Cn, D1, D2, . . ., Dn type expressions. If Ci ∼ Di for every i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), then A[C1/X1, C2/X2, . . . ,
Cn/Xn] ∼ A[D1/X1, D2/X2, . . . , Dn/Xn].
Proof. By induction on h(A), and by cases on the form of A. The only interesting case is when A = µY.A′
for some Y and A′. We can assume that Y /∈ {Xi } ∪ FTV (Ci) ∪ FTV (Di) for every i.
A[~C/ ~X] = µY.A′[~C/ ~X] (since Y /∈ { ~X } ∪ FTV (~C))
∼ A′[~C/ ~X][µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (by (∼=-fix))
= A′[~C/ ~X, µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ { ~X } ∪ FTV (~C))
∼ A′[ ~D/ ~X, µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (by ind. hyp.)
= A′[ ~D/ ~X][µY.A′[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ FTV ( ~D))
= A′[ ~D/ ~X][A[~C/ ~X]/Y ] (since Y /∈ { ~X } ∪ FTV (~C))
Since A′[ ~D/ ~X] is also proper in Y by Proposition 2.13.3, we now get A[~C/ ~X] ∼ µY.A′[ ~D/ ~X] by (∼=-uniq);
and therefore, A[~C/ ~X] ∼ A[ ~D/ ~X]. 
A.2. Finiteness of Comp(A)/∼=
In this section, we show that Comp(A)/∼= and Comp(A)/≃ are finite sets for every type expression A,
which is parallel to the fact that the set of all subtrees of a regular tree is finite[11, 2].
Definition A.3. Let k be a non-negative integer. We write A ≤k B if and only if C[A/X ] ∼= B for some C
and X such that dp→(C, X) ≤ k.
Note that A ≤ B if and only if A ≤k B for some k, by Proposition 2.15.1.
Proposition A.4. 1. A ≤k A for every k.
2. If A ∼= A′ ≤k B′ ∼= B, then A ≤k B.
3. If k ≤ l, then A ≤k B implies A ≤l B.
4. If A ≤k B, then ETV (A) ⊆ ETV (B).
5. If A ≤k B and B ≤l C, then A ≤k+l C.
Proof. Straightforward from Definition A.3. Use Proposition 4.4 for Item 2, Propositions 2.15.1, 2.12 and
4.11.1 for Item 4, and Propositions 2.15.3 and 2.15.1 for Item 5. 
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Proposition A.5. Suppose that A ≤k B.
1. If Bc∼= = ⊤, then Ac∼= = ⊤.
2. If Bc∼= = •nX, then Ac∼= = •mX for some m ≤ n.
3. If Bc∼= = •n(C→D), then
(a) Ac∼= = •m(C′→D′) for some m, C′ and D′ such that m ≤ n, C′ ∼= C and D′ ∼= D, or
(b) 0 < k, and either A ≤k−1 C or A ≤k−1 D.
Proof. By Definition A.3, there exist some E and Y such that
B ∼= E[A/Y ], and (A.1)
dp→(E, Y ) ≤ k. (A.2)
Note that E is not a⊤-variant from (A.2) by Propositions 2.9.5 and 2.15.1. We can assume that E is canonical
by Propositions 4.19, 4.4 and 4.10. For Item 1, if Bc∼= = ⊤, then ⊤ ∼= B ∼= E[A/X ] by Proposition 4.19; and
hence, A ∼= ⊤ by Proposition 2.10.2 and Theorem 4.14. Thus, we get Ac∼= = ⊤. For Item 2, suppose that
Bc∼= = •nX . By Propositions 4.24.1 and 4.24.2, we get E = •lY for some l ≤ n from (A.1); and therefore,
•nX ∼= E[A/Y ] = •lA by Proposition 4.19, from which we get A ∼= •n−lX by Proposition 4.29.1. Thus,
we get Ac∼= = •mX taking m as m = n − l by Proposition 4.21. As for Item 3, suppose similarly that
Bc∼= = •n(C→D), where D /∼= ⊤. By Propositions 4.21, 4.29.1 and 4.23.1, we get either
E = •lY for some l ≤ n, or (A.3)
E = •n(C′→D′) for some C′ and D′ /∼= ⊤ (A.4)
from (A.1). If (A.3) is the case, then •n(C → D) ∼= B ∼= E[A/Y ] = •lA from (A.1); and hence, A ∼=
•n−l(C →D) by Proposition 4.29.1. Therefore, (a) holds by Proposition 4.21 considering n − l as m. On
the other hand, in case of (A.4), we get •n(C→D) ∼= B ∼= E[A/Y ] = •n(C′[A/Y ]→D′[A/Y ]) from (A.1);
and hence,
C ∼= C′[A/Y ] and D ∼= D′[A/Y ]
by Propositions 4.29.1 and 4.29.2. Therefore, (b) holds, since (A.2) and (A.4) imply dp→(C
′, Y ) ≤ k− 1 or
dp→(D
′, Y ) ≤ k − 1 by Definition 2.14. 
Proposition A.6. Suppose that A ≤ B.
1. If Bc∼= = ⊤, then Ac∼= = ⊤.
2. If Bc∼= = •nX, then Ac∼= = •mX for some m ≤ n.
3. If Bc∼= = •n(C→D), then
(a) Ac∼= = •m(C′→D′) for some m, C′ and D′ such that m ≤ n, C′ ∼= C and D′ ∼= D,
(b) A ≤ C, or
(c) A ≤ D.
Proof. Obvious from Proposition A.5 
Proposition A.7. If A ≤k B[C/X ], then either
(a) there exists some A′ such that A′ ≤k B and A ∼= A′[C/X ], or
(b) dp→(B, X) ≤ k and A ≤k−dp→(B,X) C.
Proof. We can assume that A, B and C are canonical by Propositions A.4.2, 4.19, 4.10 and 4.4. Suppose
that A ≤k B[C/X ]. If X /∈ ETV (B), then B[C/X ] ∼= B and A[C/X ] ∼= A by Propositions 4.16, 4.11.1
and A.4.4. Hence, (a) holds considering A as A′ in such a case. Therefore, we only consider the case that
X ∈ ETV (B). The proof proceeds by induction on k, and by cases on the forms of B and C.
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Case: B = ⊤. In this case, A = ⊤ by Proposition A.5 since B[C/X ] = ⊤; and hence, (a) holds considering
⊤ as A′.
Case: B = •nY for some n and Y . Note that X = Y by the assumption that X ∈ ETV (B); and hence,
dp→(B, X) = 0 by Definition 2.14. We now consider the form of C.
Subcase: C = ⊤. In this subcase, B[C/X ] = •n⊤ ∼= ⊤. Hence, (b) holds by Propositions A.4.1 and A.4.2
since A ∼= ⊤ by Proposition A.5.
Subcase: C = •mZ for some m and Z. In this subcase, B[C/X ] = •n+mZ. Hence, A = •lZ for some l
such that l ≤ n+m by Proposition A.5. Therefore, if l ≤ m, then A ≤0 C; and hence, (b) holds, because
A ≤0 C implies A ≤k−0 C by Proposition A.4.3. Otherwise, i.e., if l > m, then let A
′ = •l−mX . Then,
A′ ≤0 B and A′[C/X ] = (•l−mX)[•mZ/X ] = •lZ = A. Thus, we get (a), since A′ ≤0 B implies A′ ≤k B
by Proposition A.4.3.
Subcase: C = •m(D→ E) for some m, D and E such that E /∼= ⊤. Since B[C/X ] = •n+m(D→ E), by
Proposition A.5, either
A = •l(D′→E′), l ≤ n+m, D′ ∼= D and E′ ∼= E for some l, D′ and E′, or (A.5)
0 < k, and either A ≤k−1 D or A ≤k−1 E. (A.6)
If (A.5) is the case, we get (a) or (b) similarly to the previous subcase. On the other hand, in case of
(A.6), either A ≤k−1 D or A ≤k−1 E implies A ≤k−0 C by Proposition A.4.5, since D ≤1 C and E ≤1 C.
Therefore, (b) holds in this case.
Case: B = •n(D→ E) for some n, D and E such that E /∼= ⊤. Since B[C/X ] = •n(D[C/X ]→ E[C/X ]),
by Proposition A.5,
A = •m(D′→E′), m ≤ n, D′ ∼= D[C/X ] and E′ ∼= E[C/X ] for some m, D′ and E′, (A.7)
0 < k and A ≤k−1 D[C/X ], or (A.8)
0 < k and A ≤k−1 E[C/X ]. (A.9)
In case of (A.7), we get (a) by Proposition A.4.3 taking A′ as A′ = •m(D→ E). If (A.8) is the case, by
induction hypothesis, we have either
(a′) there exists some A′ such that A′ ≤k−1 D and A ∼= A′[C/X ], or
(b′) dp→(D, X) ≤ k − 1 and A ≤k−1−dp→(D,X) C.
If (a′) holds, we get A′ ≤k B from A
′ ≤k−1 D by Proposition A.4.5, since D ≤1 B. Thus, (a
′) yields
(a). On the other hand, note that dp→(B, X) = min(dp→(D, X), dp→(E, X)) + 1 ≤ dp→(D, X) + 1
by Definition 2.14. Hence, if (b′) holds, we get dp→(B, X) ≤ k from dp→(D, X) ≤ k − 1, and also get
A ≤k−dp
→
(B,X) C from A ≤k−1−dp
→
(D,X) C by Proposition A.4.3. Thus, (b
′) yields (b). The proof for the
case (A.9) is similar. 
Proposition A.8. If A ≤ B[C/X ], then either
(a) there exists some A′ such that A′ ≤ B and A ∼= A′[C/X ], or
(b) A ≤ C.
Proof. Obvious from Proposition A.7 
Lemma A.9. If A ≤k µX.B, then there exists some A′ such that A′ ≤k B and A ∼= A′[µX.B/X ].
Proof. Suppose that A ≤k µX.B. The proof proceeds by induction on k. If µX.B ∼= ⊤, then it suffices
to let A′ = B. In fact, A′ ≤k B by Proposition A.4.1. Furthermore, A ≤k µX.B implies A ∼= ⊤ by
Propositions A.4.2, A.5 and 4.19; and hence, we get A ∼= µX.B ∼= A′[µX.B/X ] by (∼=-fix). Therefore, we
only consider the case that µX.B /∼= ⊤, that is, µX.B is not a⊤-variant, below. Since µX.B ∼= B[µX.B/X ],
by Propositions A.4.2 and A.7,
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(a) there exists some A′ such that A′ ≤k B and A ∼= A′[µX.B/X ], or
(b) dp→(B, X) ≤ k and A ≤k−dp→(B,X) µX.B.
The proof is completed by showing that (b) also implies (a). Suppose that (b) is the case. Since µX.B is
not a ⊤-variant, we get dp→(B, X) > 0 by Propositions 2.15.7 and 2.15.9. Hence, by induction hypothesis,
A′ ≤k−dp
→
(B,X) B, which implies A
′ ≤k B by Proposition A.4.3, and A ∼= A′[µX.B/X ] for some A′. 
Proposition A.10. Comp(A)/∼= and Comp(A)/≃ are finite sets.
Proof. It suffices to show that Comp(A)/∼= is finite, since ∼= implies ≃. The proof proceeds by induction
on h(A), and by cases on the form of A.
Case: A = X for some X. In this case, by Proposition A.6, B ≤ A if and only if B ∼= X . Therefore,
Comp(A)/∼= is a singleton.
Case: A = •C for some C. In this case, since •C = (•X)[C/X ], by Proposition A.8, B ≤ A implies
(a) there exists some B′ such that B′ ≤ •X and B ∼= B′[C/X ], or
(b) B ≤ C.
Note that (a) implies B′ ∼= •X or B′ ∼= X by Proposition A.6. Hence, Comp(A)/∼= is finite by Proposi-
tion 4.4, since so is Comp(C)/∼= by induction hypothesis.
Case: A = C →D for some C and D. Similarly, by Proposition A.6, B ≤ A implies either (a) B ∼= A, (b)
B ≤ C, or (c) B ≤ D. Hence, Comp(A)/∼= is finite since so are Comp(C)/∼= and Comp(D)/∼= by induction
hypothesis.
Case: A = µX.C for some X and C. In this case, by Lemma A.9, B ≤ A implies there exists some B′
such that B′ ≤ C and B ∼= B′[A/X ]. Hence, Comp(A)/∼= is finite since so is Comp(C)/∼= by induction
hypothesis. 
75
